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ABSTRACT 
 
There is an increasing gap between the progress of technological systems and the successful 
exploitation of these systems through cyber-attack. Whilst the mechanism and scope of cyberspace is 
progressing with each passing day, risk factors and the ability to process the required amount of data 
from cyberspace efficiently are proving to be major obstacles to achieving desired outcomes from 
cyber operations. This, coupled with the dramatic increase in the numbers of cyber attackers, who are 
constantly producing new ways of attacking and paralysing cyber systems for political or financial 
gain, is a critical issue for countries that have linked their major infrastructures with Internet 
applications. The defensive methods currently applied to counter these evolving attacks are no longer 
sufficient, due to their preventive and reactive nature. This research has developed a new Active 
Situational Awareness theoretical model for Active Defence that aims to enhance the agility and 
quality of cyber situational awareness in organisations in order to counter cyber attacks.  
 
Situational Awareness (SA) is a crucial component in every organisation. It helps in the assessment of 
an immediate situation in relation to the environment. Current SA models adopt a reactive attitude, 
which responds to events and works in passive manner to any progressing enemy cyber attack. This 
creates a defensive mind-set and consequently influences the operator to process and utilise knowledge 
only within the concept of attack prevention. Thus, one can assume that operators will only gather 
certain knowledge after the occurrence of an attack, instead of actively searching for new intelligence 
to create new knowledge about the cyber attack before it takes place.  
 
This research study introduces a new approach that incorporates an Active Defence posture; namely, a 
‘winning attitude’ that conforms to the military stratagems of Sun Tzu, where operators always engage 
attackers directly in order to create new knowledge in an agile manner by deploying active 
intelligence-gathering techniques to inform active defence postures in cyberspace. This also allows the 
system being protected to remain one step ahead of the attackers to ultimately defeat them and thwart 
any costly attacks.  
 
To back these statements, this study issued a survey to 200 cyber defence and security experts in order 
to collect data on their opinions concerning the current state of Active SA. Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) was then employed to analyse the data gathered from the survey. The results of the 
analysis revealed significant importance of Active Offensive Intelligence gathering in enhancing Cyber 
SA. The SEM showed there is a significant impact on SA Agility and Quality from Active Intelligence 
gathering activities.  
 
Further to this, the SEM results informed the design of the serious gaming environments utilised in this 
research to verify the SEM causality model. Also, the SEM informed the design of a SA assessment 
metric, where a behavioural anchor rating scale was used along with ground truth to measure 
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participant SA performance. The results of this experiment revealed that there was 2 times better 
enhancement in cyber Situational awareness among those who did utilise active measures compared 
with participants who did not which mean almost double and this shows the importance of offensive 
intelligence gathering in enhancing cyber SA and speed up defender decision making and OODA loop.  
 
This research provided for the first time a novel theory for active cyber SA that is aligned with military 
doctrine. Also, a novel assessment framework and approaches for evaluating and quantifying cyber SA 
performance was developed in this research study. Finally, a serious gaming environment was 
developed for this research and used to evaluate the active SA theory which has an impact on training, 
techniques and practice   
 
Deception utilisation by Active groups revealed the importance of having deception capabilities as part 
of active tools that help operators to understand attackers’ intent and motive, and give operators more 
time to control the impact of cyber attacks. However, incorrect utilisation of deception capabilities 
during the experiment led operators to lose control over cyber attacks. 
 
Active defence is required for future cyber security. However, this trend towards the militarisation of 
cyberspace demands new or updated laws and regulations at an international level. Active intelligence 
methods define the principal capability at the core of the new active situational awareness model in 
order to deliver enhanced agility and quality in cyber SA.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The world of cyber operations has reached a crisis point, where on the one side operational technology 
is progressing at a breakneck speed, while on the other risk factors are increasing at an equivalent rate 
due to increased hacking activities. For example, since Web 2.0 there has been a proliferation of cyber 
attacks (Orielly, 2005). Several countries have reported major damage caused by cyber attacks, which 
include complete destruction of critical national infrastructures, severe disruption to financial activities 
and other essential services (power, telecommunications, air traffic management, etc), as well as theft 
of national security data. The magnitude of the crisis can be tracked back to instances of the suspected 
involvement of governmental agencies in exploiting the weak security infrastructure of other countries 
to cause damage, or for unlawful gains.  
 
For example, the Iranian government has already held the US and Israel responsible for masterminding 
the Stuxnet (computer worm) attack on its uranium enrichment centrifuges (Greenwald & MacAskill, 
2013), while Syria has openly deployed a hacker group named the ‘Syrian Electronic Army’ that is 
engaged in bringing down, defacing or otherwise maligning any sites that carry anti-Syrian government 
content (Norman, 2011).  
 
Similarly, China has also been found to be steadily increasing its espionage network in recent times, 
according to the report furnished by SecureWorks, a leading security services provider, which recorded 
7.7 million attempted attacks from China in 2008. At the same time, China has also released a hacking 
toolkit onto the market named ‘Leopard in a Hole’, which is available at a price ranging from $20 to 
$500, and which can help in penetration tests that are used to identify and exploit SQL injection flaws 
(Dwyer, 2009). This state of affairs clearly has precipitated a new era in global cyber warfare, which 
might be more devastating than what the world witnessed in the earlier world wars.  
 
The basic reason why this state of affairs exists stems from the fact that hackers enjoy huge advantages 
when dealing with traditional cyber security practices, since in these cases they remain in a position to 
decide on the place, time and method of attack. The defender who is a victim of these attacks cannot 
easily gather any clues about impending attacks, as a result of adopting a passive defence posture. 
From a cyber security perspective, this passive, handicapped state of the defenders hinders their Cyber 
Situation Awareness (SA). At this point, the issue of attitudes becomes very pertinent, since it is the 
defensive attitude of the defenders that prompts them to react after the occurrence of an attack, thereby 
losing the battle at the very first round. The current cyber security controls described above are 
inadequate to counter these evolving cyber attacks, due to their preventive and reactive nature. The 
passive approach currently adopted in cyber security only allows defenders to react after a cyber 
incident, which is to all intents and practical purposes too late because the effect has already taken 
place.  
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With this in mind, if one considers cyber warfare to be an important and integral component of 
contemporary warfare then one cannot neglect the importance of adopting a winning, active attitude. 
This is necessary to remaining always one step ahead of the attackers in terms of military strategy and 
execution. From the perspective of cyber security, this winning, active attitude can be termed ‘active 
defence’, whereby defenders should always engage the attackers by exploiting active intelligence-
gathering techniques by constantly creating and utilising new knowledge to ensure impenetrable 
protection of cyber infrastructures. However, this proposition requires validation through reliable 
measures and critical assessment. With this in mind, this study critically investigates the efficacy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of its own active defence model, one that conforms to the military 
stratagems of Sun Tzu, the legendary military strategist of yesteryear, to ascertain whether this model 
is more capable of enhancing SA agility and quality than the existing traditional SA models.  
 
This research explores state-of-the-art SA by investigating the existing SA models and identifying their 
limitations when applied in the cyber domain. The main goal of this research is to introduce a new 
theoretical framework for active cyber SA and demonstrate its value for enhancing overall cyber SA in 
practice through serious gaming experiments. Drawing on the expertise of cybersecurity subject matter 
experts from across the world, Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is used in this research to verify 
the causality of the new theoretical model and to test whether and to what extent active offensive 
intelligence-gathering enhances cyber situational awareness agility and quality while handling a cyber 
incident. A serious gaming environment, a cyber range testbed, was developed to: (i) facilitate the 
assessment of participants’ SA when the new active SA theory is employed in practice; and (ii) 
specifically test whether participant cyber SA is enhanced when an active offensive capability is 
introduced. For that purpose, a behavioural anchor rating scale was used, and a cyber SA assessment 
framework was developed based on the findings of the SEM. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND/PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Steady growth in cyber crime has been observed since the mid-1980s, and the present situation has 
reached a state where cyber attackers hold enough power to destroy the critical infrastructures of any 
nation (e.g. power, telecommunications etc). The growth rate of cyber crime further consolidates the 
above view. In 2008, the FBI found a 33% rise in individual crime complaints in their investigation 
(Rowe & Rothstein, 2004), while Symantec, the maker of the famous Norton anti-virus system, found 
and blocked 5.5 billion malicious attacks in 2011, which is 81% higher than the volume of such attacks 
they found and blocked in 2010. And the finding of most concern is that the majority of such attacks 
targeted social networks and mobile phones (Albanesius, 2012). 
 
However, it is not that the experts were not tracking the cause of the above phenomenon. In the 1990s, 
the experts (Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Sarter & Woods, 1995) identified it as an outcome of the 
increasing gap between the progress of systems and successful exploitation of the same, which can be 
termed as a mismatch between the required and existing levels of SA. They also pointed out that it has 
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become virtually impossible to cope with the increasing dynamism of cyber technology and lethality of 
cyber attacks without quality SA. The inability to interpret the environment and be able to answer the 
fundamental question about the cyber situation among cyber operators, allows the disruptive abilities of 
cyber attackers to cause damage, and sets the current balance of cyber power in favour of the attackers 
Geers (2011).  
 
The gravity of the consequences suffered from the absence of an established way to redefine the 
current Computer Network Operation (CNO) in achieving SA could result in horrific breakdown of 
cyber infrastructures that help run all critical infrastructures across the globe. This is illustrated by the 
following instances of cyber attacks and their associated consequences:   
 
 In 2001, a 15-year-old hacker nicknamed MafiaBoy worked his way into the portals of top 
online companies and caused over US $1 billion financial losses (Verton, 2002);  
 In 2007, Israeli cyber attackers intruded into the Syrian Air Defence ICT infrastructure and 
deactivated it, which enabled them to demolish the Syrian nuclear reactor (Fulghum, Wall & 
Butler, 2007);  
 This attack prompted Syria to form the ‘Syrian Electronic Army’, which is a hacker group 
that is engaged in bringing down, defacing or otherwise maligning sites that carry anti-Syrian 
government content;  
 Israel and the US allegedly masterminded the Stuxnet computer worm attack on Iranian 
uranium enrichment centrifuges in 2010 (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013);  
 This attack prompted Iran to respond with its ‘Iranian Cyber Army’ (Rudner, 2013);  
 The Mandiant Report published by a US agency showed that cyber espionage by PLA 
(China) had been hacking the New York Times’ computer systems since 2012 to mid-2013 
(Feakin, 2013);  
 The US drew up a list of potential overseas targets for US cyber attacks within a project 
named ‘Offensive Cyber Effects Operations’ (OCEO), which clearly suggests that the US 
government is stepping up its cyber offensive capabilities (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013).  
 
The above instances highlight the fact that critical political, social and financial operations with a cyber 
dimension can be brought down from a totally unknown quarter and for unknown reasons. Further, it 
substantiates the fact that cyber security should evolve from “a technical discipline to a strategic 
concept” (Geers, 2011: 9), in the way that any strategic challenge requires strategic solutions. 
Moreover, when looking into these problems, there is no theoretical cyber SA framework or practical 
model that addresses the problems discussed herein. At this point, one realises the shortcomings of the 
traditional SA models, which are driven by a passive attitude of preventing cyber attacks. Hence, there 
is a clear need to adopt an active approach to cyber SA that would apply new knowledge gained from 
cyber intelligence gathering activities along with other prior knowledge to engage the attacker in a 
manner that takes advantage of this new knowledge. It is only recently that active defence has come to 
prominence and is being discussed more openly in public, and so adopting this approach to cyber SA 
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could change the balance of power between players. However, due to the legal and political restrictions 
on applying active SA, this research has developed a serious gaming environment that provides a 
legitimate environment in which to experiment and test the validity of active SA theory and practice so 
that no law was broken while pursuing this research. Active defence is a force multiplier in the defence 
of a realm, and the ultimate question is whether nations can afford not to take up active SA, given the 
national strategic importance of protecting high value assets like the Critical Network Infrastructure 
(CNI) of a nation’s economy and its day to day operation, or stay passive and allow cyber attackers 
who have adopted the active method to cause disruption to the nation.  
1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate whether an active offensive approach is more capable of 
enhancing cyber SA agility and quality than the existing SA models. This aim stems from an ultimate 
aim of contributing to the understanding of the concept of cyber situational awareness as well as 
deriving new cyber capability.  Accordingly, the study contains five objectives: 
 
1. Determine and critically analyse the current SA models and identify the key 
dimensions and variables for active cyber SA; 
2. Develop a theoretical framework for active SA 
3. Evaluate active SA deployment in a serious gaming environment; 
4. Develop a method framework for assessing cyber SA; and 
5. Empirically assess the significance of effect and implications of active defence in 
enhancing cyber SA agility and quality. 
1.3 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
 
The significance of this research rests on certain presumptions: that it would cover the gap in the 
existing literature, would prevent losses of various dimensions and magnitudes, would contribute to the 
process of creating a power balance among countries, and would ensure safety in all commercial and 
general cyber transactions for individuals and organisations.  
 
This study has found no literature that emphasises adopting a winning/proactive attitude while utilising 
SA in protecting cyber systems, or any literature that recommends utilising an active SA model for the 
same purpose. From these perspectives, this study stands unique. Similarly, it can be said that 
successful deployment of the new active cyber SA model developed in this research will enable the 
operators of cyber systems to increase the likelihood of successfully deterring cyber attacks, which in 
turn will save them from any associated losses that might take place otherwise. Alongside this, it can 
be easily assumed that the possession of the proposed active SA model will create a power balance 
among countries, since possession of the same will bolster the SA of all countries, where no one 
country will be able to attack another country by exploiting its weak SA. Similarly, implementation of 
this model in practice will enable all organisations and individuals to seamlessly operate in the cyber 
world, as it will maximise protection for them.  
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1.4 LAY OUT OF THESIS  
 
Chapter 2 of this study is designed to explore the literature in the area of cyber security, defence and 
situational awareness in order to develop and design a theoretical, hypothesised framework for active 
offensive cyber SA and make the case for active defence. This is achieved by providing a brief 
background about cyber security issues that shows how the current cyber security counter initiative is 
not sufficient for facing the current evolved cyber environment due to its passivity. Also, it shows why 
an active, offensive approach that adopts military philosophy is better for enhancing cyber security. 
The legal aspect of self-defence is also discussed in this chapter and different examples are given to 
make the case for active SA. 
 
Chapter 3 begins a review of research methodologies. In turn, the chapter seeks to filter through the 
methods and select a handful of methods and, where necessary, establish a combination of them and/or 
set out a procedure determining which method to use and when. Within this chapter, data analysis 
techniques are discussed, as this research utilises SEM to verify the hypothesised theoretical 
framework, which are then used to develop the serious gaming environment (discussed in this chapter 
in detail), a SA awareness behavioural anchor rating scheme, and a SA measurement framework and 
marking scheme based on simulated ground truth. This chapter also provides the type of instrument 
used to collect data, and the method of analysis. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the structural equation modelling of the hypothesised theoretical framework 
discussed in chapter two using the data collected from the electronic survey (Appendix 1). The 
structural model was produced after this research had conducted several types of test prior to the 
exploratory factor analysis. Then, confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test the consistency of 
the construct and to determine whether the data fit the hypothesised measurement model.  
 
Chapter 5 explores the analysis of the experiments’ results conducted using the serious gaming 
environment to test whether active offensive cyber intelligence could enhance cyber SA. Also, 
additional tests were conducted to test the impact of education, the utilisation of deception and the 
utilisation of offensive hacking in enhancing cyber SA. Independent Sample T-Test and One-Way 
ANOVA were used in this analysis. 
 
Chapter 6 critically discusses the findings previously covered in chapters two, four and five, and 
provides a justification for how active offensive cyber intelligence could enhance cyber SA agility and 
quality. The main theoretical contribution of this research is a novel and robust approach and 
framework for cyber SA where for the first time an active offensive intelligence activity that aligned 
correctly with military doctrine is integrated into the SA model which provides quality information that 
enhance the agility of awareness. Methodologically, this research provided a serious gaming 
environment as a robust testing environment that enabled this research to run cyber war game to test 
the impact of active SA model in enhancing cyber security. Also, an assessment framework was 
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developed using the power of statistic for the first time to evaluate the efficiency, efficacy and 
effectiveness of individual’s cyber SA. Finally, this chapter discusses the limitations and issues that 
might follow the adoption of an active offensive approach. Finally, recommendations and a conclusion 
are provided at the end of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.0 OVERVIEW 
 
Since the mid-1980s, experts on cyber systems have been observing an increasing gap between the 
progress of systems and successful exploitation of the technology. While the mechanisms and scope of 
the cyber world have been leaping forward with each passing day, risk factors and the need to process 
the required amount of data from the ocean of information in less time and with less effort are proving 
major roadblocks to achieving desired outcomes from cyber operations. Altogether, the experts (Tadda 
et al., 2006; Sudit et al., 2005; Dutt et al., 2013) point to the following two factors that demand quality 
cyber situational awareness, and the ability to apply the same, from its operators: 
 
 Coping with increasing dynamism of cyber technology 
 Coping with increasing lethality of cyber attack 
 
The first factor, i.e. coping with increasing dynamism of cyber technology, has reached a point where it 
has become almost unmanageable for cyber operators without quality situation awareness. The second 
factor is increasingly becoming a nightmare for those countries that have already associated their major 
infrastructures with Internet applications, as the population of cyber attackers has dramatically 
increased. They are constantly producing novel ways of attacking and paralysing cyber systems for 
criminal or terrorism gains, e.g. political or financial gains where active defence is more likely to be 
justified when cyber attacks are against CNI. 
 
It would be pertinent to recall that the aim of this study is to ascertain whether an all-pervasive, Active 
SA Model (henceforth ASAM) proposed in this research can save time, increase productivity and 
empower the end user to remain always one step ahead of their enemies in any cyber situation. 
Therefore, this aim also governs the structure and content of the literature review. This chapter reviews 
the background and the present state of SA research in order to determine the salient variables of 
existing SA models and their shortcomings, which will inform the methodology for validating the 
proposed ASAM.  
 
This chapter explores the current literature in the areas of cyber security and defence, and situational 
awareness, covered in five main sections. In the first section, a brief background about the cyber threats 
and cyber security issues is set out that shows how current cyber security counter initiatives are not 
sufficient for the current evolved cyber environment. Also, this section provides an insight into military 
doctrine, showing how military science could be utilised to enhance cyber security. The second section 
explores current SA models and critically reviews their variables to determine the shortcomings of 
current SA model when deployed it in the cyber domain. Also, this section exposes the problem with 
the current passive approach, and why cyber SA needs to adopt an offensive, active approach to 
deterring cyber incidents. At the end of this section, a legal aspect about cyber self defence is covered 
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that explores different countries’ laws when it comes to cyber defence. The third and fourth sections,  
critically synthesises the main points from the literature reviewed the previous section, and makes the 
case for active cyber SA. A hypothetical, theoretical framework is provided for ASAM, and a process 
model is developed. Finally, a summary of this chapter is provided in the fifth section. This chapter 
thus aims to critically review the current literature in order to develop and design a hypothesised 
theoretical framework for active cyber SA and make the case for active defence. 
2.1 BRIEF BACKGROUND 
2.1.1 Evolved Cyber Environment  
 
The disruptive abilities of the cyber attackers have influenced cyber security, causing it to evolve from 
“a technical discipline to a strategic concept” (Geers, 2011), since strategic challenges demand 
strategic solutions. The significance of the same lies in the fact that all political, social and financial 
functions today have a cyber dimension, where they always run the risk of getting attacked from totally 
unknown quarters, and for unknown reasons. Consequently, the entire system could collapse, or, 
worse, sensitive data could be stolen without the knowledge of the operator, and these data could then 
be exploited against the country to which the operator belongs.  
 
Geers (2011) categorically states that the current balance of cyber power favours the attacker. It is for 
this reason that world leaders (the G8) have increasingly expressed their worries regarding system 
breakdown or cyber espionage (Cody, 2007). An investigation into cyber crime conducted by the FBI 
in 2008 found a 33% rise in individual crime complaints, which was tantamount to $264.6 million 
(Rowe & Rothstein, 2004). Altogether, cyber attacks, under the name of ‘information warfare’, have 
become commonplace events since early 1990s and were later dubbed as strategic warfare (Molander 
et al., 1998: 3), before earning two more nicknames: cyberwar and netwar (Strategic Information, 
2012). Cyberwar emanates from financial, political and fanatical aggression, all of which can leave a 
deadly imprint, as in the macabre instance of 9/11.  
2.1.2 A Few Instances of Attacks  
 
The visionary work of Rona (1976) regarding an information war suggested as early as 1976 that 
computer networks can be both an asset and a liability for an organisation, since their high utility value 
means they are liable to come under attack, and the information flow within any command-and-control 
system is bound to be vulnerable to jamming, overloading or spoofing by an attacker (Van Creveld, 
1987). 
 
The instances of abusing databases and networks to achieve military objectives started gaining 
momentum in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union launched its Military Technological Revolution 
(MTR). The gravity of cyber attacks lies in the fact that they can damage several systems in several 
ways, ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) to the destruction of critical infrastructure (Eichin & 
Rochlis, 1989; Mishra, 2003). For example, US President Obama announced in May 2009 that cyber 
attackers who had already disrupted power supplies in several countries were now probing those 
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countries’ electrical grids (The White House, 2009). Obama’s views were corroborated by journalists, 
who cited instances of cyber attacks in Brazil which affected millions of civilians in 2005 and 2007, 
where nobody could trace the origins of such attacks (Aitoro, 2009). 
 
There are other instances, too. In 1999, unknown hackers tried to disrupt NATO military operations in 
the Kosovo war (Fulghum, 2006; Fulghumet al., 2007), while in 2007 an Israeli cyber attack paralysed 
the Syrian air defence network system right before its air force attacked a Syrian nuclear reactor 
(Fulghumet al., 2007; Lewis, 2002). In 2009, the Canadian research group named Information Warfare 
Monitor discovered GhostNet, a cyber espionage network comprising more than 1,000 computers 
across 103 countries that aimed to collect diplomatic, political, economic and military information 
(Information Warfare Monitor, 2009). In 2001, a 15-year-old student from Montreal, under the 
nickname MafiaBoy, caused over $1 billion financial damage to the top online companies by 
conducting a DoS attack (Verton, 2002). In another instance of DoS, the Burmese government blocked 
its entire network while cracking down on its political protestors (Tran, 2007).  
 
The attack process in general involves steps such as reconnaissance, scanning, obtaining access, 
retaining access, covering tracks and hiding (Kjaerland 2005). According to Geers (2011), intention-
wise cyber attacks can be categorised into three types: 
  
I. Targeting confidential data 
II. Targeting the integrity of information 
III. Targeting the availability of information resources (DoS) 
 
While the first type of attack aims to encompass any unauthorised acquisition of information by 
observing communication patterns, the second type of attack aims to sabotage data for criminal, 
political or military reasons. There are even instances of cyber criminals encrypting the data on a 
victim’s hard drive and then demanding a huge ransom in exchange for the decryption key such as 
ransomware. The third type of attack aims to prevent authorised users from accessing their systems or 
the data required for performing certain tasks. This type is popularly known as a DoS attack. The main 
challenge facing cyber defence is that Internet technology evolves day by day, which makes it very 
difficult for operators to keep pace of the same (Geers, 2007a, 2011).  
 
2.1.3 Basic Methods of Hacking 
 
There are a number of methods that hackers use to invade computers that are online (Mitnick & Simon, 
2002: 33). Often, it is hard to tell whether one’s computer has been invaded until it is too late to 
remedy. In fact, the threat of zero day attacks raised this problem, where the zero day attack effect is 
unknown to the defenders. One truth that is not debatable is how resourceful, cunning and smart the 
computer invaders can be. Indeed, these con artists can even sometimes use one’s weaknesses to 
invade the computers. Hackers are capable of getting into computers and tricking the owners into 
revealing sensitive information. In addition, they are also capable of getting onto the Internet and even 
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stopping the computer owners from accessing the Internet themselves (Erickson, 2008: 109). Hackers 
often target large companies; however, if individuals are in the wrong place at the wrong time they may 
also find themselves the targets. This is because the cyber attacker has the ability to take away the 
security, safety and peace of mind of the computer user (Bradley, 2006: 37). This raises a problem for 
home users who connect their home appliances (Internet of Things) to the network (house automation), 
where security controls are usually very basic due to performance restrictions. Moreover, the attackers 
have the ability to attack the computers regardless of the number of software that the users have 
installed to prevent them.  
  
Social engineering is the driver of all cyber invasion activities (Wang, 2006: 178). In fact, scholars 
have noted that hacking and social engineering are like “two peas in the same pod” (Loch, Carr & 
Warkentin, 1992: 2). This is because hacking is the physical aspect, or rather the outcome, of the social 
engineering or ‘mindset’ of the invasion activities. At the outset, social engineering is a way in which 
the hackers can get information from their victims. The hackers can do this by knowing their victims or 
by winning their trust, and by making them comfortable enough so that they will give them all the 
information they need for the attack. Thus, based on the victims’ responses, cyber hackers can choose 
to get quick information or use the longer route (e.g. hackers can collect intelligence about the target 
using passive methods where no interaction with target takes place, or use offensive scanning and 
social engineering to get into the target system without wasting their time looking for weaknesses to 
exploit). In addition, the hackers’ choice of the route to take depends on the length of time the hacker 
has to devote to all of the work.  
 
According to Adams (1990: 323), a good social engineer must not go into a person’s computer to steal 
information; instead, the best approach would be to make the individual comfortable and win the 
person’s trust. In this regard, a social engineer might choose to play the role of a customer service 
representative to get enough information to invade someone’s computer. For instance, when a client 
calls a cashier in a bank to inquire about some vital information, the cashier might want to know some 
verification details, such as the account name, the account number and even the social security number 
(Jacquith, 2007: 67). When the client gives this information, they expect to receive service in return. 
Suppose this information is given to a cyber attacker posing as a cashier, and then this information is 
given to the hackers without the knowledge of the customer. This means that, through social 
engineering, hackers exploit loopholes to obtain the information they want. Thus, most of these types 
of attacker are former employees who have left the company with lots of bitterness.  
 
These individuals can also develop malware which they use to harm computers in the same way that 
other hackers can. Indeed, worms, Trojans and viruses are some of the malwares used by attackers to 
commit cyber crimes. For instance, when attackers plant worms in a victim’s computer, they use the 
computer’s own system resources to the extent that its speed reduces. In addition to slowing down, the 
invaded computer can show pop-up error messages even when the system is not in use (Johnson, 2013; 
Opala & Rahman, 2013). However, the worst thing with these malwares is that they replicate and 
multiply to such an extent that they can do serious damage to an infected computer. In addition, when 
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they have multiplied to high enough levels they are capable of erasing the computer’s files, and thereby 
the cyber terrorist succeeds. If this happens to financial institutes, this could lead to loss of money, 
which might affect the national economy. 
 
Along with Trojans, viruses and worms, the cyber attackers can use botnet attacks. According to Opala 
& Rahman (2013), a botnet is a computer that has been set up to relay or transfer information to a main 
system; the information to be transferred can vary from personal information to financial or highly 
confidential information. However, most of the botnet attacks take place without the host’s knowledge. 
In addition, they mostly take place at home, because home computer users hardly ever install firewalls 
on their computers. Moreover, home users hardly ever take security measures to protect themselves and 
their computers from cyber attack. This is due to the fact that security products are expensive, and 
usually bring added complexity to home users, who are not experts in dealing with security incidents. 
In contrast, big companies buy licenses which, when used appropriately, can protect their employees 
from malicious invasion. Home users often assume that, because they are not connected to large 
companies, they are thus hardly part of the hackers’ plans (Grow, Elgin & Herbst, 2006). Once the bot 
is inside the computer, the attackers can use a root kit to manipulate the data in the system as well as 
maintain access to the invaded computer (Grow et al., 2006). To do this, the hackers conceal their 
presence by erasing log activity and the system log. In addition, the development of a house automation 
solution that allows multiple appliances to be connected to the Internet so that the user can control it 
remotely raises new threats, where hackers can hack into such appliances and use them for malicious 
purposes.  
 
Click fraud has also been used by hackers, though as a less intrusive attack. According to Grow et al. 
(2006), click fraud happens when a person clicks an advertisement or a banner, so that the click rate for 
that advert is significantly increased. Thus, this happens even when the person doing the clicking is not 
interested in the particular advertisement – its statistics increase nevertheless. Similarly, experienced 
hackers use auto click software or automated programs to run some websites. A good example is the 
case of the California hacker who was arrested for threatening Google, Inc. with releasing self-made 
click fraud software (Muller, 2008). The companies that use click fraud benefit from the ads over the 
Internet in unjust fashion, which encourages malpractice; thus, it is considered a legal issue.  
 
Spam, on the other hand, is when attackers flood the Internet or email address of the victim with 
numerous copies of the same message (Georgala, Kosmopoulos, & Paliouras, 2014). They send these 
messages to people who would otherwise have not chosen to receive such messages. However, users 
think this method of attack is less harmful, since they only see junk files of messages and 
advertisements in their address books. The spammers identify a few email addresses from which they 
start their attack, and in the process extend their invasion.  
 
Another method the attackers will often use is Denial of Service (DoS). This method does not take 
confidential or sensitive information from the victim but only attempts to annoy the user. This is 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 13 
because through the denial of service, the hackers are able to stop the user from accessing services on 
the system. The DoS can be very devastating to the victim, since they can crash his or her services. In 
this regard, DoS attacks are considered more similar to program exploitation than network-based 
exploitation (Adams, 1990: 299). However, for hackers to benefit through this method, they must take 
advantage of poor vendor implementation.  
 
Hackers can also use the phishing method, which attempts to manipulate victims to voluntarily give out 
the information that is crucial to the invasion. Through phishing, users are manipulated into handing 
information to a person or site that are not known to them. The con artists often improve or refine their 
phishing ideas. Today, since most people are aware of such bad intent, they have changed their target 
audience and instead trick only a selected group of persons. Mitnick & Simon (2002: 59) describe this 
form of phishing as ‘spear phishing’, since the hacker attacks a selected group of persons. Thus, they 
only attack individuals who the attackers are convinced are on a certain mailing list, or who belong to a 
specific bank. To persuade their victims, the hackers use sites that look trustworthy to the users, and in 
the process lure them to enter their personal information, which they later use for their own benefit.  
 
Therefore, hackers often exploit three computer security issues. To start with, hackers often take 
advantage of the vulnerability weaknesses which enable them to reduce systems’ information insurance 
(Erickson, 2008: 109). Thus, through vulnerability the attacker identifies a flaw, accesses the flaw and 
exploits the accessed flaw. However, an attacker can only do this by using the tools and techniques 
which are required to connect to a system (Beaver, 2011: 66). On the other hand, the attackers benefit 
from exploits such as spoofing, Escalation of privilege (EoP), Denial of service (DoS), pivoting, 
Trojans, worms and viruses, which are able to take advantage of vulnerabilities, glitches and debugs. In 
addition, attackers who rely on DoS gain control of a user’s computer and thereby hinder them from 
accessing services.  
 
This section has clearly identified how cyber attackers conduct their malicious activities, and it is 
obvious that cyber criminals employ active methods to achieve their objectives. This confers an 
asymmetric advantage on the criminal. At the same time, victims of these cyber attacks are restricted to 
passive defence, which is not sufficient to defeat cyber attackers’ active methods. 
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2.1.4 Types of Malware  
 
Researchers have identified 10 types of malware, and brief descriptions are given below.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Types of Malware (Source: Author) 
Table 2.1: Types and Description of Malware 
Type Description 
Spyware  
 
Hackers secretly install spyware on a computer system to collect and send 
information about computer usage as well as other personal and confidential 
data to its developer. The spyware infects computers through deceptive ways, 
which include Internet add-ons or plugins, free online scanning, search engines, 
dubious websites and even images (Squidoo, 2012).    
Worms  
 
Infectious and self-replicating, worms spread by either exploiting vulnerabilities 
on the target system or by using some form of social engineering to trick 
computer or system users into executing them. They utilise computer networks 
to send replicas of themselves to connecting computers on those networks (Kent 
et al., 2005). They pose a major threat to large computer networks (CISCO, 
2012).   
Adware Adware is advertisement-supported software, and designed to display 
advertisements on computer systems and websites, or to send advertisement 
emails. Some types also act as spies to steal users’ sensitive information 
(Squidoo, 2012).    
Trojan horses Trojan horses normally pose as a type of a free, useful software or add-on, but 
once installed gives hackers access to the system for performing their criminal 
operations from a remote station (Ken et al., 2005). Once a Trojan is activated 
on a host computer, server or network, it can cause a number of attacks, which 
include damaging the host by activating and spreading other malware, stealing 
data, deleting files, changing desktops and/or installing pop-up windows 
(CISCO, 2012).     
Crimeware Crimeware is developed specifically to carry out crime on the Internet, 
especially to steal financial and confidential information such as credit card data 
and passwords that can be used to access private online financial services 
identities or bank accounts. It is usually installed through social engineering, or 
Malware 
Viruses 
Worms 
Adware 
Spyware 
Trojan 
horses 
Crimeware 
Hijackers 
Keyloggers 
Logic bombs 
Dialers 
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by duping Internet users to release their confidential information (Squidoo, 
2012).  
Hijackers Hijackers modify the browser settings of a user’s computer to redirect it to the 
page of the developer’s choice. Usually the user is directed to start pages as 
well as search pages with paid advertising. Sometimes hijackers may cause the 
browser to crash or the computer to run slow (Baratz, 2004).  
Keyloggers Keyloggers are created to monitor user keystrokes so that the information is 
logged and reported to the developer or the person/organisation that installed 
them. They are used as spyware to steal users’ identities and confidential 
information. They can also be used by organisations to monitor employee 
activities (Squidoo, 2012).   
Logic bombs/slag 
codes 
A logic bomb is “a computer instruction that codes for a malicious act when 
certain criteria are met”, which could include a particular action like deletion of 
a file or a program timed to run at a specified time in the computer’s internal 
clock. In this case, the logic bomb waits until a specified time or date to log its 
destructive payload. It normally exists by itself, without having to replicate 
itself; and to complicate the code even more it can be attached as a genuine file 
(Robillard, 2004).  
Dialers These are programs that set up modems to connect to a 1-900 number, thereby 
enabling the developer or owner of the program to acquire revenue at the 
expense of the original user. Once they are installed in the computer, they 
change the user’s modem access numbers to some especially high-cost access 
numbers, normally in another country (Baratz, 2004).     
Viruses Viruses can get into the system embedded in a software program. They can 
disrupt the activities logbook, replicate themselves, and increase the workload 
of the machine (Squidoo, 2012). 
 
Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 explain the types of malware used by cyber attackers and how resourceful 
they are in allowing attackers to achieve their criminal objectives. Cyber criminals use these malwares 
for many purposes. Most of the time, they are used as intelligence-gathering platforms from which to 
perform their malicious activities against other targets, and as sources for stealing money. It is clear 
that these malwares are active in nature, and used successfully against targets that rely on passive 
security controls. Therefore, current passive security controls are not sufficient to beat cyber attackers’ 
active methods. Due to this fact, defenders need to change their methods of defending their assets, and 
think of ways to use similar techniques in order to succeed against cyber criminal actions, as the active 
methods used by cyber attackers are very resourceful. If the defender gathers intelligence from the 
attacker’s domain, so the defender’s cyber SA will be enhanced, and will be more accurate in 
predicting attack, as the SA will be built based on intelligence from two domains, rather than from a 
single domain. 
2.1.5 Categories of Malware 
 
There are three major categories of malware, observes Clarke (2009): Vector, Payload and Invocation. 
The first of them, Vector, enters a system through copying from a portable storage device plugged into 
or directly connected to the computer or system, or through downloads from another device on a 
remote network or a local area network. Vector-malware classified downloads or transmissions include 
those that infect a computer or system through file transfer using software that executes a standard 
protocol, which could be FTP, or a proprietary protocol, as long as the protocol is implemented on both 
devices. They also include malware transferred through malicious emails, the web, bulletin boards, 
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instant messaging systems and P2P networks. A Trojan is an example of vector download malware 
(Sinha, Kemerlis, Pappas, Sethumadhavan, & Keromytis, 2014).  
 
Second, Payload malware is active code usually delivered to the target device so as to perform the 
function of its sender (or developer) or hacker, although it may perform other functions than its 
ultimate purpose. These include obscuring its existence or operation. The scope of this malware 
normally excludes the code that causes it to replicate itself (Alcorn, Frichot, & Orru, 2014).. As such, 
payloads have applications which are able to perform any operation on data. These applications are 
able to create data by inserting data into control files, inserting entries into the computer’s or system’s 
list of executable programs whenever the device is starting up or shutting down, deleting data or 
directory entries, modifying data by changing security settings for user-accounts or files, and 
modifying parameter-settings and port-settings (Sinha, Kemerlis, Pappas, Sethumadhavan, & 
Keromytis, 2014). Payloads also perform data capture and data disclosure by performing the functions 
of spyware, keystroke loggers, Trojan horses and adware, as well as including malware that can operate 
or act on software by installing malicious software, and making modifications to software to establish a 
new backdoor which allows the hacker or developer to gain access to user-accounts on a computer or 
system by bypassing safeguards and install a rootkit that obscures the operations of the malware. 
Payloads also modify anti-malware software to reduce its effectiveness. They can also modify malware 
that already exists on the computer/system to enable them operate without detection (Clarke, 2009).        
 
Third, Invocation malware is used to cause the code to run into the target computer/system. Invocation 
comprises codes which are native to the instruction-set of the target computer/system, those that 
require an interpreter or run-time interpreter or compiler, and those that require embedded codes such 
as macros on spreadsheets and word-processing documents (Alcorn, Frichot, & Orru, 2014). Invocation 
malware is capable of causing malware to run in the target device remotely through a website 
application attack, a user-account or a bot, or by action of a remote device, where a bot is malware that 
can be triggered remotely so as to perform a specific function (Clarke, 2009: 22).         
 
The above summary states clearly the active methods used by cyber attackers and their advantages in 
taking control over targeted systems. Therefore, defenders can also use these methods to protect the 
CNI and prevail over cyber attackers. Cyber SA can rely on these active methods to enhance the 
intelligence and thus the perception of the situation, so that defenders can be a step ahead by 
monitoring attackers’ activities both from the attacker’s and defender’s domains (Peterson, 2013). This 
new intelligence-gathering capability is required, and offensive, active methods must be utilised by 
defenders in order to achieve an organisation’s security goals.       
2.1.6 Categories of Cyberwar 
 
In their article ‘Countering Cyber War in 2011’, the Carnegie Mellon University Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) divided cyber warfare into three categories: gaining information superiority; 
limited cyber war and unrestricted cyber war. While the first level is an extension of the commonplace 
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military goal of gaining advantage by virtue of information, the second level involves damaging the 
civilian Internet infrastructure. The third level is tantamount to a third degree of attack, since it aims to 
completely destroy the social fabric of a nation by causing maximum damage to civilian infrastructures 
such as emergency services, aviation control, the stock exchange and power generation systems 
(Shimeall, Williams & Dunlevy, 2001). Therefore, from a strategic perspective, the current state of 
cyber threat relates to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), such as aviation (Gorman, 2009), finance 
(Wagner, 2010), water (Preimesberger, 2006) and electricity (Meserve, 2007), besides social and 
political situations (Orr, 2007), since all of them are currently connected to the Internet. 
2.1.7 Sun Tzu’s Military Philosophy  
 
The above state of affairs clearly shows that cyberspace has become a new warfare domain that is 
spread across the globe via computer networks, where its intangible nature makes it difficult to assume 
the location of any possible zone of attack. Such a situation influences cyber operators to find ways to 
successfully manage their cyber systems, which in turn influences them to learn tactics from military 
strategists, such as Clausewitz (Western view, kinetic-non-kinetic warfare) and Sun Tzu (Eastern view, 
yin-yang warfare), where Clausewitz’s (1976) principles follow a Newtonian view of the world and 
Sun Tzu’s principles emanate from the concept of deception.  
 
Clausewitz (1976) conceptualises war by using objectives, plans and other principles for attaining 
political objectives. According to him, war is a type of politics which served well both citizens and 
strategy makers in the post-Napoleon era. However, Clausewitz found it difficult to tackle irregular 
wars, since Western warfare did not experience such situations frequently. On the other hand, Sun Tzu 
focuses on using the intelligence of one party to defeat the other. His strategy involves the concept of 
yin and yang in Taoist philosophy, which is better suited to cyber situations since it covers all possible 
situations, especially where the issue of intelligence is involved. For example, the integration of 
networks takes place in the mind of the commander, which includes cyber support and the intelligence 
fusion centre. By deception in cyberspace, the mind of the commander can be attacked (Cahanin, 2011; 
Nakashima, 2010; Thomas, 2009). It is clear that from the military perspective of defence, intelligence 
is at the heart of establishing SA, and that most of the time this is achieved by being active behind 
enemy lines. Without intelligence, one will be battling with inferior SA (i.e. partially blind). Therefore, 
this argument can also be applied in cyber space, where a cyber defender should actively collect 
intelligence from behind enemy lines so that complete intelligence can be provided to help build the 
active SA.    
 
The 2500-year-old Sun Tzu’s military stratagem propagated in the book The Art of War (Sun Tzu, 
1994), prescribes using deception, adaptability and speed as the mother of warfare strategies. Besides 
that, he suggests making the enemy’s communication systems the primary target, stressing the 
importance of tactical reconnaissance, observation and flank patrolling, and considering probing 
attacks to be as important as battle itself. In his view, moral strength and intellectual prowess prove 
decisive factors in any long-term strategy. 
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Sun Tzu defends his military strategy with strong arguments. For example, he states that it is only the 
enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest level of intelligence in support of the 
army for purposes of spying, and thereby achieve great results. Cahanin (2011: 1) states that such 
“focus on the criticality of intelligence, deception to defeat the mind of the enemy, and knowing that 
relationships between things matter most in the strategy of war” make Sun Tzu’s philosophy an 
important guide to successfully managing cyber war. Many researchers highlight the striking 
resemblance of the 13 ideas of Sun Tzu and modern cyber war situations: 
Table 2.2: Cyber Interpretation of Sun Tzu’s Strategy 
Tactical Suggestions of Sun 
Tzu 
Cyber Situations 
AoW I:  
Laying Plans 
Good leaders not only exploit flawed plans, but also exploit flawed 
adversaries (Parks & Duggan, 2001; Sawyer, 1994). 
AoW II:  
Waging War 
After stealing the credentials and privileges of an authorised user, the 
hackers become insiders of the system and cause further damage by 
fulfilling their mission, such as creating DoS or espionage (Addinall, 
2012; Geers 2011). 
AoW III:  
Attack by Stratagem 
In case the fight involves IT infrastructure,  a cyber-only victory is the 
only way to protect the same, and for that matter it is important to 
attain victory before combat is even necessary (Sawyer, 1994). 
AoW IV:  
Tactical Dispositions 
The primary challenge in cyber warfare is to know whether the system 
is under attack, and therefore the short-term cyber defence goal is to 
improve an organisation’s ability to collect, evaluate and transmit 
digital evidence (Geers, 2011). 
AoW V: 
Energy  
 
Both attackers and defenders try to outrun their opponent in terms of 
application (Geers, 2011). 
 
AoW VI:  
Weak and Strong Points  
 
Adversarial cyber reconnaissance should be difficult and confusing to 
the attacker so that they doubt whether the information they get is 
accurate (Sawyer 1994). 
AoW: VII:  
Manoeuvring 
 
Cyberwar simulates strategic bombing submarine warfare, special 
operations forces, and assassinations (Parks & Duggan, 2001), where 
hoodwinking the enemy through misinformation plays a big role 
(Addinal, 2004; Yuill, Denning & Feer, 2006). 
AoW: VIII.  
Variation in Tactics  
 
Commanders should not rely on the good intentions of others or count 
on best-case scenarios (Sawyer, 1994). In cyberspace, computers are 
attacked from the moment they connect to the Internet (Skoudis, 
2005). 
AoW IX: 
The Army on the March  
 
Much like in real-time war, cyber commanders also need to check all 
nuances of the system while counter attacking the enemy, and should 
always remember that the attacker can also apply deception (Sawyer, 
1994).  
 
AoW X:   
Terrain  
Cyberspace contains more dangers than the real world, since 
terrestrial distance does not play any role while one is connected to 
the network. Cyber weapons, too, are unreliable in character, since 
they are prone to reverse engineering. Thus it takes meticulous pre-
operational cyber attack planning and timely application to manage 
cyber terrain (Parks & Duggan, 2001). 
AoW XI:  
Nine Situations 
 
 
Dispersive ground; facile ground; contentious ground; open ground; 
ground of intersecting highways; serious ground; difficult ground; 
hemmed-in ground; desperate ground (Sun Tzu, 1994). The cyber 
operators must fight both in their own and in the attacker’s territories, 
and in the process such situations can occur anytime (Sawyer, 1994). 
AoW XII:  
The Attack by Fire 
The cyber operators need to accomplish something for which DoS 
appears ideal, i.e., to sever communications between enemy camps 
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(Geers, 2011). 
AoW XIII:  
The Use of Spies 
IT security requires broader organisational support to maintain the 
critical infrastructures, and for this it needs to analyse the cyber 
environment by deploying spies. For example, pro-Palestinian hackers 
denied service to around 700 Israeli domains during the 2006 war 
between Israel and Gaza (Stoil & Goldstein, 2006). 
 
The above points altogether highlight the fact that Sun Tzu’s Eastern world philosophy conceptualises 
war by focusing on the criticality of intelligence, the use of deception to defeat the mind of the enemy, 
and the knowledge that relationships between things matter most in the strategy of war (Cahanin, 
2011). According to this view, cyber deception has already been proved to be a potent weapon against 
the attackers, whereby it enables the operator to hide the real situation from the attacker and instead 
present a make-believe situation (Masip, Garriodo & Herrero, 2004).  In spite of this development, a 
move toward using deception to enhance cyber SA, it is still not sufficient, as further active 
components should be considered in order to be able to collect intelligence from the enemy’s domain, 
as that is what active SA requires so the new proposed model will correctly aligned with doctrine.   
2.1.8 Counter Initiatives  
 
The malicious codes that are known as computer worms, malware or viruses first surfaced in 1949 with 
the advent of self-replicating automata proposed by John von Neumann. Although such codes remained 
at an experimental stage until the early 1990s (Chen & Robert, 2004), in that decade the cyber world 
witnessed an explosion of malware both in terms of number and potency, which influenced network-
savvy countries to indulge in serious research. For example, DARPA (the US Defence Advanced 
Research Projects Agency) was formed in 1958, which analysed five characteristics of worm: (i) 
discovering the target; (ii) ways of transmission; (iii) activating the code; (iv) managing payload; and 
(v) motivation of the attacker. DARPA finally conceptualised Internet worms in terms of attacker 
motivation (Geers, 2011: 23), as Table 2.3 shows. 
 
Table 2.3: Correlation between Attacker’s Motivation and Types of Worm (Geers, 2011) 
Attacker’s Motivation Name of the Worm 
Experimental curiosity Morris/ILoveYou 
Non-existent or non-functional payload Morris/Slammer 
Backdoor creation for remote control Code Red II 
HTML proxy, spam relay, phishing Sobig 
DoS Code Red/Yaha 
Distributed DoS Stacheldraht 
Criminal data collection, espionage SirCam 
Data damage Chernobyl/Klez 
Political protest Yaha 
 
While the above table shows that the range of computer hacking can extend as far as the hackers can 
stretch their imagination, the researchers established the following issues that have both broadened and 
deepened cyber security problem space:  
 
• System vulnerability due to high cost of producing quality software 
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• Technical challenges involved in software patch deployment 
• Susceptibility of the common C/C++ languages 
• Usage of administrator rights by common system and programs 
• Pursuing monoculture computing environment (Geers, 2011: 23) (Ransome & Misra, 2013).   
 
The reliability of the above information is supported by the fact that Kaspersky Lab identified 42,250 
unique samples of malware in a single month, May 2009 (Geers, 2011). From the above table, the 
current point of interest regarding malware revolves around Stuxnet and Flame, where the former is a 
highly sophisticated malware discovered by one Belarusian anti-virus firm in 2010, and which was 
used to destroy a Iranian uranium centrifuge in 2010 (Devine, 2010); the latter was discovered during 
an investigation that was prompted by the International Communication Union (Bitdefender Labs, 
2012; GMA News 2012). According to Kaplan (2012), Flame is the most powerful and sophisticated 
cyber weapon ever to be developed, while the researchers at the Kaspersky Lab reported that Flame is 
20 times the size of Stuxnet, and far more powerful (Kaspersky Lab, 2012). Its main purpose is to 
perform cyber espionage by stealing information from systems and computers that it has already 
accessed. Therefore, more sophisticated cyber attacks require more sophisticated means of cyber 
defence against them i.e.means that are more capable of producing more sophisticated cyber SA. Since 
the two players in this situation are using different methods, this puts attackers in a better situation, and 
so the defenders should start to change their passive defence approach and adopt a more offensive and 
active approach so that they can defend themselves better. 
2.1.9 Current Combat Tools in Cyber War  
 
As a result of the increase in sophistication of cyber attack activities and organisations, and the 
defensive methods they use, we must acknowledge the current asymmetry between cyber attackers and 
defenders. Adoption of a guarded active defence approach is already in place under the label of ethical 
hacking and use of honeypots. So, the world is already seeing active paradigms for Computer Network 
Defence (CND), in spite of the legal constraints imposed. This section will cover the aspect of cyber 
deception, and how this technique can be adopted by a defender to enhance its cyber SA and cyber 
security while controlling the effects of cyber attack. 
 
2.1.9.1 The art of cyber deception in cyber security 
 
The connotation of deception in cyber parlance can be explained by saying that cyber deception is all 
about hiding the reality from the receiver of signals in order to gain certain benefits (Masip, Garrido & 
Herrero, 2004). While this is applicable to both ethical and unethical hackers, ethical hackers can 
secure moral support for their deception, such as claiming that they need to remain covert in order to 
protect the safety of a network from cyber attack. Therefore, deception, from the perspective of ethical 
hackers, can be a great tool for a much-required hassle-free cyber operation. From the above 
perspective, all cyber operators or commanders need to play the role of ethical hacker, and therefore 
they too need to master the art of cyber deception to foster cyber security. So, through this approach, 
defenders will be able to gather intelligence from cyber attackers, which eventually will help to build 
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an enhanced cyber SA, as intelligence from such methods generate more reliable data as the sources 
the domains owned by attackers. 
 
Cyber deception involves imitation and dissimulation, which can be achieved by deploying several 
methods. Rowe & Rothstein (2004) present a comprehensive list of the same, along with observed 
ratings regarding their suitability for offensive and defensive cyber operations, as shown in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4:  Deception Methods and their Utility Value in Cyber Operations [Rowe & Rothstein 
(2004: 24)] 
 
 
It is understandable that the above methods can work both ways, i.e. in favour of both ethical and non-
ethical hackers. For example, an unethical hacker could provide a fake webpage to lure innocent 
visitors with the aim of earning money, and can influence them to lose it, while an ethical hacker can 
use the same mimicking technique to hoodwink an attacker for purposes of protecting his/her network. 
When this method is used by ethical hackers, intelligence about attackers is easily gathered so that the 
defender can understand the intention and motive behind the cyber attack. Also, such intelligence will 
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help to identify the method used by attackers so that better security can be adopted. Such information is 
very important, because this intelligence will help defenders to build better SA about cyber incidents, 
which will eventually lead to better cyber security. 
 
Here, one can argue that it is not easy to deceive Internet users in this Information Age, where there is 
plenty of knowledge available regarding how to detect and avoid cyber deception. Yet, cyber deception 
has become a global concern, mostly due to two facts: one, computer users have a tendency to believe 
what they see before their eyes, and therefore are somewhat gullible to well-organised cyber traps 
(Rowe & Rothstein, 2004) (Poursaberi, Yanushkevich, Gavrilova, Shmerko, & Wang, 2013); two, such 
tendencies emanate from the novelty of the medium, which influences the perceptions of users, a 
situation which is explained in McLuhan’s (1964) famous theory that the medium is the message, 
which shows that humans once displayed the same credulous attitude when newspapers were novel and 
themselves acted as messages, or when radio was novel and did the same.  
 
Thus the hackers capitalise on such human vulnerability. Consequently, websites that want to do real 
business suffer from incessant cyber attacks, as they are the favourite targets of hackers, since many 
websites have weaknesses at one or the other of their layers, and it is easy to navigate the sites that are 
open for all (Barber, 2001).  
 
The increasing instances of cyber crime strongly demonstrate the fact that the cyber world has become 
the number one crime zone – more so than the real world. For example, US organisations alone 
incurred $100 billion losses every year due to cybercrime and cyberespionage, according to a report 
published by the FBI. This in turn shows that factors such as the ease of committing crime – often 
within a few minutes – the easy availability of ‘crime instruments’ (hacking tools), the easy availability 
of huge number of ‘soft targets’ in one single place, and the ease of operating from home, have 
together contributed to the huge boom in cyber crime (Gorman, 2013) (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2003).  
 
Unethical hackers are also exploiting various ways to improve their techniques, since that is all they 
need to invest in. On the other hand, ethical hackers are desperately seeking ways to conduct vigorous 
tests to measure the effectiveness of all the protection tools that are employed in cyber protection 
management.  
It is interesting to note that it is human error that has been found to be one of the most significant 
sources of susceptibility in any secure information system. In a survey done in 2006, it was found that 
about 60% of security breaches were connected to human error made by security managers and other 
information professionals. Not only that: the research findings also found that cyber crime had not only 
engulfed private and public organisations, but also had become a nightmare for ordinary people, who 
had become dependent on online activity for financial or other information exchange. Complaints from 
common people are now literally pouring in regarding Internet fraud. For instance, the FBI recorded a 
33% increase in individual cyber crime complaints in 2008 than the volume it received in 2007. At the 
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same time, it also found an amount as startling as $264.6 million had been siphoned from ordinary 
people (Zyda, Spraragen & Ranganathan, 2009). 
 
Such a state of affairs thus fully legitimises the deceptive operations of the ethical hackers, who 
actually work towards uncovering unethical hackers and preventing them from looting organisations 
and individuals. However, the power balance clearly favours the unethical hackers (Geers, 2011), as 
they solely focus on the destructive aspect of technology. It is for this relentless counter-research of the 
hackers that decoys, honeypots and other anti-hacking programs are being used, but they are yet to 
become fully effective. Websites employing systems to deceive intruders and prevent unauthorised 
access to their sites, such as tar traps (Hollinger, 1998), are also falling short of optimum performance.   
 
Computer systems, too, are vulnerable to attacks, which in turn supports the need for wider application 
of deception for protection. However, the concept of deception by defenders is still in its early stages, 
at least in the general cyber world. There are calls for taking help from the military sector, which 
utilises a variety of deception techniques to successfully defend its networks. Nonetheless, not all 
measures and strategies have analogues in cyberspace. Some of the most pertinent examples are 
honeypots which decoy computer systems that encourage attacks with the aim of collecting data and 
information about the attackers and their attack methods so that better cyber SA and cyber security can 
be put in place. In this respect, researchers advise employing deception tactics, such as identity 
deception, false delays, fake information and false error messages (Bayuk 2011). 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to defend against cyber attacks and crimes, since the practice is 
asymmetric, with the advantage in the hands of the attacker, who usually remains in a position to 
decide on the place, time and method of attack, about which the defender cannot gather any clue 
beforehand. This gives the attacker a better chance to perpetrate the crime. Such a state of affairs thus 
shows that there is an urgent need to devise a multi-layered defence mechanism which would be able to 
detect and handle the attacks in an effective manner. It goes without saying that there should be a 
concerted effort to defeat the cyber attackers, and with this in mind operators should explore all 
possible avenues to effectively beat the attackers in all phases of the attack process. The attack process 
is generally composed of the following steps, although it slightly differs from one network professional 
to another: reconnaissance; scanning; obtaining access; retaining access; covering tracks; and hiding 
(Kjaerland, 2005). 
 
In addition, the support of the law is also essential in fighting cyber crime; hence, there should be legal 
cooperation among states regarding the enforcement of agreed standards of cyber conduct. For that 
matter, all states should reach a consensus on the forms of conduct that should be regarded as cyber 
crime within national borders, and the same then should be interpreted into a legal regime wherein 
those states should strictly forbid the identified forms of destructive cyber conduct and at the sometime 
set a framework to share cyber incident intelligence so all states collaborate in fighting cyber crime  
(Lobel, 2012). Since unethical hackers always exploit any easy access to information, there should also 
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be an effective defensive architecture in place to identify the real intention of each cyber visitor, so as 
to filter the cyber criminals from ordinary people (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). This research found that 
cyber deception is an essential component of cyber security for gathering intelligence about cyber 
attacks, helping build a strong cyber SA; thus, cyber deception is required for active cyber SA. There is 
a plethora of literature that deals with the art of cyber deception in cyber security, the topic of this 
study, which will be covered in the discussion section. 
 
From the research and review of the literature from various authors and scholars, much can be 
discovered with respect to the topic of study. However, this section calls for providing certain basic 
information regarding the efficacy of ethical deception (deception employed by an ethical hacker) in 
protecting the networks in form of active defence that deploy such active measurement for cyber 
security. For example, ethical deception can be an effective instrument for cyber operators to use to 
collect information that valuable to security agents, who in turn could catch the cyber criminals by 
devising better strategies. One important point emerges at this juncture: that there should be a clear 
guideline to seize trans-continental cyber criminals; and it is high time the governments of various 
states open a clear dialogue in this regard. It is the absence of a universal policy to frame cyber space 
that is providing huge advantage to the cyber criminals (Nomikos, 2005). 
 
Cyber deception can also be used as a perfect shield to protect any organisation’s data and information 
critical for its operation. Therefore, from a business perspective it can be said that cyber deception can 
also be a source of competitive advantage to the business organisation, as it can facilitate efficient 
operations for them. A classic example of the same can be found in the instance of Coca Cola’s cyber 
operation, as no one has been able to steal its business information, such as the ingredients it uses to 
manufacture Coca Cola products, which in turn provides the company with competitive advantage 
(McCarty, 2003).  
 
2.1.9.2 The role of cyber deception in cyber security and defence 
 
Confidently, there are instances that suggest gradual development in practicing deception to beef up 
computer security against cyber attacks. For example, there is increased use of encryption, which is a 
form of deception security measure used to hide information by deploying confusing strings of random 
symbols (Rowe & Rothstein, 2004: 34). Randomisation has already been identified as an essential tool 
for preventing hackers from obtaining information that can enable them to exploit the victim’s system 
behaviour (Masip & Garido, 2004: 25). The use of honeypots, another security measure based on 
deception, is also on the rise. Honeypots attract hackers by impersonating different machines that are 
worthy of being attacked. In spite of these efforts, the role of deception still remains mostly under-
utilised, and opportunities where defensive deception could have been useful are often missed. In any 
case, researchers have already provided a number of deception taxonomies that can be used to keep 
hackers at bay. Deception is a crucial resource for active SA, to allow defenders to gather intelligence 
and understand the enemy’s intentions and methods. This will eventually help the defender make better 
decisions.  
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Deception consists of simulation and dissimulation, where simulation is known as showing false 
information, which is essential in launching a defensive attack against the hackers. On the other hand, 
dissimulation is used as an offensive attack by enabling the user to hide real information from the 
attackers. Dissimulation aims to exploit three offensive techniques, which are masking, repackaging 
and dazzling. The masking technique enhances dissimulation by blending a relevant object with the 
background and making it seem irrelevant so as to escape detection. For instance, “a malicious 
JavaScript may be embedded as a white space in a relatively benign looking JavaScript. In addition, an 
important private text message may be embedded as a white font in the whitespace of an apparently 
innocuous email message sent to a group” (McQueen & Boyer, 2009: 2). The repackaging technique 
works by hiding the real object, where it makes a relevant object appear like something which it is not. 
This technique is applied to phishing attacks by exploiting friendly, official and innocuous subject lines 
to propel a receiver to open the message. Finally, the dazzling technique hides the real object by 
making the relevant object seem very confusing due to giving adverse information about its true nature 
(Masip & Garrido, 2004: 41).  
 
In deception, the obfuscation and randomisation of identifying elements are essential methods for 
inducing confusion. For instance, in an encrypted channel the meaning of the message remains hidden 
while making it clear and obvious that a message was sent. In every deception there must be 
dissimilation and simulation, since it requires some kind of false display to completely hide the real 
elements. In this regard, simulation plays an important role, as it contains three effective techniques, 
which are invention, mimicking and decoying. Invention is a creative form of deception, which 
develops a perception about the existence of a relevant object, when in reality there is no such object. 
For instance, a honeypot might be used in a system to give the appearance of a subnet of machines, and 
where such a subnet of machines displays exact IP addresses, when in actual fact there is no such 
subnet (Burgeon & Buller, 1994: 161). Similarly, mimicking creates misinformation by displaying 
characteristics of a relevant and actual object. Phishing attacks are a good example of the same, which 
may direct the hackers to a web page that appears to be a valid page of a reputed firm (Whaley, 1982: 
188). 
 
However, decoying, the third form of simulation, is the most interesting, as here the falsehood is 
displayed to turn the attention of the hackers from more relevant objects to the displayed, false object. 
For instance, when a web page with false but realistic data is used to attract a hacker’s attention, this 
deception helps keep the hackers away from the real data.   
 
Altogether there are seven security dimensions in a cyber security control system, which are security 
group knowledge, attack group knowledge, access, vulnerabilities, damage potential, detection and 
recovery (Whaley, 1982: 191). These dimensions play a critical role in creating the foundation for 
defensive actions (Burgeon & Buller, 1994: 178). Massip & Garrido (2004: 41) observe that these 
seven dimensions of security can be defended by the six deception types. For example, deception can 
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prevent the attackers from accessing the mechanisms and processes involved in security systems 
(Masip & Garrido, 2004: 42), whereas deception techniques such as “randomization system diagnostic 
and the timing of audits to reduce predictability could make it very difficult for the potential attackers 
to defeat the security control mechanisms” (McQueen & Boyer, 2009: 4). 
 
This shows that deception can beat the hackers if it can successfully play its role in creating a false 
perception of the object and hiding the real object from attack, which would limit the attackers’ 
knowledge of the real object (Rowe & Rothstein, 2004: 39). So, cyber SA can learn from attackers in 
order to deny the purpose of their cyber attack. Often, masking proves to be the best deception 
technique to prevent attack of this dimension of security, as it prevents leaking of information. 
Alongside it, techniques such as inventing, mimicking, repackaging, dazzling and decoying can be 
used to confuse the hackers (Rowe & Rothstein, 2004: 41). SA must have the variety to match the 
complex environment it seeks to protect against adaptive attacks, a variety which can be achieved 
through utilisation of deception. 
 
Deception also plays an important role in preventing the attackers from accessing the information on 
the other security dimensions. For example, the six dimension techniques which make the actual 
information appear different to the hackers than its true nature can mislead the hackers. In this way, the 
operators can successfully hide the information regarding vulnerabilities, access and damage potential 
of the network by using deception (Burgeon & Buller, 1994: 179). 
 
Another good way to prevent hacker interference is to minimise the number of accessible security 
services, which can be done by using the six deception techniques, including masking and repackaging. 
Alongside these, dazzling can be employed by randomising the IP ports and addresses, since the 
presence of many ports and false traffic can mislead the attacker. The following table shows how 
deception techniques can be used improve the security of the access dimension (McQueen & Boyer, 
2009: 6). 
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Table 2.5: Deception Types and their Utility [adapted from McQueen & Boyer (2009: 6)] 
Types of Deception Defensive Actions  
Dissimulation Defence that hide services from the attacker. 
Masking Masking is any method that prevents attackers from 
observing services associated with the control system. 
 Configure to not answer pings. 
 Configure firewalls to prevent traffic flow 
between the control system and external 
networks, except as required. 
 Hide control systems communications from 
external network behind a NAT (Network 
Address Translation device). 
Repackaging Repackaging hides service information by making the 
service appear to be something that is of no interest to 
attackers. 
 Running a service on a non-standard port. 
 Providing service connect headers, which 
make the service appear to be another, more 
secure, version of the same service, e.g. make 
Wu-FTP appear to be ProFTP. 
Dazzling Dazzling can be used to hide information about the 
system services by making what is observable by 
attackers confusing or unintelligible. 
 Encryption should be used for all services 
when feasible.  
 Randomisation of IP addresses. 
Dissimulation Defence that hide services from the attacker. 
Inventing Inventing is any deception that causes the attacker to 
falsely see services that do not exist. 
 False network traffic that contains IP 
addresses and ports that do not exist. 
Mimicking Mimicking can deceive the attacker into believing that 
a relatively unimportant service is a critical 
component of the control system. 
  If there are multiple versions of the same 
service, make them all appear to be the same 
version on the same machine. 
Decoying Decoying is a diversion meant to divert the attacker’s 
attention away from critical aspects of the control 
system network. 
 False network traffic that leads the attacker to 
phony, seemingly vulnerable services located 
in virtual machines. 
 
Table 2.5 summarises different techniques of cyber deception, but it is important to understand that, in 
order to enhance cyber SA and be able to defend actively, it is crucial to know that these deception 
techniques alone are not sufficient. However, knowing how to plan and execute these deception types 
requires military strategic thinking in order to get the full advantage out of it, so that strong cyber 
intelligence can be gathered, better cyber SA can be achieved and effective defence can be put in place 
against cyber attack.  
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2.1.10 The Crucial Role of Offensive Hacking in Cyber Security 
 
The traditional, reactive approach to cyber security is increasingly becoming insufficient before the 
increased dynamism of the cyber world, since it works with past knowledge and does not have the 
capability to exploit the vulnerabilities of the attackers. On the other hand, the offensive method of 
ethical hacking works its way through the vulnerabilities of the attackers, thereby providing greater 
scope for web commanders to protect their own sites. The offensive hacking method essentially 
comprises deception, which works as “an important two-agent psychological phenomenon with many 
applications to information security” (Rowe, 2004: 1), such as is used by an offensive agent when 
attackers try to hoodwink the information systems into providing secrets or destroying themselves, 
while occurring as a defensive screen by feigning an exaggerated processing delay to create a make-
believe situation for the attackers to believe that the computer has succumbed to a DoS attack and so 
move away. This shows how an offensive method can fulfil the old adage that prevention is better than 
cure.  
 
However, it is not that the attackers do not know about such strategies; therefore, they can reappear 
with a new style of attack, which requires that defenders apply new strategies of deception to outwit the 
attackers’ prowess. According to Bell & Whaley (1991), the operator can adopt at least six deception 
tactics to protect the network, which are masking, repackaging, dazzling, mimicking, inventing and 
decoying, while Whaley shows how nine types of misperception can be adopted to restrict the 
attackers, which are patterns, players, intentions, pay-offs, place, time, strength, style and channels. 
There are other concepts, too, which show that the offensive method has a huge role in protecting the 
network, even though such techniques are still detectable due to fact that current deception uses low 
levels of interaction which can be detected, so attackers will find new ways to defeat it.    
 
The scope of SA requires intelligence from outside one’s own network to be able to find essential 
elements of information about attackers. The currently adopted SA relies only on intelligence that 
comes from one’s own network, which is incomplete, as information about what an enemy is hiding or 
wants to hide is not acquired. This can be overcome by developing a theory and practice of active SA 
that adopts deception and offensive measures to build cyber SA. It worth to note that active defence 
must include target acquisition in the process of information gathering (ISTAR: Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Target acquisition and reconnaissance). Benign software, (Benware) that has no intention 
of manipulating the normal execution of the target. Unlike malignant software, the purpose of such 
software is to cause damages in the target. Therefore, Benware is a Trojan based software used by 
defenders with an intention to gather intelligence from enemy in the form of self-defence. 
 
In addition, deception is dependent on enemy vulnerability, and therefore the operator should exploit a 
program that is capable of outwitting the attackers’ perceptions about the state of the targeted network, 
as well as the attackers’ perceptions of what they gained in the end. For example, one typical program, 
called Benware (a tool used by defenders with no intention to leave damages in the targeted host where 
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Malware as discussed earlier has an effect such as destroy, deny, degrade etc. ), can be used to achieve 
such a successful result against the attackers in the following manner:  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Exploiting the Benware Program to Deceive Attackers (Source: Author) 
Benware is a Trojan-based program that can be used by a defender to gather intelligence from an 
enemy domain or network. This program requires the utilisation of active, offensive hacking and 
deception techniques in order to be executed and transmitted into an enemy network. Through this, an 
Active SA can be established. 
 
Figure 2.2 highlights how the Benware (Trojan) controller contributes to the entire process of 
deceiving the attacker through using commands prepared on the basis of the OS and the mission 
objective of the operator, where in the end the attacker has to remain unknowingly content with fake 
secrets/intelligence.  
2.2 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS RESEARCH INITIATIVES 
2.2.0 Governments and Cyberspace 
 
The growing instances of state-sponsored cyber espionage programs have become a serious concern for 
maintaining inter-country relationships. Many countries are gearing up for global cyber war, which 
could be more devastating than what the world witnessed in earlier world wars (Gorman, 2013). 
Already there are several instances of cyber attacks led by the security agencies of various 
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governments, which have paralyzed civic life and business transactions, caused damaged to 
infrastructures, and spread panic among common people. For example, stung by the attack of the 
Stuxnet cyber worm virus in its secretive nuclear facilities in 2010, Iran became actively engaged in 
cyber warfare through its ‘Iranian Cyber Army’ (Rudner, 2013).  
 
Cyber attacks are mostly unique in nature, and there are innumerable ways they can strike. It is 
becoming increasingly difficult to ‘defend’ computer systems with the ‘known’ knowledge bank, and 
accordingly, the old adage ‘prevention is better than cure’ is gradually influencing countries to take the 
offensive against any invader in their systems for the sake of protection. Therefore, this offensive 
stance also requires changes in the way SA is developed. Therefore, active defence and active SA will 
help in reducing cyber uncertainty and at the same time provide better risk management. 
2.2.1 Government Initiatives to Develop Cyber Attack Power  
 
The fact that countries across the globe are apprehensive of cyber attacks becomes evident from their 
own governmental documents. For example, in January 2013, PLA’s (China) Lieutenant General Qi 
Jianguo openly commented in the official weekly newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party Central 
party school that “The West’s so-called ‘Internet freedom’ actually is a type of cyber-hegemony”, 
besides stating that “seizing and maintaining superiority in cyberspace is now more important in this 
information era than seizing command of sea and command of the air” (Bellacqua & Hartnett, 2013). 
In addition the cyber commons underpins all the commons; namely: air, maritime (sea), space and land. 
 
Jianguo’s comments, however, avoided the issue of their own cyber attacks, which has recently been 
exposed by an investigation conducted by the US private sector. The investigation published a report 
called the ‘Mandiant Report’, which went into detail on how one of the cyber-espionage units of the 
PLA had been hacking into the New York Times’ computer systems from 2012 to mid-2013 (Feakin, 
2013). 
 
Instances like the ones cited above thus prompted the US government to draw up a list of potential 
overseas targets for US cyber attacks in a project named ‘Offensive Cyber Effects Operations’ 
(OCEO), which clearly suggests that the US government is stepping up its cyber offensive capabilities 
(Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013). This change in stance also requires changes in how SA is 
conceptualised and implemented in practice. 
2.2.2 Inter-Country Cyber Warfare  
 
The US and Israel have already been accused of masterminding the Stuxnet computer worm attack on 
Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013), while Syria has openly 
deployed its ‘Syrian Electronic Army’, which is a hacker group engaged in bringing down, defacing or 
otherwise maligning sites that carry anti-Syrian government content. This group mainly targets media, 
as well as American President Barack Obama (Norman, 2011). China, on the other hand, has steadily 
been increasing its espionage network over the past few years. For example, SecureWorks, a leading 
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security services provider, reported in 2008 that it had recorded 7.7 million attempted attacks from 
China in that year. Not only that, China has also released a new hacking toolkit onto the market named 
‘Leopard in a Hole’ that is priced between $20 to $500, which helps in penetration tests used to 
identify and exploit SQL injection flaws (Dwyer, 2009). This clearly shows how the world is moving 
towards more active methods in cyber space, so active defence is needed, and active SA is required to 
be able to tackle such innovative attacks. 
2.2.3 Situational Awareness (SA) Theories and Models  
 
Sun Tzu states that: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a 
defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle” (Luzwick, 2000: 
15). Therefore, intelligence is the secret to winning a war and nobody has attempt to determine a 
theoretical framework or measurement the effect of SA enhancement as a result of active SA which 
will be shown later in chapter 3. 
 
The problem of uncertainty is that it is present everywhere, including all three phases of cyber situation 
awareness. The three phases of cyber situation awareness are prior security risk management, real time 
intrusion detection and posterior forensics analysis (Li et al., 2010, Eun & Abmann, 2014). When we 
talk about real time situation awareness, the invisibility of cyber attackers increases due to the degree 
of uncertainty in the cyber world. It is near impossible to find out where the cyber attackers are located, 
when and how the cyber attackers are going to commit a crime. IDS sensors are available, but they can 
only halt the symptomatic phenomena of the attacks, and there is no guarantee whether the attack has 
taken place and whether the cyber attackers have succeeded or not (Eun & Abmann, 2014, Li et al., 
2010). This section presents an overview of Situational Awareness (SA) and how it can be used to 
respond enemy attacks in cyber space, as well as pointing out the current limitations; plus specifying 
the gap where new capacities for cyber SA are required. 
 
In literal terms, situational awareness means to acquire knowledge about the things going on around us 
(Adams et al., 1995; Endsley & Garland, 2000). The term ‘Situational Awareness’ itself is an area of 
research although the concept has a long history behind it (Harrald & Jefferson, 2007). SA can be 
traced back to the theory of the military grouping with the NCW (Alberts, 2002). Quite extensive 
research work took place in military aviation security in the mid-1980s for the purpose of designing 
computer boundaries for individual operators (Endsley, 1988, 1995; NASA, 2006). 
 
Cyber Situation Awareness, usually referred to as Cyber SA, is still considered to be an area of 
research that is always evolving in an increasingly interconnected age, which made its mark with 
Denning’s (1987, 2001) pioneering work on using expert systems to detect computer attacks in 1987. 
That was followed by a plethora of experiments covering areas such as anomaly detection, pattern 
matching, agent-based systems etc, which are now described within the confines of level 0 or early 
level 1 data fusion (Salerno et al., 2008; Tadda, 2006, 2008).   
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The early stages of these experiments shaped the concept of tactical fusion, which was proposed by the 
JDL (Joint Director’s Laboratory) model in 1992, and which gained popularity among researchers. 
This model contains five functional levels, 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. It was published by Hall & Llinas (1997), 
and it focuses solely on data management for preventing cyber attacks. Here, most of the tasks are 
concentrated on levels 0, 1 and 4. Tadda finds the JDL model to be a bottom-up, data-driven model 
(Figure 2.3). The significance of the JDL model lies in the fact that it highlighted the significance of 
algorithmic techniques in supporting situation awareness (Salerno, Hinman & Boulware, 2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Tactical Fusion/JDL Model [adapted from Tadda (2008)] 
However, the work on successfully comprehending the concept of SA was very much underway, since 
the researchers rightfully sensed that human elements are equally important in achieving quality SA. 
From a simple point of view, SA refers to knowledge about ongoing events in the cyber environment, 
but the three elements hidden in that definition – knowledge, ongoing events and the cyber 
environment – contain a plethora of elements that command human abilities, such as perceiving, 
comprehending and projecting the situation. In the wake of such requirements, Endsley (2000: 3) 
provided one of the briefest yet most comprehensive definitions of SA when she stated that SA refers 
to “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”.  
 
This definition clearly underpins three essential drivers of SA, which are perception, comprehension 
and projection. Endsley (2000) observes that the perception of cues (which she refers to as Level 1 SA) 
appears fundamental, since in the absence of basic perception of important information the chance of 
wrongly visualising the situation drastically increases. In support of her argument she cites a finding 
that that 76% of SA errors made by the pilots (either system failure or cognitive processing problems) 
stemmed from lack of perception of the required information (Jones & Endsley, 1996). 
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Comprehension, on the other hand, refers to an outcome relating to how people interpret, associate, 
store and retain information, and thus takes its place in the SA process at Level 2 SA in Endsley’s 
(1995c) definition. Flach (1995: 3) argues that “the construct of situation awareness demands that the 
subjective interpretation (awareness) and in the sense of objective significance or importance 
(situation)”. Equally, Jones and Endsley (1996) observe that lack of comprehension can cause 20% of 
SA errors. 
 
The Level 3 SA, i.e. projection, helps operators to perform at the highest level of SA, since it enables 
them to forecast situational events and their dynamics, suggests Endsley (2000). Endsley argues that 
from an intuitive point of view SA is all about “knowing what is going on”, while from a formal point 
of view it is all about “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” 
(Endsley 1995b: 36). 
 
Thus, Endsley further consolidated the theoretical perspective of SA by adding human factors to it, 
thereby opening a new horizon of developments towards achieving quality SA (Wickens, 2008: 397). 
Endorsement of the above view from a host of researchers (Endsley, 1993, 1994; Endsley & Rodgers, 
1994; Endsley & Robertson, 1996; Endsley et al., 1998) highlighted the temporal aspects, as the above 
view showed that both perception of time and temporal dynamics associated with events play crucial 
roles in the formulation of SA, and that a critical part of SA involves understanding the amount of time 
available in the occurrence of an event or in the course of an action. Such developments helped 
researchers to underpin time as an integral part of Level 2 (comprehension) and Level 3 (projection) 
SA. 
 
Endsley (1995c) argues that the approach to earning quality SA should be goal-driven, since operators 
have multiple goals within any environment, which makes SA dependent on task performance and 
goals set in a specific environment. Smith & Hancock’s (1995: 139) view that SA is “purposeful 
behaviour directed toward achieving a goal in a specific task environment” also supports Endsley’s 
view. 
 
Based on her theoretical understanding of SA, Endsley (1995a) developed her SA model, which is 
mostly referred to as a mental model comprising three levels: perception; comprehension; projection 
(Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4: Endsley’s Model (1995b) 
The above model segregates SA from decision making and performance stages to depict it as an 
operator’s mental model of the state of the environment, which acts as the main precursor to the 
decision making processes. According to Endsley (2000), the central tenet of cyber operation is to 
convert quality situation awareness into successful performance, which in turn requires treating SA as a 
separate stage of functioning. She defends her argument by saying that, while it is possible to obtain 
quality SA, it is not always possible to convert the same into action due to other intervening factors, 
such as poor strategy selection, lack of decision choices, technical constraints, lack of training and so 
on. With this she highlights the integral relationship between SA and decision making, where decisions 
are formed by SA in as much as SA is formed by decisions. From another perspective it can be said 
that this model depicts SA as a package containing both tacit and explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994; 
Nonaka & Nishiguchi, 2001), the successful exploitation of which depends on other appropriate 
external channels, such as technology, training and the amount of freedom available for decision 
making. 
 
In the existing literature, SA is dominated by studies of individual operations and their dimensions 
(Stanton et al., 2001). You can find many separate and dedicated theories, such as Endsley’s three-level 
model (Endsley, 1995), Smith & Hancock’s perceptual cycle model (Smith & Hancock, 1995) and the 
activity theory model of Bedny & Meister (Bedny & Meister, 1999). In every model, the psychological 
approach, process and product are quite different. Take the example of Endley’s three-level model. It is 
a purely cognitive theory which largely depends upon information flow and does not consider 
technological factors. Contrary to this, SA is described as a purely perceptual model by Smith & 
Hancock, and Bedny & Meister employ activity theory to explain SA. Ultimately, Endsley’s model is 
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too general: it doesn’t state how SA is achieved in detail, which makes it insufficient for cyber security.  
Also, the model was originally designed for pilot SA, and information about intelligence feed is not 
included in detail. The model is generally too abstract and high level, and detail on how SA is 
performed is not covered. Therefore, this model fails to address what is required to achieve SA, and 
fails to identify the domain of intelligence that basically is the source and the key to success in 
perceiving the situation. 
  
2.2.3.1 Tadda’s situation awareness reference model (combo model)  
 
Tadda (2008), on the other hand, considers the JDL model as a Bottom-up, Data-driven and Functional 
model, considering Endsley’s model to be a Top-down, Goal-driven and Mental model. He recognises 
the utility value of both, and accordingly proposes a combined model comprising the best elements of 
both, along with new elements such as an initial data requirement and textual input. In his model, 
Tadda begins by defining the problem/goal in a top-down manner, and then opts for a Processing Flow 
solution, by which actions take place such as projection (alerts), comprehension (model analysis), 
perception (data collection), parsing/extraction and data cleansing. At this stage, his model covers 
JDL’s Level 0/1. Next, he opts for the task of Process Refinement, which deals with missing data, 
additional data and input for sensor management, before the model takes up the task of Off-line 
Processing, which involves knowledge discovery. Tadda’s model is illustrated in Figure 2.5 below.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Tadda’s Combination of JDL’s & Endsley’s Models (Tadda, 2008) 
Tadda (2008) uses three broad areas of operation, being Anticipation, Comprehension, and Perception, 
and illustrates how this works when applied to the cyber SA:  
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Figure 2.6: Tadda’s (2008) SA Awareness Reference Model Applied to Cyber SA 
Tadda (2008) suggests that this combo-model, applied to a cyber domain, would collect evidence at the 
Perception level, and then would comprehend the situation by recognising intrusion attempts and 
exploiting a priori knowledge, which in turn would enable it to anticipate the possible magnitude of 
impact. He illustrates the same through another diagram (Figure 2.7): 
  
 
 
Figure 2.7: Tadda’s (2008) Model Applied to the Cyber Domain 
Tadda (2008) underpins seven variables as the main contributors to SA: 
1. Evidence: Gathered through IDS alerts (Snort, Dragon), system logs, service logs (Apache 
and IIS) and network flow data; 
2. Tracks: This refers to the collection of all evidence that are available against one or more 
targets made by one or more attackers; 
3. Situation: This refers to the set of tracks at a snapshot of time; 
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4. Situation Awareness of a Network: This refers to the mental model of the analyst; 
5. True Positive: This refers to a successful attack; 
6. False Positive: This refers to an incorrectly identified attack; 
7. Non-relevant Positive: This refers to the situation where the operators correctly identify an 
attack that has failed to penetrate.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Revised Framework of SA Reference Model (Tadda 2008) 
“The largest gap in current research is how to perform situation projection or anticipation – projection 
in the lower right section of the lower right section of the above diagram”, observes Tadda (2008: 340), 
thereby underpinning the difficulty in determining possible futures, where it takes the ‘knowledge of 
us’ to combat the ‘knowledge of them’ (the attackers). This observation amply hints at the possibility 
that the knowledge of us at comprehension level 2 could fall short of meeting an actual situation in the 
desired manner if the attacker were to apply greater knowledge and skill. It also indicates that any 
scheme/model with a single goal of protecting against attack in a single domain environment always 
runs the risk of getting outwitted by an attacker with superior knowledge and skill. Interestingly, 
Endsley (2000) also speaks about the uncertainty involved in projection by stating that it is not always 
possible to convert SA into practice, identifying the quality of strategy as one of the main constraints.  
Another observation is that the Tadda model relies on data captured from local networks, which is not 
enough for cyber security as defence should look into data from cyberspace, i.e. other data that have 
effect in real life. Therefore, the Tadda model is focused on a single domain, and this makes the model 
passive, in turn producing incomplete SA. Cyber SA is not only about network data, but also must 
consider other effects on the environment of the cyber attack. Local monitoring of the network cannot 
detect zero day attacks, so zero day effects in the real world must be considered in order to defend 
against them better. Finally, the model neglects a very important source of intelligence which is crucial 
for cyber security: the enemy network. Without it, incomplete SA or poor SA will be produced. 
Therefore, the active SA model should consider this factor in order to enhance cyber security. 
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2.2.4 Intelligence and Situational Awareness 
 
According to Peterson (2013), cyber security is one of the major concerns in the modern world. It 
affects everyone, including individuals, organisations, industries, and even government institutions. 
The reason why so many organisations are affected is because there is no proper structure for dealing 
with the cyber threats. Defence systems are insecure due to their design (Peterson, 2013). For this 
reason, there is an increased need for organisations to develop situational awareness on cyber security. 
This can only be realised through cyber intelligence as intelligence reduces risk and error propagation 
in decision making which eventually enhance cyber security. This part seeks to discuss, critically, the 
characteristics of cyber intelligence that can enhance situational awareness, as well as consider the 
approaches used in intelligence collection. 
 
Intelligence operation can be defined as the act and process of gathering information about an enemy in 
order to uncover the enemy’s motive and objectives. Intelligence operation is a multifaceted term that 
includes the following activities: direction and planning; data collection; data processing; data 
exploitation; data production and analysis; integration; dissemination; evaluation; and feedback (Prouty 
& Ventura, 2011). The process of intelligence operation can be daunting, and fraught with 
disappointments. Cyber SA, as explained earlier, needs to capture intelligence from multiple domains 
using proper methodology and plan if it is to uncover the enemy’s intention and achieve better SA in a 
more comprehensive, timely and accurate manner.  
 
2.2.4.1 Accuracy: 
 
Accuracy of intelligence comes first in cyber security. Lehr & Pupillo (2009) indicate that accuracy of 
data assists in situational awareness in that it helps the organisation to take informed and certain steps 
towards cyber security. As Lehr & Pupillo (2009) note, the challenge in Internet security has persisted 
because there is no accurate information as to who propagates the attacks, when, or where they are 
initiated. Hu & Jiang (2012) indicate that the affected parties realise the need for accuracy in cyber 
security. As such, they organised a conference looking into measures aimed at improving the accuracy 
of such data. It is quite obvious why this accuracy is needed: ensuring cyber security is very important 
as it helps in safeguarding company secrets, identities and other sensitive information. Cyber security 
systems work based on the available information. Therefore, if the intelligence is not certain, 
organisations might invest a lot of money blindly, yet still suffer from the same fate they seek to evade. 
For this reason, it cannot be denied that accuracy of cyber intelligence is crucial for an organisation’s 
situational awareness as quality SA requires high accurate intelligence and limited and inadequate 
intelligence will result I erroneous SA and propagation of error and uncertainty. 
 
2.2.4.2 Timeliness: 
 
In curbing the threat and avoiding excessive damage from any critical situation, timing is very 
important. Defensive intervention can sometimes come in too late, at a time when the damage has 
already occurred – a situation under which the effect of the intervention would be insignificant. The 
same applies to cyber intelligence. As Peterson (2013) observes, the perpetrators of the attacks keep on 
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devising new ways to carry out their attacks. This implies that unless there is timely intervention, then 
organisations will be forever prone to attacks. This calls for pro-active rather than reactive measures. 
 
In order for the pro-active measures to be successful in controlling cyber crime, the collection of cyber 
intelligence must be very timely as well as accurate. Amin, Schwartz & Hussain (2003) indicate that 
cyber intelligence should be reliable in this way. That is, it must come in at the right time in order to 
prevent attacks from occurring. The importance of timeliness in situational awareness is that by 
observing it organisations can predict the next possible attack, the mode of attack or the areas 
vulnerable to attack. Consequently, measures can be put in place so as to make sure that actions are 
taken before it is too late. For this to be realised, the cyber security experts have to make proper 
preparations to deal with the attacks. This is where timely intelligence is needed. Failure of intelligence 
to have this characteristic means that an organisation will forever be going for curative measures rather 
than preventive measures. Timely intervention is the only solution, and this can only be facilitated by 
timely cyber intelligence which provides defenders the advantage of operating within the enemy’s 
decision cycle and influence there action through utilising deception as discussed earlier. Active Cyber 
SA provides agility and can increase the tempo of the battle rhythm in cyberspace beyond the 
capabilities of the adversary i.e. out manoeuvre the enemy. 
 
2.2.4.3 Completeness: 
 
There is also the aspect of completeness. Organisations might have the intelligence gathered locally, 
but if it is incomplete then the organisation can be just as vulnerable as if it did not have any 
intelligence at all as this approach only look into one domain which is not adequate and that why active 
SA is required to overcome the issue of incomplete intelligence. The cyber security personnel would 
then be working with uncertainty, thereby providing a loophole, much to the advantage of cyber crime 
perpetrators. The issue of incomplete cyber intelligence is not new to organisations. GAO (2000) 
indicates that for a long time there were barriers to sharing cyber intelligence between affected players, 
i.e. government institutions and the private sector. As such, each had little bits of intelligence which 
were not substantial enough to make proper prevention measures. This is the reason why cyber 
insecurity has persisted. There are different pockets of intelligence, but still no way by which the dots 
can be connected in order to come up with a comprehensive security system. 
 
There has also been a failure of the concerned parties to come up with comprehensive information. 
Bhaskar (2006) further indicates the damage caused by lack of complete intelligence. There is the 
absence of an adequate number of security officers trained in computer forensics. Therefore, Active SA 
requires proper training and a method to determine people performance. As such, even if the 
information is available, no one can fully make sense of it in order to devise a counter-measure. This is 
another issue that has greatly contributed to lack of completeness in cyber intelligence. 
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Due to the lack of completeness in intelligence, it is hard for organisations to make proper situational 
analysis. Thus, they are prone to continued attacks. However, GAO (2000) indicates that the affected 
parties realise the need for having complete intelligence. This is the reason why the barriers to sharing 
cyber intelligence are dissolving. Governments and the private sectors can come together and share the 
little information they have on the situation as indicated by UK government in CISPA (cyber 
intelligence sharing and protection act) (Lewis, Louvieris, Abbott, Clewley, & Jones, 2014). Through 
such measures, more information can be pooled to make meaningful conclusions. Based on this 
discussion, it cannot be denied that completeness of cyber intelligence is vital in ensuring 
organisations’ situational awareness. 
 
Much has been said about the intelligence. However, there is the need to look into the process by which 
this intelligence or data can be collected. Stevens (2012) indicates that the methods of intelligence 
collection are subject to criticism. As such, there is a need to look into why such criticism arises. This 
can be looked at in relation to the available approaches to intelligence collection. From the above 
discussion, the current methods of intelligence gathering is not sufficient to fight cyber attacks due to 
the reason covered earlier. Therefore, Active offensive intelligence gathering is required to enhance 
cyber SA and cyber security. 
 
2.2.4.4 Passive data collection 
 
Passive data collection is one of the approaches currently adopted in cyber SA models, as Tadda (2008) 
suggests: a data-gathering level from a local network without specifying details of what data are to be 
captured. Huey & Rosenberg (2004) argue that this provision was given under the Convention on 
Cybercrime (CC). Stevens (2012) further indicates that the Department of Homeland Security in the 
US asked for budgetary allocation meant for collection of computer and Internet data so as to enhance 
cyber security research. This approach is passive in nature because what is captured is only network 
data using technology similar to the one used at the organisational level, but this one is more like 
national level monitoring. Situational awareness is raised in this approach by employing monitoring 
data within their own network, which is again passive and incomplete as the defender can see only one 
side of the truth. Avenues that can be employed in this case include technological means such as 
network monitoring tools, firewalls, IPS, and IDS.  
 
Passive data are invaluable in raising situational awareness for an organisation. Application of deep 
packet inspection gives an insight into the traffic content, thereby hinting at any suspicious moves. This 
arises through the identification of suspicious content. This also helps to reveal the Internet portal used 
in propagating the attack, as well as the possible impact of it (Holdaway, 2001). This can inform the 
organisation on the nature and urgency of the corrective action needed (Theohary & Collins, 2011). 
However, what the organisation sees in this case is valuable if it is to recover from a cyber attack, but it 
is not sufficient to deter the attack. This is because captured intelligence provides data about an 
incident already taking place, and gives insight into what attackers reveal about their attack, Therefore, 
cyber SA in this case is based on inadequate data, meaning that poor decisions will be made. Looking 
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into Endsley SA, intelligence issues in this case can lead to erroneous SA (Poor situation 
understanding, Poor judgment and Poor decision making).  
 
2.2.4.5 Active data collection 
 
This is where intelligence collection is not disguised. More often than not, this is carried out when an 
investigation is already ongoing. This can be through installation of physical data collection devices, as 
described by Chen, Tan, Xing, Wang & Fu (2012), through collaboration with Internet service 
providers (ISPs) (Huey & Rosenberg, 2004), or through utilising hacking techniques (Varon, 2002). 
Under such circumstances, organisations dealing with data are forced to collaborate with the security 
agencies. Ethical hacking occurs on a large scale during such activities, where government agencies 
can use it to gather more intelligence. Virus infection is another method that can be employed by 
intelligence services as an offensive approach. By introducing a virus, such as a law-enforcement 
Trojan, a government’s intelligence services are able to discover their cyber enemies. This is achieved 
by noting those who try to terminate the government-powered virus (Chen, 2010). Such intelligence is 
important because it can help in ascertaining the origin of a given cyber attack. It can also be used in 
tracking cyber traffic; hence aiding in formulating measures and strategies that can help to improve 
cyber security (Theohary & Collins, 2011). Therefore, an active approach will provide more 
intelligence that can be compared with what is already seen in the passive approach, which eventually 
will aid in building proper cyber SA to deter cyber attacks. So, any cyber SA theory should take into 
account in enhancing cyber intelligence in order to enhance cyber security. 
2.2.5 Collaboration and Sharing Cyber Intelligence 
 
Current developments in information technology have been a major boost to the ways in which people 
conduct business. However, there is a challenge to associate equivalent developments with 
technological developments. There have been quite widespread incidents of cyber insecurity. Some of 
the unlawful activities committed through cyber crime include hacking, stealing of identities, stealing 
of copyrights and business secrets, cyber bullying and white-collar crime, such as fraud and 
embezzlement of funds (Ginovsky, 2012: 22).  
 
These challenges have made the world in general realise that there is the need to act proactively and 
protect people from incidences of cyber attack (McGraw, 2013: 109). Cyber security has become a 
major security concern. According to White House.gov (2013: 1), cyber incidents are one of the major 
security challenges facing the US, to which no solution has been derived yet. According to Kaser 
(2012: 3), the US government decided on a Cyberspace Policy Review with three principal goals. First 
of all, it aimed to create a comprehensive line of defence to modern threats. Secondly, it sought to 
safeguard the nation from the full measure of the threats. Thirdly, it sought to protect the future of the 
cyberspace environment (House.gov, 2013: 2). This latter part stressed the importance of the primary 
goal: establishment of a front-line defence to face modern day threats. It aims to do this by asserting 
the fact that horizontal collaboration is needed, where organisations work hand in hand to curb this 
menace (Solansky & Beck, 2009: 852). 
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Solansky & Beck (2009: 830) indicate that cyber terrorism has become a major security challenge, 
matching up to other acts of terrorism. This threat does not only face the public; indeed, the private 
sector and investors are equal targets. Therefore, these actors are just as keen as the government to 
make sure that such crimes are prevented. Peterson (2013: 120) indicates that the vulnerability of the 
critical infrastructure in the US predisposes them to cyber attacks. This threat calls for the concerned 
parties to come together and form a robust group to counter this challenge. The Economist (2013: 61) 
posits that there have been several attempts to solve this problem. Among them is the Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA). This is where the private sector and the UK 
government share cyber intelligence in order to help fight cyber crime. This calls for collaboration 
between the concerned parties as this bring down the of cyber security especially for SMEs (Lewis, 
Louvieris, Abbott, Clewley, & Jones, 2014). 
 
Collaboration helps in gathering more information on cyber attack. House.gov (2013: 3) has it that 
when all the concerned parties bring to the table what little they have on cyber attacks, then it is 
possible to build a case on the notorious incidences, the frequency of their occurrence and the manner 
in which they are executed. With such information, it is possible to get into the minds of the 
perpetrators and predict their next move. This would help in countering them and curbing their 
activities. While this seems like a great idea for dealing with cyber security, it has to be noted that 
information sharing is not really as horizontal, as it should be. For instance, The Economist (2013: 62) 
argues that some cyber crime regulation measures involve regulation of networks. This has been done 
by the US Congress as well as the European Commission. Such occurrences cast doubt as to whether 
horizontal sharing can actually work. Some people feel that it is a move intended by the government to 
intrude into the private affairs of individuals (Albanesius, 2012: 1). This is the reason why the CISPA 
bill was so controversial, just like the SOPA bill, which sought to prevent online piracy. The argument 
is that through information sharing, people’s private information would be freely accessible by the 
government (Kaser, 2012: 3), and that this would constitute an abuse of the Bill of Rights, whereby 
everyone is entitled to privacy. 
 
House.gov (2013: 2) observes that sharing of information helps the concerned parties to deal with 
cyber threats. At this point, it has to be noted that cyber crime is quite elusive. As technology evolves, 
so does the nature and extent of the cyber crimes. As such, the methods derived by one party to deal 
with a given threat can soon become obsolete (Peterson, 2013: 123). As such, it can be quite time and 
resource consuming for one party to continually derive new methods of dealing with the incidents. This 
can be very uneconomical (Ginovsky, 2012: 25). However, when the parties come together and form a 
unity of purpose, they create a pool of information. Every party contributes intelligence gathered and 
the control methods they have derived. A combination of these strategies leads to the creation of a 
formidable force which can be used to crack down on the cyber terrorists. The US government has 
realised this, which is the reason why it came up with the policy of sharing information on cyber crime 
and cyber incidents. It is a way of building up a body of knowledge on this contemporary problem so 
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as to help all the concerned parties steer clear of the threats (Solansky & Beck, 2009: 860). 
Furthermore, House.gov (2013: 3) indicates that sharing of cyber intelligence is a strategy that can be 
used to get up to date, solid and reliable information on cyber situation awareness. This increased 
quality of information and awareness is important since it acts as a red flag for the organisations. 
 
Again, this point seeks to prove that horizontal collaboration and sharing of cyber intelligence is the 
way to go. However, critics of the CISPA are of the opinion that this is just a strategy of the 
government to meddle in people’s lives. Kaser (2012: 3) argues that the CISPA Act is just a 
masquerade by the government to enforce censorship and surveillance. The provisions seem to go 
against the rules concerning privacy, data security and cloud computing. This argument, however, is 
thwarted by Albanesius (2012b: 1), who indicates that some private companies realise the need for 
such collaboration. He gives the example of Facebook, which supported the bill, arguing that it acts as 
a bridge between the private sector and the government to team up and fight against a common foe. 
Therefore, all parties would benefit. 
 
Another benefit from sharing of intelligence and collaborating in confronting cyber crime is that it 
helps in the construction of a strong cyber situational awareness, and so better protection for CNI. 
Everyone understands the potential threats, possible roots of attack and likely modes of attack 
(Albanesius, 2012b). As such, individuals, companies, states, firms and individuals know how to evade 
the pitfalls that can expose them to cyber attacks. Proper channels of reporting and dealing with cyber 
incidents are created, ensuring that no incidence goes unaddressed. Such a task force could be the key 
to saving a nation from the spectre of cyber crimes (McGraw, 2013: 121). 
 
From a critical point of view, it can be argued that there are two major sides in relation to the CISPA 
and the Cyber Security Bill. On one side are the supporters, who argue that all concerned parties need 
to come together and work as one in order to counter the threat of cyber crime. The parties need to pull 
their resources together and create a robust team to curb cyber incidents in order to protect the nation’s 
interests and resources (Solansky & Beck, 2009: 65). On the other side are those who argue that the 
bills are just disguises by the government, allowing them access to people’s personal information. One 
undeniable fact is that such measures are needed to prevent cyber terrorism. Therefore, the parties need 
to find a common ground where they can work together for the good of all (Albanesius, 2012b: 2). 
 
In conclusion, this section has highlighted the importance of collaboration and intelligence sharing for 
the prevention of cyber crime and cyber incidents. It has looked at the challenge of cyber crime and the 
efficacy of collaboration in dealing with it. From the discussion, it has emerged that cyber crime and 
terrorist incidents are major security challenges in the modern world. Such crimes are elusive because 
they continuously evolve over time, as technology evolves. For this reason, it would not be financially 
economical, and more time consuming, for a single entity to try and deal with the cyber attacks. 
Instead, the concerned parties should come together and form a union of purpose that can liberate them 
from this menace. Such a move would help in gathering meaningful intelligence on cyber crime, and 
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consequently help in the building a strong force that could effectively deal with the problem. Finally, 
the whole process would enhance an organisation’s situational awareness, where resources and effort 
would be distributed among collaborating parties. This is a very cheap type of intelligence that cyber 
SA can use to learn and understand cyber incidents much better so that proper projections can be made. 
Therefore, Cyber Intelligence sharing is an essential dimension that must be incorporated in any cyber 
SA theory and model. 
2.5.6 SA Agility 
 
Albert & Hayes (2006) state: “SA agility is perhaps the most important attribute to SA approach” (57), 
and “the ability to recognize a need to change and the ability to adjust are associated with agility” (43), 
while pointing to the fact that agility is crucial for SA, since it ensures that the commander/operator 
remains alert enough to recognise the changes and to make necessary adjustments. In addition, they 
also make it clear that availability of appropriate resources, and the ability of utilising the same, 
contributes highly to agility.  According to them, agility is composed of the following characteristics: 
  
 Robustness – effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations and conditions; 
 Resilience – the ability to rebound from damage or misfortune; 
 Responsiveness – the ability to act within windows of opportunity; 
 Innovation – the ability to do new things or old things in new ways; 
 Flexibility – the ability to accomplish missions in multiple ways; and  
 Adaptation – the ability to alter process and organization to improve effectiveness or 
efficiency.(Albert & Hayes, 2006: 189).  
 
SA agility contains three independent variables, which are Timeliness, Adaptation and Responsiveness. 
Timeliness within this context covers several ideas, such as the availability of information relative to 
the time when it is needed, awareness attained relative to the time when it is needed, understanding 
achieved relative to the time when it is needed, the timing of a decision corresponding to the time when 
it is needed for action and timeliness of command intent (Albert & Hayes, 2006). The importance of 
timeliness in situational awareness is that through it organisations can predict the next possible attack, 
the mode of attack or the areas vulnerable to attack. Therefore, measures can be put in place so as to 
make sure that the appropriate actions are taken before it is too late. Intelligence’s failure to have this 
characteristic means that an organisation will forever be going for curative measures, rather than 
preventive measures (Huerta, d’ Entremont & González, 2006). Timely intervention can be the only 
solution, and this can only be facilitated by timely cyber intelligence. 
 
Adaptability refers to the extent to which an SA model or approach can be modified in order to 
accommodate new developments (Saraswat, Pankaj & Rani, 2010: 555). As is well known, the world 
of IT is never a static one. On the contrary, there are developments coming in day after day. Similarly, 
attackers keep on changing their tactics. As such, an approach that might have been effective at a given 
time might soon become obsolete. At this point, it has to be noted that the costs and duration of the 
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process of coming up with an SA model is quite high. In order to ensure agility in SA, there is the need 
to have a flexible, dynamic model that can accommodate changes in the future (Saraswat, Pankaj & 
Rani, 2010: 555); as opposed to a static model, which cannot be altered. The latter would cost the 
implementing company a considerable amount. Therefore, it is arguable that a flexible model is more 
agile due to the fact that the flexible model will provide better agile intelligence, as it can be changed 
as per the developments in technology. It also remains active and relevant for longer. 
 
Responsiveness refers to the ability to deal with fleeting opportunities available in all operating fields, 
such as in the tactical arena or at the operational and strategic levels. In addition, it refers to the ability 
to do new things, or to do old things in new ways (Huerta, d’Entremont & González, 2006). The 
significance of responsiveness lies on the fact that the pace of change has increased across the globe, 
while the adversaries have become more adept (Albert & Hayes, 2006).  
2.2.7 SA Quality 
 
SA quality provides the basis for agility, observe Albert & Hayes (2006), where the connotation of 
quality even covers the characteristics of SA agility. Apart from that, it is the quality of decisions, 
quality of planning and quality of execution that highly contributes to SA quality. Therefore, accuracy 
and reliability should be identified and put into consideration while building cyber Situational 
Awareness, as these two variables show how SA is being approached.  
 
Accuracy of intelligence is vital in cyber security (Lehr & Pupillo, 2009). The persistence of the 
challenges in cyber security can be attributed to a lack of accurate information as to who prosecutes the 
attacks, when, or where they are initiated. Hu & Jiang (2012) indicate that there have been efforts to 
ensure this aspect of accuracy in intelligence. The concern for accuracy of intelligence resides on the 
fact that intelligence is vital in ensuring cyber security which, on the other hand, is very important as it 
helps in safeguarding company secrets, identities, and other sensitive information. The cyber security 
systems work based on the available information. Therefore, if the intelligence is not certain, 
organisations might invest a lot of money blindly, yet this suffers from the same fate they seek to 
evade. For this reason, it cannot be denied that accuracy of cyber intelligence is crucial for 
organisations’ situational awareness. 
 
There is also the aspect of Reliability. Even if organisations have all the intelligence needed, reliability 
is important to ensure that the information is actually helpful. Unreliable intelligence can mean that 
cyber security personnel work with uncertainty, thereby providing a loophole that can be exploited by 
cyber crime perpetrators. GAO (2000) indicates that, for a long time, reliability of intelligence has 
proven to be wanting mainly because there is no organised manner in which the intelligence can be 
gathered. On the contrary, different parties retain small pockets of information. As a result, most of 
them have certain amounts of information, but not in a comprehensive manner. This makes it hard to 
make any headway in dealing with cyber crime. To curb this situation and ensure reliability of 
information, Bhaskar (2006) indicates that there is the need for collaboration between the concerned 
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parties. This is the only way through which they can pool the information together and make sense of 
it. Otherwise, the current disintegration in intelligence renders the intelligence unreliable. 
2.3 SELF-DEFENCE: LEGAL ASPECT 
 
Cyber crime is a growing, global problem. Despite intense efforts by law enforcement officers to stop 
the practice, cyber crime continues to spread. Brenner (2010) says that, partly, the growth of cyber 
crime stems from the extra-territorial nature of the practice. On the contrary, Wall (2007) argues that 
the growth of cyber crime mainly stems from the changing nature of such crimes. The abuse of new 
technology has also led to the spread of this practice. Consequently, there have been rising numbers of 
cyber attacks in the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries have reported cyber crimes 
for many years, and, despite greater attempts to curb their spread, they continue to increase. Loader 
(2013) states that developing countries, which do not have established Internet networks, also report 
increased incidences of cyber crime. 
 
The American government has treated cyber security with utmost importance. In fact, the US 
Homeland Security considers America as a breeding ground for cyber crimes. This is because America 
is not only a victim of such attacks, but also the source of most attacks (Schell, 2004) (Parish & 
Goostree, 2013). The Anti-Phishing Working Group produced statics that show the growth of cyber 
crimes within the past years (Chik, 2007). Increased awareness of cyber crime in the UK and America 
has largely driven the rise in the number of cyber crime litigation in both countries. However, most of 
these litigations do not have a common legislative basis.  
 
This section explores the nature of cyber crime in the context of the laws of defence in the US and the 
UK, while seeking to find the legal background support the development of active cyber SA that relies 
on the offensive method as self-defence in cyber space to fight cyber attacks. In the subsequent 
sections the legal underpinnings of such laws are considered. Significant emphasis is made to compare 
the application of the laws of defence on cyber crime with the application of the same laws in the 
‘physical world’. In this regard, this section explores the laws of defence (as outlined by the UN), the 
right to bear arms, and the implications of these laws in cyberspace. This is because active defence and 
active SA have to deal with or operate within the constraints of a legal framework. 
2.3.1 UK and US Laws on Cyber Crime 
 
2.3.1.1 America 
 
Since federal and state governments govern American states, the process of formulating laws is divided 
between the state and federal governments. Usually, state laws are more applicable to cyber crime, 
unless there is a special situation where there is a need for federal intervention (Chik, 2007). For 
example, when cyber crime threatens national security, federal cyber laws may apply. Alternatively, 
when the prevention of cyber crime requires the uniform application of law, the federal government 
may intervene in the formulation (or enforcement) of such laws. Therefore, because of the distributed 
functions of state and federal governments, both governments have historically contributed to the 
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formulation and enforcement of cyber law. Nonetheless, because of the political differences in 
America, every state formulates and enforces its own laws. There is therefore no legal requirement for 
all American states to adopt uniform laws (Chik, 2007).  
 
There are also regulations which apply to jurisdiction in cyber protection. According to the Tallin 
Manual (2013), both the federal and state regulations apply within the territory of jurisdiction. As such, 
it is illegal for a state or the government to engage in activities that would lead to perforation of the 
cyber sovereignty of another nation or state, on whichever platform. Furthermore, rules apply that a 
state bears responsibility for cyber operations attributable to the said state. As such, the state would be 
answerable to any irregularity associated with cyber activities within its jurisdiction. Lachow (2013) 
notices that, despite the already existing regulations, there is a need for the US government to “provide 
greater clarity on which ACD actions are legal and which ones are not” (10). This is mainly because 
there are different approaches that the institutions might take in trying to curb cyber insecurity. Some 
of the options seem to be almost legal, while others are almost illegal. Clear guidance needs to be given 
on the same so as to avoid confusion. 
 
2.3.1.2 UK 
 
Specific legislations on cyber crime in Europe inform the UK’s cyber laws. Indeed, there is a close 
relationship between Europe’s public policy on self-defence and the UK’s legislation on the same. For 
example, the UK is subject to cyber crime legislations, as formulated by the Council of Europe (CoE). 
Therefore, the provisions of self-defence laws (under the convention) are applicable in the UK, just as 
they are applicable in other European countries that are signatories to the convention. The close 
historical, geographic and economic relations between the UK and Europe inform the close 
interconnection between the UK’s and Europe’s cyber laws.  
 
Nonetheless, the most common law governing cyber crime in the UK is the Computer Misuse Act of 
1990 (Emm, 2012). The UK government has, however, updated this act with newer and stiffer 
penalties. The impetus to update this law came from the inadequacies of existing laws to curb hacking 
activities within the UK. Even more so, this issue came into sharp focus when previously existing 
legislations failed to convict Stephen Gold and Robert Schifreen for gaining unauthorised access to a 
UK organisation, BT Prestel services. Because of the inadequacy of the law to convict the two 
suspects, the court acquitted them (Emm, 2012). 
 
The UK cyber laws also take an international perspective. A report by the House of Commons (2013) 
indicated that the UK recognises the actions of NATO as well as its international allies such as the US 
in dealing with cyber insecurity. The House of Commons sets out the regulations under which the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) can implement cyber insecurity control measures without compromising 
the cyber sovereignty and integrity of other nations and partners. The report also stressed the fact that 
when dealing with cyber intelligence laws, the UK and its partners have to adhere to international 
standards such as those stipulated by NATO. It is clear enough that the current situation is still a grey 
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area. There are no clear laws allowing active defence, even though the UK’s MoD can respond to cyber 
insecurity.  
2.3.2 The Right of Defence 
 
Normally, every country has a right to defend its people against any form of attack. However, 
technological advancements have introduced a new form of attack, which contravenes the conventional 
wisdom regarding the right to self-defence. Cyberspace is the platform where conventional rules of 
self-defence have been broken (Arsene, 2012). However, as Moore (2010) observes, several countries 
still adopt a conventional approach to preventing cyber attacks. For example, the US uses the military 
to defend the country against cyber attacks. Arsene (2012) questions the justification for doing so, 
because there are many risks associated with adopting a military approach to defending a country 
against cyber attacks. One risk is the overlap of self-defence and conventional-space defensive 
strategies. In other words, militarising cyber security may take a war-like approach, which should not 
be the case. Therefore, while conventional wisdom may approve the use of force in conventional space, 
use of force as a right to self-defence may not work in the cyber world. Therefore, even though a cyber 
attack may manifest the same characteristics as a conventional attack, responding to such an attack 
with force may be unlawful (Arsene, 2012).  
 
People often compare the self-defence law to the English law. Researchers say this law is part of 
private defence because it allows for the use of illegal means to prevent an attack (or protect a country 
from harm) (Himma, 2008). In Britain, this law stems from common law and the Criminal Law Act of 
1967 (Samaha, 2005). One common principle of self-defence rules focuses on the use of reasonable 
force to prevent an attack. Therefore, according to the nature of the law, self-defence is more of a 
justification than an excuse (Scheb, 2012: 417). Globally, the right of self-defence against cyber attacks 
is still an unresolved issue. Indeed, because of some of the complexities identified when comparing 
cyber attacks with conventional attacks, it is difficult for countries to exercise (blindly) their right to 
self-defence without considering the unique dynamics of cyber attacks (Committee on Deterring Cyber 
Attacks, 2010: 163).  
 
The UK and the US share the same approach to cyber attacks. Both countries propose the use of force 
when cyber attacks result in death, injury, harm or destruction of property. However, the US has been 
most vocal about this provision. In fact, there are loud calls in the US to treat cyber attacks like 
‘ordinary’ attacks if they cause death or property destruction (Committee on Deterring Cyber Attacks, 
2010). The US Defence Department claims that it will not hesitate to use force to defend itself against 
cyber attacks that can kill, destroy property or harm its people.  
 
2.3.2.1 The right of defence as per the UN law and proportionality of response 
 
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter describes situations when countries can use force for self-defence 
(Ellen, 2012). The clause discourages the use of force as a means to solve international conflicts, but it 
approves it when states need to defend themselves from external aggression. Article 51 of the UN 
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Charter stipulates this provision (Ellen, 2012). Many people have interpreted the provision of the 
charter as either supporting or opposing the use of force as a self-defence mechanism in cyberspace 
attacks (Jasper, 2012). Here, the main dilemma centres on whether to use force, even when there is no 
armed attack (such as in cyberspace). Some analysts have approved the use of force in such situations, 
while others reject the use of force (Ellen, 2012).  
 
Because of the dilemma caused by the application of Article 51 (the use of force as a self-defence 
mechanism), the International Court of Justice has been forced to interpret the use of force as a self-
defence mechanism. Milhorn (2007) explains the court’s ruling by demonstrating that the use of force 
as a self-defence mechanism only applies to situations where there is a significant and real threat to a 
country. The charter also stipulates that the use of force only applies to the specific country that wants 
to defend itself (Ellen, 2012). Moreover, the article says that the intention to defend the country using 
force should show a high probability of success. Lastly, the charter says that the force applied should 
be proportional to the potential damage suffered from the attack (Schiller, 2010). However, in 
cyberspace, waiting for damage means acting in a passive way to the threat of cyber attack, whereas by 
taking an active approach this damage could be avoided through adopting a proper response to the 
cyber attacker. 
 
All the above stipulations are difficult to apply in cyberspace. In fact, some observers say it is 
impossible to apply the above provisions to combat cyber crime (Wyler, 2005). Usually, complications 
arise when determining whether any direct loss of life (or any loss of property) meets the conditions for 
triggering article 51. Broadly speaking, it is often difficult to find the evidence that would trigger the 
activation of article 51.  
 
The complications brought by the nature of cyber crime also pose a challenge to the implementation of 
article 51 of the UN charter because some cyber crimes are difficult to trace to one country. Moreover, 
even if a state traces the source of the attack to one country, they may not know the individual who is 
directing the attack (Wyler, 2005). For example, an attacker may infiltrate innocent servers and use 
them to direct the attacks, such as a zombie. However, it is true that sometimes attribution might be 
difficult to trace, but the utilisation of active defence and active SA are the ways to establish the source 
of attacks. Furthermore, trying to trace such attackers may consume a lot of time. Estonia and Iran 
provide examples of the difficulty of tracing attackers, because even though the countries experienced 
cyber attacks a few years back, they were still unable to discover the real identity of the attackers due 
to the fact that no active measures were in place, so both failed in the process of defence and 
identification of the attacker.  
 
Lastly, the main issue affecting the use of force (as stipulated in article 51 of the UN charter) rests on 
the need to prove proportionality and necessity (Himma, 2008: 410). Apart from the time-consuming 
nature of attempting to uncover the identity of attackers, it is also difficult to prove that allowing a 
counter-attack may achieve the objective of preventing the attack. Similarly, it is difficult to limit the 
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effects on intended targets if a defensive attack occurs. According to the strict circumstances within 
which the UN allows defensive attacks, it is difficult to meet the criteria for launching an armed attack 
against cyber crime (Carr, 2011: 50). Therefore, even though cyber attacks may interfere with a 
country’s economic sphere, air space, maritime space and/or territorial integrity, it is difficult to depend 
on article 51 of the UN charter to justify defensive attacks on cyber crimes. This issue is considered to 
have implications for the development of active cyber SA and active defence. 
 
2.3.2.2. Right to bear arms 
 
In the UK, the right to bear arms is part of English common law (Wyler, 2005). Scholars such as 
Aristotle and Machiavelli (Kates Jr, 1992) also recognised this right to be part of a person’s right to 
self-defence. Similarly, the US constitution also acknowledges the right to bear arms as part of self-
defence. The same protection is replicated in several state constitutions. Still in the US, the government 
introduced the right to bear arms as a Second Amendment to the Bill of Rights.  
 
Parliamentary supremacy in the UK has, however, imposed many regulations governing the right to 
bear arms. For example, the prerogative to control the right to bear arms shifted from the monarch to 
parliament, of which the Pistol Act of 1903 was the main legislative provision (Wyler, 2005). The right 
to bear arms covers several weapons that are deemed offensive according to the law. Knives and 
firearms are the main weapons considered offensive by the UK law. 
 
While the right to bear arms may be a critical part of self-defence law, its applicability in cyberspace is 
impractical. Indeed, the right to bear arms aims to protect a person from a physical assault (or harm). 
However, attacks in the cyber world are intangible but the effect in the real world is tangible. Similarly, 
as with other situations described in this thesis, it is difficult to know the attacker. Therefore, it is 
equally difficult to apply the right to bear arms as a means to protect a person from cyberspace attacks. 
However, since cyber attacks are getting more sophisticated, and cyber criminals are using active 
methods to attack, then the cyber self-defence law should be modified to allow active defence and 
active cyber SA. 
2.3.3 Case Study and Discussion 
 
Cyber space security poses unique challenges to the application of self-defence laws. For example, 
when two people share organisational resources through open port access, it is difficult to establish the 
legal justification for using self-defence legal provisions if an attacker tries to infiltrate the cyber 
network. This situation is true when one party gives another party the authority to gain access to the 
organisation’s resources, where the second party responds to a security threat through the established 
connection. Technically, the second party would not be breaching the law because he/she is responding 
to the attacker through an established connection.    
 
In the above situation, it is difficult to establish the right legal framework for approaching the issue, 
because the intention of the attacker is not established. If the second party knew the intention of the 
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attacker, it would be easier to justify the action of the second party who acts in self-defence. This 
scenario is played out in the Computer Misuse Act, which seeks to establish the intention of the 
attacker (first) before any legal consequences are determined. Without knowing the intention of the 
attacker, it is difficult to establish that the law has been broken. However, a hack is a hack, irrespective 
of intention. It is the behaviour which is illegal, and so in order to establish cyber self-defence, 
lawmakers should consider this behaviour in order to draw up the most suitable law. 
 
An incident that occurred in the UK in 2004 demonstrates the need to establish the intention of the 
attacker before castigating that attacker. Here, an organisation accused a teenager of destroying a server 
by sending millions of mails to the server (Ellen, 2012). However, the court ruled that the defendant 
had not contravened the Computer Misuse Act because his actions did not lead to any unauthorised 
changes to the information on the computers. The failure to prove the intention of the defendant proved 
to be the biggest weakness here. However, if the organisation had been able to prove that the teenager 
had changed the information on their servers, they would have established the intention of the attack 
and held the defendant liable for his actions. However, they failed to do so. 
 
The above case highlights the need to establish the intention of an attacker who tries to gain access to a 
cyber network. In the absence of a determined intention from the attacker, it is difficult to justify a 
response to an enemy threat. Therefore, the existence of the intention to gain unauthorised access to a 
cyber attack does not provide sufficient grounds to warrant a counter-attack. However, if the attacker 
were to go further and alter information on a server, there would be substantial grounds for a response 
– sufficient to warrant a conviction which may come late and not be sufficient in a case where the 
target is a national critical infrastructure. 
 
Self-defence laws aim to protect people and organisations from injury or harm. However, the changing 
technological nature of the environment has brought new challenges to the applicability of these laws. 
Often, they have been forced to play catch up to confront cyberspace attacks, and even developing 
countries are still grappling with the challenge of enforcing self-defence laws without contravening 
other laws. This section demonstrates that the provision for the enforcement of self-defence laws poses 
unique challenges to the enforcement of the same laws in the cyber world. Therefore, although cyber 
attacks may bear the same characteristics of armed attacks, it is difficult for organisations to evoke self-
defence laws, even those outlined by article 51 of the UN charter. Some of the unique challenges posed 
to the enforcement of self-defence laws in the cyber world include proportionality issues, the trans-
national nature of cyber attacks, and the difficulty experienced in identifying the attacker. In spite of 
the legal debate, active defence is a reality، hence active SA needs to be understood in order to defend 
against it at the very least. 
 
Besides the above challenges, it is similarly difficult to invoke self-defence laws (at least in the 
conventional way) in cyber attacks because cyber attacks (often) do not lead to direct loss of life, even 
though effects in the network have corresponding effects in real life. Therefore, there is a significant 
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mismatch between the uses of armed attacks (as a self-defence mechanism) in the physical world 
because it is difficult to satisfy the conditions for approving armed attacks in cyberspace.  
 
The recent case in 2014 between Ukraine and Russia, when Russia took control of the Crimea, justifies 
the legitimacy of using active offensive action in cyberspace. The two countries were in a state of war, 
and Ukraine’s (Kiev’s) network infrastructure (communication network) was targeted, leading to 
massive disruption of the mobile network in Kiev (Lee, 2014). In this situation, Ukraine was already at 
war with Russia, and since Ukraine’s cyberspace was targeted, then it should be legal for Ukraine to 
respond to the attack in order to defend itself. Consequently, active defence and active SA should be 
implemented so that nations can protect their interests from cyber attacks. 
 
This section has highlighted the significant differences and similarities in the applicability of defence 
laws in the UK and the US. By the nature of their geography and distribution, both countries are 
subject to larger legislative provisions in their cyber laws. For example, the UK is a signatory to 
European laws on cyber attacks, while cyber defence laws that the federal government formulates also 
bind American states. Even though cyber defence laws continue to evolve in these countries, English 
common law is the basis of their enforcement. In America, the Bill of Rights also plays a critical role in 
the enforcement of these laws. Nonetheless, as the analysis in this chapter shows, there is a clear trend 
towards the militarisation of self-defence laws in cyberspace (especially in the US) (Greenwald, 2012: 
2). Analysts should treat this trend with a lot of caution, because the militarisation of self-defence laws 
in the cyber world may fail to achieve the same objectives they would achieve in the ‘real’ world. It 
appears that cyber self-defence is a moot point, but the legitimacy of active SA and active offensive 
defence depends on the context and the level of threat a country’s CNI faces, or whether it takes place 
in the context of an act of war. The question now presents itself: are active SA and active SA 
legitimised when implemented together with kinetic warfare activities (as in the Ukraine and Russia 
case)? It is therefore pertinent and important for international and local laws to encompass the unique 
dynamics of cyberspace attacks. The introduction of a new set of laws to accommodate these dynamics 
may be a good start for many countries to address the unique challenges of the cyber world so active 
defence and active SA can be developed correctly while lined and supported by law. 
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2.4 EMERGING POINTS AND ACTIVE SA HYPOTHESISED THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
Within the context of this study, an important argument emerges from the literature review: If 
converting the SA into successful decision-making happens to be the central tenet of SA utilisation, 
and if it requires appropriate channels (knowledge/software programs) to obtain the desired outcome, 
then it should also be acknowledged that intangible channels such as Attitude or Outlook be considered 
as important instruments to achieve the desired SA utilisation (Endsley, 1995b, 2000; Tadda, 2008).  
For example:  
 Attitude 1: Defensive posture to deter cyber attacks (Defensive attitude) 
 Attitude 2: Offensive posture to deter cyber attacks (Winning attitude) 
 
The three SA models reviewed in this study clearly show their preference for Attitude 1, i.e. a 
defensive mindset which in turn influences the operator to process and utilise knowledge only within 
the concept of attack prevention. Accordingly, all of them focus most on analysing the nature of attacks 
in order to learn about the tactics employed by the attacker. Thus, in this case one can assume that the 
operators would gather certain knowledge only after the occurrence of an attack, instead of creating 
any knowledge that would be new to the attacker and would be capable of managing cyber operations 
without any hassle.  
 
In contrast, Attitude 2 conforms to a military stratagem of Sun Tzu, where the operators would always 
be engaged in creating new knowledge, since Attitude 2 commands an attacking attitude to prevail over 
all possible cyber attacks. At this point, this researcher realises the gravity of adopting an appropriate 
attitude towards SA, since it highly influences the designing of systems; for example, Attitude 2, as 
mentioned above, could result in forming a mirror domain, could include operations such as invading 
the enemy’s domain, could hoodwink attackers by sending them into a mirror domain, could collect 
information about what they want, and could misdirect them with false or fake information through 
deception techniques and so on.  
 
Therefore, from the perspective of Attitude 2, all three models – the JDL Model (purely data-based 
model), Endsley’s Model (mental model) and Tadda’s Model (combination of JDL and Endsley’s 
model) – appear to be suffering from uncertainty, while focusing mostly on self-awareness and 
confining their activities within the host domain. This assumption is consolidated when one learns that 
both Endsley (2000) and Tadda (2008) identify the shortcomings of their model in level 3 of SA, where 
new knowledge is required to nip the attack in the bud. Now, this study has argued that an attitude of 
only blocking attackers would never be enough to win the situation; instead, it would motivate the 
enemies to innovate, creating newer and innovative ways of attack.  
 
Thus, one can identify Attitude 1 as a reactive approach (existing models) and Attitude 2 as a proactive 
approach (required new models), where existing models function as below:   
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Figure 2.9: Attitude 1: Reactive approach (existing models) (Source: Author) 
2.4.1 Models Using the Reactive Approach Are Inadequate in the Present Context 
 
Models using a reactive approach can be considered as low-resolution models in the present context. 
The increased dynamism of the cyber world is the first point that negates adopting a reactive approach, 
as it encompasses only past knowledge that can be used to address the enemy’s attack. The futility of 
such an approach can be understood by anyone who keeps tabs on recent developments in the cyber 
world. For example, the Department of the US Army has observed that trends in the cyber world are 
changing rapidly, since Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is continuously improving 
in all areas of cyber operations. Accordingly, the army conducted an assessment that led to several 
indicators. First, the army’s current vocabulary, including CNO (computer network operations), EW 
(electronic warfare) and IO (information operations) are increasingly becoming inadequate due to the 
emergence of several new cyber features. In order to address these challenges, the US army has 
introduced three interrelated dimensions, or full spectrum operations (FSO), where each dimension 
contains its own set of causal logic and commands a focused development of solutions. Therefore, 
active defence and active SA are already integrated into the US approach, as active SA is considered 
legitimate by the US army to use when deployed on a mission.  
 
The first dimension of FSO refers to the psychological contest of wills against enemies who are 
implacable, warring factions, criminal groups, and other potential adversaries. The second dimension 
of FSO refers to strategic engagement, which involves keeping friends at home, gaining allies abroad 
and generating support or empathy for missions. The third dimension refers to cyber-electromagnetic 
contests, which involve gaining, maintaining and exploiting technological advantage (TRADOC, 
2010). It becomes clear at this point that the cyber commanders require: 
 
a) Winning the psychological contests of wills against enemies; 
b) Creating quality local and global allies; 
c) Winning cyber-electromagnetic contests. 
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Judging from the above perspective, one is forced to admit that the SA models that operate only with 
limited (past) knowledge, such as the Endsley/JDL/Fusion models, are low-resolution models, which 
do not have enough requisite variety to deliver what the cyber commanders require in order to achieve 
the above three goals, because all of these goals involve a diverse range of cyber operations, each 
commanding quality level 3 SA operations, requiring the application of new knowledge. We can recall 
at this point that both Endsley (2000) and Tadda (2008) identified the shortcomings of their respective 
models at level 3 of SA, where new knowledge, from a new source of intelligence, is required to nip an 
attack in the bud. 
 
2.4.1.1 The risk quotient becomes very high 
 
The gravity of SA becomes clearer when one reviews the relationships between the three pillars of any 
nation, being its cyber infrastructure, critical infrastructure and physical infrastructure. This can be 
depicted as below:  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10:  Physical, Critical and Cyber Infrastructural Relationships [adapted from DHS (2010)] 
The above diagram clearly highlights several facts:  
 
 First, at the national level, the critical and physical infrastructures are fully dependent on 
favourable interactions between the Internet and the control systems.  
 Second, at the local level, each component of the critical and physical infrastructures requires 
appropriate cyber security to carry out its function.  
 Third, the wired and wireless connections between the components of the critical and physical 
infrastructures require appropriate cyber security to carry out transactions.      
 
Such preconditions clearly establish the fact that the issue of cyber security is extremely important at 
national, local and inter-infrastructural levels. Therefore, one has to concede that the idea of waiting to 
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gain knowledge from an instance of attack in order to use it in a post-attack situation could prove fatal 
for a nation as a whole, especially when the issue is viewed from the perspective of the security of the 
critical and physical infrastructures. Therefore, this strongly prompts the inference that adopting 
Attitude 1, i.e. the reactive approach, could by very risky, as it allows the enemy to apply its new 
knowledge in attack, while the defender has no clue regarding the possible magnitude of the possible 
damage involved. Therefore, the models based on the reactive approach, such as Endsley’s, JDL’s and 
the Fusion models clearly appear to be risky investments, as their failure could be disastrous for a 
nation.  Therefore, a new model to overcome this risk inherent to the reactive approach is required. 
2.4.2 Benefits of the Active Approach in the Present Context 
 
On the other hand, the required new model’s active approach, influenced by Sun Tzu’s military 
strategy, is set out in Figure 2.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Attitude 2: Proactive Approach According to Sun Tzu’s Strategy (required new model) 
(Source: Author) 
The above differences between the existing models and the required new model can also be termed 
Passive SA and Active SA. A classic passive CND (cyber network defence) is composed of multiple 
niche intrusion detection tools, such as password protection, data encryption and firewalls, which carry 
out network data analysis and produce unique alerting outputs (Beaver et al., 2011). Therefore, a CND 
is totally reactive in nature, as it acts only after the attacker has inflicted a certain degree of harm on the 
network. Passive defence typically reacts to pre-defined techniques, such as disabling an account after 
three incorrect logins and notifying the administrator by email of the event; but this could be ignored 
and result in the need to start an investigation into why the account was deactivated, and what was the 
cause (whether the user forgot her/his password or whether it was a hacking attempt). Altogether, these 
tools are inadequate in the sense that hackers devise techniques to penetrate them and launch attacks 
(Holdaway, 2001). In the preceding sections, we have seen that the standard understanding and 
application of SA theory in cyberspace has severe limitations, namely its reliance on intelligence 
captured from local networks; it does not capture all the possible attacks in the environment, nor is it 
dynamic enough to tackle the innovative techniques of cyber attackers, and it activates only when 
incidents occur, and when it is too late to defend. 
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In contrast to the cyber security approach, active defence comprises measures originated by the 
defender against the attacker, which not only thwart the attack in progress, but also ideally make it 
difficult to launch more attacks. Active SA and active defence are about taking the initiative to deny 
the cyber attackers from achieving their purpose. Holdaway (2001) categorises them into three types, 
namely: 
 
1. Counterattack – can be conducted against the attacker’s information system during or 
immediately after the initial attack. 
2. Pre-emptive attack – aimed at the enemy’s information system infrastructure, it is designed in 
such a way that it will deter the enemy from launching effective attacks against the network 
systems.  
3. Active deception – uses the momentum of the attack to defeat it by channelling an attack 
away from the defender’s information scheme and into a practical mould of it. This makes the 
attacker believe it is successful, when in actuality it is neutralised. 
 
For example, active SA might use Benware to act as a law-enforcement Trojan to infiltrate the attacker 
with the agent that can help in gathering information about the attacker and discover what they are 
planning. Such intrusions can include live video feeds, screenshots and/or basic data streams (Varon, 
2002). This will allow the defenders to be active in the enemy’s domain so that more reliable 
intelligence will be fed into their cyber SA, which will eventually lead to better cyber security. 
 
In addition, Benware can be used over time to investigate the information on the attackers’ system and 
use it to gather information about them. The possibilities are truly endless in this case, and the location 
of the attackers could be tracked easily, since Benware could help eliminate the capabilities of the 
proxies used to cover the attackers’ the paths. Benware can establish direct connections to the operator 
in order to triangulate the location of the attackers. It can also act as a client through which to issue 
various commands that can be performed on the attackers’ devices/computers upon request (Theohary 
& Collins, 2011). 
 
Upon gathering enough information, the operator could use Benware to act as a law enforcement 
Trojan, whereby the operator would infiltrate the attackers’ system with the agent, which can help in 
gathering information about the attackers and know what they are planning to do next. This could 
include a live video feed, screenshots and/or basic data streams (Chen, 2010). 
 
2.4.2.1 Anticipated advantages of active defence 
 
Essentially, the best defence is a strong offense, and many countries have adopted this offensive 
strategy to deny criminal or terrorist forces’ attempts to control or use the Internet for their own illegal 
purposes through the creation of good botnets (Theohary & Collins, 2011). Furthermore, active defence 
involves constant patrolling in cyberspace, and such patrols can detect, deny, pursue and destroy 
websites, malicious software and several other cyber agents and computer hardware held by those with 
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criminal and/or terrorist intentions (Varon, 2002). In addition, patrolling offers faster and more 
accurate information about future threats, including their source, machinery and architecture. This 
enables an organisation to upgrade its intelligence system to a level from where it can scan many nodes 
and secure vital intelligence. This in turn makes the organisation far more capable of detecting the type 
of attack, the movement of the attacker within the network, any security credentials that have been 
compromised and what data have been stolen or destroyed (HBGary, 2013). Finally, it works as a real 
threat of counterattack/response, making the hackers wary of conducting an attack in the first place, in 
addition to delivering tangible means of penalising them. 
2.5 HYPOTHESISED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ACTIVE SA MODEL  
 
The essence of the review generates the following points underpinning this study: 
 
1. The cyber commander should possess an attitude/mindset of being offensive in taking on all 
cyber attacks, instead of adopting a defensive attitude; 
2. Such an attitude would encourage the operator to decisively create new knowledge, as a 
winning attitude within this context requires new knowledge; 
3. The cyber commander then should create and exploit new knowledge through appropriate 
channels, such as an appropriate SA model, which would enable the operator to exploit multi-
domain ambience, invade attackers’ domains, and apply deception tactics; 
4. An aggressive strategy appears capable of defeating the attackers even before they can resort 
to any harmful operation in operator’s domain; 
5. Finally, the operator should be able to achieve the desired outcome, i.e., managing, retaining 
and improving the desired cyber operations. 
 
Such preconditions can be framed in the following manner: 
 
Figure 2.12: Theoretical Framework Emerged from Literature Review (Source: Author) 
No one can deny the fact that most of the organisations dealing with sensitive data relating to one or 
more infrastructures of national importance cannot afford to wait for an attack incident to occur and 
then react, because the consequences may already be severe at that point. Such a state of affairs thus 
consolidates the argument in favour of a more proactive and offensive approach to effectively protect 
the network. Therefore, the findings of the literature review demands formulation of a new channel, i.e. 
a new SA model or system that would complement the winning attitude, such as enabling the cyber 
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commander to employ an appropriate deception technique involving a multi-domain environment. It is 
here that the Active SA Model (ASAM) proposed by this study fits in, where its tasks within the 
context can be framed as below:  
 
 ASAM will interact with adversaries; 
 ASAM will be activated once an attack gets redirected; 
 ASAM will use deception (new knowledge for the attacker) through redirecting the attacker 
to a deception server; 
 ASAM will use spyware such as Benware, if so needed, to control the adversaries and to get 
into their domain; 
 ASAM will influence the enemy through deception, which will affect their own SA.  
 
The cutting edge aspect of ASAM would be the new knowledge it generates, which would act as the 
force multiplier. The tasks mentioned above highlight the role of intelligence (creation and application 
of new knowledge), which in turn helps this study to further narrow down the role of ASAM to create a 
compact theoretical model, in the following manner:  
 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Compact Hypothesised Theoretical Model of ASAM (Source: Author) 
We have argued the role of intelligence is extremely crucial for an endeavour such as the creation of 
the ASAM model, which needs to be continually updated with knowledge regarding the possible 
enemies (capabilities, resources, plans, motives etc.), since that knowledge will form the basis of a 
counter action. However, there is no literature on any specific type of cyber intelligence that can be 
exploited within this novel context except the concept put forward by Sun Tzu, who specifically 
focused on the intelligence of one party used to defeat the other. His strategy involves the concept of 
yin and yang in Taoist philosophy, which suits the cyber situation well, since it covers all possible 
situations, especially where the issue of intelligence is involved. For example, the integration of 
networks takes place in the mind of the commander, which includes cyber support and the intelligence 
fusion centre. By deception in cyberspace, the mind of the commander can be attacked (Cahanin, 2011; 
Nakashima, 2010; Thomas, 2009). Thus, the merit of the above concept prompted this researcher to 
rely on the variables situated in the framework of this model (Table 2.7). This study has also taken a 
leaf from computer forensics, which is a process of constructing cyber incidents and understanding 
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incident kill chains, besides aiming to define and identify hackers, hacking impacts, the resources and 
tools involved in hacking, and enemy plans and their motives. Altogether, the literature prompted this 
study to believe that commanders in a cyber war should direct their intelligence operations to focus on 
gathering information that allows denying the cyber attackers from achieving their purpose.  
 
 
Figure 2.14: Knowledge and Intelligence Involved in SA (Source: Author) 
Since a cyberwar is no less important than a real-time war as cyber is an integral part, it is part of the 
global commons, it becomes pertinent to consider the eight interrelated variables recommended by the 
United States Army’s (2010) Cyberspace Operations  Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028. Those 
variables are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, the physical environment, 
and time. The said recommendations appear highly important for any cyber SA model for answering 
the following questions, which together can be termed the Safety Framework: 
  
1. Who is the enemy? 
2. What is the enemy’s motive behind the attack? 
3. What is the location of the enemy?  
4. What is the goal of the enemy? 
5. What is the capability of the enemy? 
6. What is the weakness of the enemy? 
7. What could be the impact of attack on the operator’s domain? 
8. How could the attack be defused beforehand? 
 
However, considering the gravity of the threat to cyber security, as reviewed earlier, the proposed 
ASAM requires integrating military philosophy in its structure and mechanism. Accordingly, it should 
utilise 13 military recommendations from Sun Tzu’s Art of War (AoW) under four categories: 
Initiation, Direction, Action, and Exploitation which shape the process of active defence. 
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Category 1: Initiation (What is the situation?) 
 
Under this category, ASAM would allow commanders to first deal with basic knowledge (identifying 
the possible enemies), and then would formulate the basic line of action by utilising Sun Tzu’s AoW I 
(Laying Plans) and AoW IV (Tactical Dispositions). According to AoW I, good leaders not only 
exploit flawed plans, but also exploit flawed adversaries (Parks & Duggan, 2001; Sawyer 1994). 
Furthermore, the interpretation of AoW IV from the perspective of a cyber war suggests that the 
primary challenge in cyber warfare is to know whether the system is under attack, and therefore the 
short-term cyber defence goal should be to improve an organisation’s ability to collect, evaluate and 
transmit digital evidence (Geers, 2011). Both of AoW’s sub-categories thus point to the importance of 
gathering appropriate inputs about the enemy, and therefore the commander would have to deal with 
four variables in this category, which are Enemy Identity, Enemy Location, Enemy Motive and Enemy 
Goal. These provide the basic information which the commander cannot do without.  
 
Accordingly, the activities that fall under this category would involve the use of passive intelligence, 
where security alerts would send tacit knowledge that could be converted into explicit knowledge by 
virtue of intelligence gathering when the commanders start identifying important variables about the 
enemy.  
 
Category 2: Direction (Where Am I Going?) 
 
Under this category, ASAM would develop the above plan in detail, besides understanding the possible 
magnitude of the power of the enemy. At this stage, ASAM would utilise AoW IX (Army on the 
March) and AoW X (Terrain). According to AoW IX, much like in real-time war, cyber commanders 
too need to check all nuances of the system while counter attacking the enemy, and should always 
remember that attackers too can apply deception (Sawyer, 1994). Alongside this, AoW X suggests that 
cyberspace contains more dangers than the real world, since terrestrial distance does not play any role 
while one is connected to the network. Cyber weapons are also unreliable in character, since they are 
prone to reverse engineering. Thus it takes meticulous pre-operational cyber attack planning and timely 
application to manage the cyber terrain (Parks & Duggan, 2001). Both AoWs thus point at the 
importance of gauging the enemy from all sides, which in turn would lead the commander to deal with 
three variables in this category, which are Enemy Capability, Enemy Weakness and Possible Impact of 
Enemy Attack. 
 
Accordingly, the activities within this category would involve usage of the Explicit Knowledge 
acquired from the activities of Category 1, which would enable the commander to gauge the enemy 
from all sides and to decide on the course of action. 
 
 
 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 62 
Category 3: Action (How Am I Going to Do That?) 
 
Within this category, ASAM would allow commanders to launch an attack on a cyber explorer who has 
already been tracked down as a lurking prowler. At this stage ASAM would allow commanders to 
utilise AoW II (Waging War), AoW III (Attack by Stratagem), AoW V (Energy), AoW VI (Weak and 
Strong Points), AoW VII (Maneuvering), AoW VIII (Variation in Tactics) and AoW XI (Nine 
Situations). Since this category uses the most number of Sun Tzu’s military advice, it is pertinent to 
describe them in brief: 
 
AoW II: The cyber commander would collect the credentials and privileges of the enemy without 
letting the enemy know about it (Addinall, 2012; Geers, 2011). This would be done to ensure the safety 
of the commander domain. This is tantamount to ethical hacking, since the commander does this only 
after being convinced about the enemy’s evil intentions. 
 
AoW III: If the cyber war involves the IT infrastructure, a cyber-only victory is the only way to protect 
the same. Therefore, it is important for the commander to secure victory before combat is even 
necessary (Sawyer, 1994). 
 
AoW V: This is a win-or-perish situation, and therefore it is expected that the enemy will apply all its 
power and skill to outrun the commander, and therefore the commander must remain one step ahead by 
consistently applying all of the skills of war, and hit the opponent at the most opportune moment 
(Geers, 2011). 
 
AoW VI: The commander would make all adversaries’ cyber reconnaissance difficult and confusing to 
the enemy, so that the enemy falls short of developing an effective strategy (Sawyer, 1994). 
 
AoW VII: Much like in a real-time war, the commander would deceive the enemy through 
misinformation before going for the final kill (Parks & Duggan, 2001). 
 
AoW VIII: The commander would treat every combat situation as a new situation and approach it with 
all alacrity, and would not sit complacent on happy memories of earlier success (Sawyer, 1994).  
 
AoW XI: Much like in a real-time war, the commander would keep checking on all the nuances of the 
system while counter-attacking the enemy, and would also keep in mind that the enemy too can apply 
deception (Sawyer, 1994).  
 
The above suggestions would lead the commander to deal with three variables in this category, which 
are Timing of Attack, Consistency of Action and Variation in Action. Accordingly, the activities within 
this category would contribute to the commander’s intelligence, which in turn would expand the 
possibilities for exploiting the enemy. 
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Category 4: Exploitation 
 
Under this category, ASAM would work on exploiting the frustrated state of the enemy, such as 
deceiving and cornering the enemy in order to extract more knowledge about the enemy, its motive and 
goal. Here, ASAM would utilise AoW XII (Attack by Fire) and AoW XIII (Use of Spies). AoW XII 
suggests that the commander should annihilate the enemy, while AoW XII suggests using spies to get 
more information in such a situation. Such suggestions would lead the commander to deal with two 
variables in this category: Knowledge Collection and Demolition. 
 
Knowledge Collection and Demolition can work in tandem and enable the commander to launch 
offensive and deception processes. This active state of cyber SA, coupled with the passive state of 
cyber SA, will generate a comprehensive intelligence, which would then contribute to the dynamics of 
Perception, Comprehension and Projection, which in turn would contribute to SA Agility and SA 
Quality. 
 
It is worth noting that cyber commanders should always engage in categories 1 and 2, as the situation is 
dynamic and ever-changing, so cyber commanders need to be alert to when the situation in the 
environment changes. Also, re-planning and setting a new direction is required in cyberspace because 
there is no plan that survives contact (Clausewitz, 1976). However, with an active defence strategy, re-
planning is possible to achieve due to the fact that intelligence from the enemy’s domain will be 
captured, allowing cyber commanders to set a plan before the enemy takes action. 
2.5.1 Enhanced Hypothesised Theoretical Model of ASAM 
 
The cyber domain and cyber attacks are always evolving, and cyber incidents happen in a fraction of 
second; an agile response should then be in place to deter and defend networks. This literature review 
has identified and explained the variables of the new, enhanced SA model (Table 2.7), where 
intelligence factors directly impact SA. The enhanced SA in this model is achieved through utilising 
the offensive capability that allows defenders to interact with suspect attackers in order to gain new 
knowledge, meaning that active intelligence becomes critical component part of the enhanced SA 
model. Active intelligence in the new, enhanced model is introduced because it has been argued that 
being passive in cyber security is inadequate. Passive intelligence and intelligence gathering capability 
along with SA represents the current state-of-the-art of SA models. One current model, such as Tadda’s 
(2008), is passive, since it monitors only local networks. Also, all other, previous models have no 
factors that allow us to assess how good a particular SA is. Therefore, this research believes in the 
importance of having a measurement factor that determines how good is the personnel SA by 
measuring the quality of their SA and their agility in achieving it. 
 
Finally, the cumulative power of active intelligence in ASAM, it is argued, would greatly enhance SA, 
which in turn would help the commander to frustrate the enemy to the fullest. The proponent of this 
model recognises the fact that the level of the qualities of the three major components of this model, 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 64 
i.e. perception, comprehension and projection, would depend on the qualities of several factors. For 
example, the quality level of perception would depend on the quality level of intelligence, while the 
quality of intelligence would depend on the qualities of correctness and completeness. In the same 
fashion, the quality level of comprehension would depend on the quality levels of previous knowledge, 
skills and experience, analytical ability and confidence. Finally, the quality of projection would depend 
on the intent, i.e. the desired outcome. Therefore, Enhanced SA can be measured using the quality and 
agility variables (Table 2.7) to determine how good the SA performance is, which is critical to SA 
evaluation. 
 
Therefore, covering issues ranging from Basic Knowledge to Advanced Knowledge, the enhanced 
theoretical model of ASAM would look like (Figure 2.15): 
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Figure 2.15: Enhanced Hypothesised Theoretical Model (ASAM) (Source: Author) 
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One might question at this point how ASAM could perform so many tasks. This can be answered by 
stating that the main driving force of ASAM is intelligence generated from new knowledge (gathered 
from the adversary domain), which would operate with enhanced ability to deter cyber attacks since it 
is consistent with military doctrine. Figure 2.16 represents the mechanism of ASAM. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Mechanism of ASAM (Source: Author) 
The above diagram makes it clear that, in ASAM’s case, a continuous flow of intelligence would give 
the upper hand to the operator dealing with security threats even before their occurrence. For example, 
ASAM would influence (Figure 2.9) the attacker by exploiting the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, 
Decide and Act), which is a decision-making model and part of Colonel John Boyd’s Asymmetric Fast 
Transient theory of conflict (Boyd, 1987). The central tenet of OODA theory from a military 
perspective is to defeat the adversary strategically, by psychological paralysis (Value Based 
Management, 2011). Here, the basic difference between ASAM and the reviewed models becomes 
prominent once again, since ASAM works by gathering new knowledge from the adversary domain 
and feeding that new knowledge into the organisation’s SA – specifically into the comprehension 
phase, which in turn can diffuse any attack even before it occurs.  
 
ASAM comprises several factors (Table 2.7 and Figure 2.15). SA on its own is a combination of 
perception, comprehension and projection. In previous literatures (Tadda, 2008; Endsley, 1995; see 
section 2.2.3), researchers discussed how information feeds into perception; however, they were not 
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clear enough about what to perceive. Tadda’s model provides some basic information about data-
gathering and the importance of intelligence feeding at level 0 of his model, but in his research Tadda 
does not explicitly cover what information is to be gathered; also, the model focuses only on the 
passive intelligence gathered from the defender network (Tadda, 2008). For that reason, SA and 
passive intelligence factors together represent the current passive SA model that relays only the 
information that comes from the local domain. On the other hand, the core of the proposed ASAM in 
this research is the active intelligence factor that facilitates interaction with adversaries, with the aim of 
gathering intelligence from their domain as well as accruing passive intelligence. In ASAM, this type 
of intelligence comes from previous knowledge or experience regarding cyber incidents, risk 
assessments of cyber resources, politics or deception, as discussed earlier, whereby adversaries can be 
channelled into manageable or controlled cyber resources for the purpose of gathering intelligence. 
Finally, ASAM integrates the principal factors that allow measurement of the performance of cyber 
commanders’ SA, since cyber incidents require an agile SA that exploits quality active intelligence 
when dealing with cyber attacks.  
2.5.2 Comparison between Active SA model and current SA models 
 
At this juncture of the critical review it becomes pertinent to compare the three SA models reviewed in 
this study, as well as the promises offered by ASAM under the context of the safety framework set out 
below, which advises defeating the adversary well before it can do any harm to the network. Table 2.6 
shows the comparison between 3 main SA models with active SA. The variables in the table were 
extracted from the literature discussed earlier. Also, the table lined the variables with active SA so 
better understanding can be developed in the area of active defence. 
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Table 2.6: Analysis of SA Models within the Safety Framework 
[Synthesis of all Review Points] 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 shows that the JDL/Endsley/Fusion models fail to address the above-mentioned situation-
dependent variables, which in turn exposes their severe limitations in providing quality cyber security 
that could demolish the enemy before it can do any harm to the network. On the other hand, ASAM 
proposes to address all of the above situation-dependent variables, which makes it an ideal SA model 
in the present context.  
 
Table 2.7 summarised the variables extracted from this thesis literature for the conceptualised active 
SA model which will be used for designing this research survey. Therefore, the data collected from this 
survey will be analysed using Structural equation modelling to extract the causality model of Active 
SA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situation Independent Variables JDL Endsley Fusion ASAM 
Winning Attitude No No No Yes 
Defensive Attitude Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SA Agility  
 
Timeliness Yes Yes No Yes 
Responsiveness No No No Yes 
Adaptability No No No Yes 
SA Quality Accuracy No No No Yes 
Reliability No No No Yes 
 
Situation Dependent Variables JDL Endsley Fusion ASAM 
INITIATION Enemy Identity No No No Yes 
Enemy Location No No No Yes 
Enemy Motive No No No Yes 
Enemy Goal No No No Yes 
DIRECTION 
 
Enemy Capabilities  No No No Yes 
Enemy Weaknesses No No No Yes 
Possible Enemy 
Attack Impact  
No No No Yes 
ACTION Timing of Attack No No No Yes 
Consistency of 
Action 
No No No Yes 
Variation in Action No No No Yes 
EXPLOITATION Knowledge 
Collection 
No No No Yes 
Demolition No No No Yes 
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Table 2.7: Variables of Enhanced Situational Awareness (see Chapter 3 and Appendix 1 for more 
detail)  
Perception Correctness: The extent to which awareness is consistent with ground truth 
(Albert & Hayes, 2006: 124). 
Completeness: The percentage of relevant information attained (Albert & 
Hayes, 2006: 125). 
Comprehension Previous Knowledge: The explicit knowledge which serves to formulate 
decisions and to generate new knowledge by fusing it with tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka & Nishiguchi, 2001).   
Skills and Experience: Ability to acquire new knowledge and the ability to 
convert both new and explicit knowledge into desired action (Nonaka & 
Nishiguchi, 2001).    
Analysis: Systematic unravelling of knowledge and understanding. 
Confidence: Willingness to use the information ((Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125). 
Projection Intent: The will to perform an act (Salerno & Tadda, 2009: 1). 
 
SA Agility Timelessness: A state of eternal existence, such whether ASAM is capable of 
constantly producing new knowledge and enhancing the ability to diffuse the 
attack before its occurrence (Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125). 
Responsiveness: The ability to act within windows of opportunity (Albert & 
Hayes, 2006: 125). 
Adaptability: The ability to adapt to changes quickly, or the ability to alter 
processes and organisation to improve effectiveness or efficiency (Albert & 
Hayes, 2006: 189). 
SA Quality Accuracy: The quality of nearness to the truth, or the true value or the quality 
and usefulness of knowledge provided (Endsley & Robertson, 1996; Albert & 
Hayes, 2006). 
Reliability: The quality of the sources used to produce SA (Albert & Hayes, 
2006). 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering 
Passive data collection: is the process 
of collecting network data of people 
interaction across the network or 
process to capture network traffics in 
an organization that data are being 
collected from them using local 
security sensors (Huey & Rosenberg, 
2004: 598; Beaver et al., 2011). 
IP identification: Identifying the 
location of a network service user by 
use of IP address (Gordon, 2005). 
Geo-Location: Identifying the actual 
geographical location of a user 
through the computer terminal 
connected to the Internet. 
Motive: The reason behind performing 
a given act (Varon, 2002; GAO, 2000) 
Active data collection: Intelligence 
collection is not disguised. This can be 
through installation of physical data 
collection devices, as described by 
Chen, Tan, Xing, Wang & Fu (2010: 
1739), or through utilisation of 
hacking methods (Varon, 2002), 
through collaboration with Internet 
service providers (ISPs) (Huey & 
Rosenberg, 2004: 600). 
Capabilities: Ascertaining the origin of 
a given cyber attack. Tracking cyber 
traffic and Enemy strength and 
resources (Holdaway, 2001) 
 
Weaknesses: Enemy weak points that 
can be exploited. 
Attack timing: Initiation of the attack 
at a time when it is most appropriate 
(GAO, 2000). 
Attack consistency: Extent to which 
attacks are similar and sustained 
(GAO, 2000) and the strength of 
enemy attack. 
Knowledge collection: Gathering of 
information, which could be active or 
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passive (Chen, 2010). 
Demolition: Destruction of the enemy 
plans. 
 
Intelligence  Timelessness: Right timing in order to prevent attacks from occurring. Helps 
organisations to predict the next possible attack, the mode of attack or the areas 
vulnerable to attack (Peterson, 2013). 
Accuracy: Precise information as to who propagates the attacks, when or where 
they are initiated (Lehr & Pupillo, 2009). 
Completeness: Comprehensiveness of intelligence. Pockets of information can 
be pooled through private and public sector collaborations to make meaningful 
conclusions (Amin et al., 2003). 
 
2.5.3 Active SA Process model 
 
In order to effectively enhance situational awareness, ASAM has to be implemented via a given 
process. This is carried out in three major steps. First of all, there is the passive perception or alert 
stage. The alert stage is noted through passive action (Palermo & Kocsis, 2005). Immediately, the 
active mode is initiated. This aims at identifying who the hacker is, why the attack is being instituted, 
the location from which the attack is orchestrated and other relevant information on the hacker. This 
can include the attacker’s identity, motive, location, goal, capability, weakness and impact. This 
information is gained through the offensive method. 
 
The second step is high level interaction, where the enemy domain is actively accessed. At this point, 
the offensive mode is in full swing. The enemy’s domain is hacked, reckoned and scanned. Some of the 
issues that are discovered include the operating system that the attacker is using, the ports that have 
been opened and the services that are being run. This helps to know the domains that are vulnerable. 
This step also helps to give all the necessary information for countering the attack (Gordon, 2005; 
Wang, 2006: 178). 
 
The last step of the process is the resource database mobilisation. At this point, the active domain is 
prepared to counter the attack. The identified vulnerabilities are sealed so as to make sure that the 
hacker has no access to the system. Furthermore, the cyber commander or computer network operators 
in the active domain already have an idea of what is in the hacker’s mind. As such, it is possible to take 
the necessary protective measures which would ensure that the domain remains safe and impenetrable 
to the attackers 
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Figure 2.17: ASAM Hypothesised Process Model: (Source: Author)
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Altogether, the theoretical findings identify the set of actions proposed by ASAM as the best set of 
actions for cyber security. However, ASAM requires undergoing the rigors of evaluation through real-
time laboratory testing on a cyber range to prove its efficacy and effectiveness. Therefore, The ASAM 
theoretical model after being validated through SEM has informed the design of the process model 
which will be used in the experimental design to develop the data collection plan. Moreover, the 
variables identified in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 have been used to develop a framework for assessing SA and 
the utility of the proposed ASAM in practice using the cyber range in a Serious Gaming Experiment. 
This approach to SA evaluation not only serves to evaluate whether ASAM enhances SA but also 
provides the means to directly measure SA performance (combining Measure of SA Effectiveness, 
MoSA Efficacy and MoSA Efficiency) in order to determine SA Training, Techniques and Procedures 
for a Cyber Commander. Chapter 3 of this thesis will discuss these points in detail. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This research activity focuses on coming up with a new approach towards ensuring cyber security. The 
motivation behind coming up with the new model lay in the fact that the current models (JDL, Endsley 
and Fusion) lack in terms of agility and quality. They are also reactive (passive) in nature, implying 
that they cannot help in enhancing cyber SA in a world where there are new developments coming up 
day after day. 
 
ASAM is designed in such a manner that it is proactive. It employs offensive mechanisms to break into 
the enemy’s domain, actively collect intelligence form the domain, and also secure information on the 
enemy’s variables such as the intent, potential, threat, location, capability and possible impact of the 
attacker’s actions. All these variables give vital information that go a long way in ensuring cyber 
security. ASAM also helps in reducing the vulnerabilities in the governmental and other private sector 
organisations, as they can pool all the information they need to protect themselves from the attackers. 
In this chapter the design of ASAM is set out, and a cyber environment is proposed for testing of the 
same. 
 
Based on the literature review, it can be argued that ASAM is hypothesised as being superior to the 
other SA models due to its active, offensive nature. Unlike the other models, ASAM helps in gathering 
intelligence in a very timely manner. It is also highly accurate, since the information is offensively 
attained by hacking the enemy’s domain. As such, the intelligence gathered has all the desired 
characteristics of cyber intelligence. It meets the criteria for accuracy, completeness, timeliness and 
reliability. As such, the decisions made with regard to the data are well informed, and the protective 
measures derived from this information are made precisely by being customised to counter specific 
enemy attacks. Therefore, ASAM confirms the argument that active defence with an offensive 
approach is quite important in gathering intelligence from enemy networks, enhancing the agility and 
quality of cyber situational awareness and, consequently, helping deter cyber attacks.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.0 OBJECTIVES & OVERVIEW 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the candidate research methodologies. The 
approach promulgated in this thesis uses a combination of methods in order to achieve the research aim 
and objectives: to investigate whether an active offensive hacking method is more capable of 
enhancing cyber SA agility and quality than the existing SA models. This aim stems from an ultimate 
aim of contributing to the understanding of the concept of cyber situational awareness. Accordingly, 
the study contains five objectives: 
 
1. To determine and critically analyse the current SA models and identify the key 
dimensions and variables for active cyber SA; 
2. To develop a theoretical framework for active SA; 
3. To evaluate active SA deployment in a serious gaming environment; 
4. To develop a method framework for assessing cyber SA; and 
5. To empirically assess the significance of effect and the implications of active defence 
in enhancing cyber SA agility and quality. 
 
This chapter discusses in detail the methods employed, and provides a justification for their use. Data 
collection instruments and data analysis methods are considered. Scenario development and serious 
gaming environments are also discussed within the experimental design. 
3.1 METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW  
 
The sole aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive, high-speed and cost-effective active cyber 
SA model. Accordingly, the researcher probed the nuances of various research methodologies before 
opting for a mixed method whose efficiency has been proven in social science (Creswell, 2003), i.e. 
through a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. This approach was 
adopted for several reasons.  
 
First, the qualitative method banks on the collective wisdom gathered from the extant literature and the 
wisdom of a given researcher in the field, as developed through the processes of the research journey, 
from a specific situation to a general situation, where concepts emanating from events and human 
perceptions enrich the researcher’s understanding (Bryman & Bell, 2003; DeVault, 2012; Guidestar, 
2003). Such processes promised to be important drivers of this research, because the area of research 
was relatively new and the present researcher had great need to learn from the pioneering works of 
those who had come before. 
 
Second, the quantitative method employs a deductive approach that considers the potential causes of 
something, and accordingly tries to verify the effect of the same through objective, quantitative and 
statistically valid measurements (Bryman & Bell, 2003; DeVault, 2012; Guidestar, 2003). Within the 
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context of this study, this method also promised to be an important research driver, as it promised to 
provide tangible evidences for arriving at a conclusion regarding whether the proposed Active SA 
Model (ASAM) could provide the desired cyber SA solution; i.e., to ascertain whether ASAM can 
enhance the agility and quality of Cyber SA.  
 
Third, a host of experts suggest combining both qualitative and quantitative methods to exploit the 
possibilities offered by both (Creswell, 2003; Neuman, 2000). They also suggest adopting a method 
adapted to the nature of the investigation (Odell, 1998; Patton, 1990), where the method would not lead 
the research, but would instead be of consequence to the researcher’s philosophical standpoint, since it 
“necessitates a philosophical solution to why research” (Holden & Lynch, 2002: 2). In the process, the 
researcher also learnt that the research method should emanate from logical deduction covering four 
issues: epistemology; theoretical perspective; methodology; and methods (Crotty, 1998).  
 
The above views and assurances led this researcher to probe what epistemology (i.e. what theory of 
knowledge integrated into the theoretical perspective) should inform the research – objectivism or 
subjectivism – before exploring the philosophical perspectives of methodologies such as positivism, 
post-positivism, interpretivism and critical theory. In the process, Creswell (2003: 5) describes 
interrelated levels of decisions based on the above perspectives, which sets the research design in 
motion by virtue of three basic questions:  
 
1. What knowledge claims are being made by the researcher (including which theoretical 
perspective)? 
2. What strategies of inquiry will inform the procedures? 
3. What methods of data collection and analysis will be used?  
 
Creswell (2003) further defines his view through a diagram that depicts how three elements of inquiry, 
knowledge claims, strategies and methods, combine to form different approaches to research, before 
getting translated into processes in the design of the research:   
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Figure 3.1: Knowledge Claims, Inquiry Strategy [adapted from Creswell (2003)] 
The suggestions of Lincoln & Guba (2000) that stating a knowledge claim is actually the beginning of 
a research project, after which philosophical depiction of the same authenticates it, covering questions 
such as what is knowledge (ontology), how s/he knows it (epistemology), what values are there 
(axiology), how s/he writes about it (rhetoric), and what processes s/he adopts to investigate 
(methodology). This learning led the researcher to probe the four schools of knowledge claims, being 
postpositivist, constructivist, advocacy/participatory, pragmatist, positivist and interpretivism schools 
of thought. A brief account of the same appears below.  
3.1.1 Types of Research Theories 
 
This section provides an overview of the various theories and philosophies that are most relevant for 
the research methodologies considered. They are into two main groups: natural science and design 
science. The general concept is that natural science is concerned with explaining how and why things 
are, whereas design science is concerned with “devising artefacts to attain goals” (Simon, 1981). An in-
depth summary of the corresponding theories is provided below. 
 
3.1.1.1 Natural science research theories 
 
March & Smith (1995) provide a very accurate and concise description: natural science includes 
traditional research into physical, biological, social and behavioural domains. Such research is aimed at 
understanding reality. Natural scientists develop sets of concepts, or specialised language, with which 
to characterise phenomena. These are used in higher order constructions – laws, models and theories – 
that make claims about the nature of reality. Theories – deep, principled explanations of phenomena 
(Achinstein, 1968) – are the crowning achievements of natural science research. Products of natural 
science research are evaluated against norms of truth, or explanatory power. Claims must be consistent 
with observed facts, the ability to predict future observations being a mark of explanatory success. 
Progress is achieved as new theories provide deeper, more encompassing and more accurate 
explanations. 
 
Postpositivism: This challenges the traditional notion of absolute truth of knowledge (Philips & 
Burbules, 2000). This concept was shaped by eminent 19
th
-century scholars such as Comte, Durkheim, 
Locke, Mill and Newton (Smith, 1983). Postpositivists ask what warrants knowledge, which is also 
known as quantitative research. Socially constructed knowledge claims originated in the works of 
Berger and Luckmann; this school of thought claims knowledge through an alternative process and set 
of assumptions, and more often than not combines with interpretivism (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). 
According to this concept, individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work, 
and thus subjective meaning of experience should be developed to decipher the complexity of views. 
Accordingly, it mostly banks on the participants’ views regarding the situation within a given context. 
Advocacy/participatory knowledge claims surfaced in the 1980s; this is a derivative of the works of 
Marx, Adorno, Marcuse, Babermas and Freire (Neuman, 2000), who observed that postpositivist 
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assumptions impose structural laws and theories that fail to fit marginalised individuals/groups. Thus, 
participatory knowledge suggests addressing social justice issues by containing an agenda for reform in 
the research that would change the lives of the participants, institutions or the researcher.   
 
Pragmatism: This is an outcome of the works of Peirce, James, Mead and Dewey (Cherryholmes, 
1992) that contains many forms. For example, a section of the pragmatists state that knowledge claims 
emerge from actions, situations and consequences, and that pragmatists express concern for the 
application and solution to problem (Patton, 1990). This concept assigns more importance to the 
research problem than to the research method. It also endorses the advantage of mixed method, and 
suggests focusing on the problem and then using a pluralistic approach to derive knowledge about the 
problem. Researchers like Cherryholmes (1992), Patton (1990) and Creswell (2003) observe that 
pragmatism claims knowledge on at least seven accounts:  
 
1. It suggests adopting mixed method instead of adopting one single system of philosophy and 
reality, thereby enabling the researcher to draw inferences from both quantitative and 
qualitative methods; 
2. It suggests freely choosing methods, techniques and procedures that would fit best fulfil 
research need and purpose; 
3. It suggests employing several approaches to data collection and analysis; 
4. It encourages researchers to exploit both quantitative and qualitative data to achieve best 
understanding of a research problem; 
5. It looks into the whats and hows of research on the basis of its intended consequences, such as 
where they want to reach with the outcome. This also enables the researcher to justify the 
need to mix quantitative and qualitative data; 
6. It accommodates the fact that research involves social, historical, political and other contexts 
that may appear relevant, besides accommodating the application of a theoretical lens through 
mixed method, which would reflect social justice and political aims; 
7. It encourages achieving a change instead of questioning the reality, and for that matter it 
suggests including anything that is required to bring the desired change through research 
solutions.  
 
The above suggestions made by the pragmatic school of thought appear best suited for this 
investigation, since this school too wanted to solve a problem (in the case of this research, presenting a 
comprehensive and viable cyber SA solution) and obtain a desired outcome (in this case, quality and 
agile cyber SA). At this point, the researcher realised that, within the context of this study, qualitative 
research could provide a deeper understanding of social phenomena involved with the research topic, 
and quantitative research could focus on collecting tangible proof on the same through SEM, where 
numerical data or structural representations would eventually accommodate or discard the findings of 
the qualitative research. Such a realisation was further consolidated with the views of Silverman (2000) 
and Ross et al. (2011), who identify mixed method’s power to investigate the same research problem 
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from two directions, and thereby help the researcher to cover the diversities of the research topic. Such 
brainstorming eventually convinced this researcher of the utility value of mixed method within the 
context of the study.  
 
The next task was to adopt an appropriate qualitative method and to formulate a logical sequence of 
research actions. Thus, the researcher reviewed the major three qualitative research approaches, 
ethnography, phenomenology and grounded theory, in order to select the right method.   
 
First, the researcher found that the ethnographic approach emerged from cultural anthropology, and 
focuses on ethnic groups with emphasis on the nature, construction and sustenance of that culture. In 
the process it “attempts to explicate structured patterns of action that are cultural and/or social rather 
than merely cognitive, behavioral or affective” (Arnould, 1998: 86). It deals more with lifestyle 
investigation within a cultural or sub-cultural context (Stebbins, 1997). 
 
Second, the researcher found that the phenomenological approach tries to create an understanding of 
complex issues that contain nuances that otherwise go unnoticed. For that matter, it enlarges and 
deepens the understanding of the range of immediate experiences (Shultz, 1967; Spiegelberg, 1982), 
and in the process it critically reflects on conscious experience rather than subconscious motivation, 
while unfolding essential and constant features of an experience. Altogether, it can be exploited to 
theorise the basis of lived experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Jopling, 1996). 
 
Third, the researcher found that grounded theory emerged from symbolic interactionism, which 
suggests that “[i]ndividuals engage in a world that requires reflexive interaction as averse to 
environmental response. Accordingly behavior is goal driven, evolving from social interaction that is 
highly symbolic itself” (Goulding 2005: 295). Such behaviour includes both verbal and non-verbal 
communication, where the notion of symbols appears intrinsic to the perspective (Schwandt, 1994). 
Symbolic interactionism was theorised by many researchers, such as Lazarsfeld, Merton, Hyman and 
Strauss, before Glaser developed a systematic and well defined procedure of the collection and analysis 
of qualitative data and named it grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1998), since it aims 
to generate a theory that would be grounded in the words and the actions of the individuals involved in 
the study.  
 
The above descriptions of the three types of the qualitative research approach clearly highlight their 
differences in outlook as well as in procedures. For example, this researcher found the ethnographic 
approach falling short of the requirements of this study, which needs to cover elements that are spread 
across a heterogeneous setting in order to test the potential of the ASAM. Similarly, the 
phenomenological approach also appeared inadequate in this context, since this study aims to reach a 
definitive conclusion (i.e. whether ASAM can optimise quality and agile cyber SA), rather than 
describing the inherent elements of a situation and building a theory on it. 
 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 78 
Positivism is a theory that aims to isolate concepts and phenomena, allowing a hypothesis and theory to 
be generated based on the results of the analysis and data collected. In turn, the concepts and 
hypothesis are then tested by generalising the study to fit a larger model and iteratively improve on the 
theory/model. Limpanitgul (2009) writes that positivist methods consist of observations, experiments 
and survey techniques, and often involve complicated statistical analysis in order to generate the 
findings and to test hypotheses empirically (Schiffman & Kanuk, 1997).  
 
There is often a need to manipulate ‘reality’, with variations in only a single independent variable so as 
to identify regularities in, and to form relationships between, some of the constituent elements of the 
social world (Davison, 1998). Straub et al. (2004) reinforce the notion that the need to ensure that the 
data being gathered are as objective as possible, and a relatively accurate representation of the 
underlying phenomenon, is paramount. They go on to state that positivist science needs to be more than 
a series of anecdote or highly biased observations, where instead careful and thoughtful data gathering 
and intellectual constructs are needed. This research has developed the theoretical conjecture (Active 
SA hypothesised model) through examining literature where active SA theory then seeks the input and 
response of the community of cyber security subject-matter experts to collectively contribute to the 
building of active SA theory. Therefore, the positivist approach was adopted in this research because it 
is the most suited approach for this matter. 
 
Researchers Alavi & Carlson (1992) have found that, although many authors have chosen to adapt a 
positivist approach in their respective papers, there is also a vast community of researches alike who 
believe there should be other methodologies and theories used (Kuhn, 1970; Bjørn-Andersen, 1985; 
Remenyi & Williams, 1996). 
Interpretivists believe that reality is not objectively determined, but is socially constructed (Husserl, 
1965), and is fully understood by studying it in its natural environment and formulating the concepts 
accordingly. By its nature, interpretivism promotes the value of qualitative data in pursuit of 
knowledge (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994), leading the researcher to a better understanding of the 
concept/phenomena under study, which in turn allows generalisation of those ‘understandings’ to be 
tested on other phenomena. Kelliher (2005) states that, in essence, this research paradigm is concerned 
with the uniqueness of a particular situation, contributing to the underlying pursuit of contextual depth 
(Myers, 1997). From this discussion, it is clear that the only approach fit for this research is positivism. 
This research theoretical conjecture was developed based on literature, and then the theory of active SA 
had to consider how cyber security subject matter experts would respond to and collectively contribute 
to the building of this research theory. However, while interpretive research is recognised for its value 
in providing contextual depth, results are often criticised in terms of validity, reliability and the ability 
to generalise, referred to collectively as research legitimisation. These concerns are amplified in a 
single case scenario (Eisenhardt, 1989; Perry, 1998). 
 
3.1.1.2 Design science research methodology (DSRM) 
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The theory of active SA requires an environment that allows applying the theory in practice while 
maintaining all legal constraints. Therefore, a serious gaming environment was developed for this 
research in order to examine the active offensive capability in enhancing the agility and quality of 
cyber SA to defend against cyber attacks. For this purpose, a design science methodology is required to 
build a SA assessment framework and a testing environment. The following will discuss the design 
science in detail. 
 
Derived from March & Smith (1995), the argument follows that, whereas natural science tries to 
understand reality, design science attempts to create things that serve human purposes. Design science 
is technology-oriented. Its products are assessed against criteria of value or utility – do they work? Are 
they an improvement? Rather than producing general, theoretical knowledge, design scientists produce 
and apply knowledge of tasks or situations in order to create effective artefacts. If science is an activity 
that produces “credentialed knowledge” (Mishra & Eich, 1992), then, following Simon (1981), design 
science is an important part of it. Design science products are of four types: constructs; models; 
methods; implementations. 
 
Design Science in Information Systems 
 
Hevner and et al.’s (2004) design science principle for Information Systems (IS) has produced a seven-
point guideline in which they write that knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its 
solution are acquired in the building and application of an artefact, shown below: 
1. Design as an Artefact (Serious Gaming Environment) – 
Design-science research must produce a viable artefact in the form of a construct, a model, a method or 
an instantiation.  
2. Problem Relevance – 
The objective of design-science research is to develop technology-based solutions to important and 
relevant business problems. In this research, Active SA capabilities are required to enhance cyber 
security. 
3. Design Evaluation – 
The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artefact must be rigorously demonstrated via well-executed 
evaluation methods. The evaluation methods proposed can be broken down into the following groups: 
a. Observational – via case studies (in business environments) or field studies 
(monitoring the use of the artefacts in multiple projects). 
b. Analytical – examining the artefact for static qualities such as complexity, 
fit of artefact in technical architecture, demonstrated optimal properties of 
artefact, or its performance (dynamic qualities). 
c. Experimental – either in a controlled experiment (for example: usability) or 
in a simulation where one can run the artefact with artificial data. 
d. Testing – Black Box (test interfaces to artefact) or White Box testing (using 
metrics such as execution paths in artefacts implementation). 
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e. Descriptive – use of information from knowledge base to build argument for 
artefact’s utility or in the form of scenarios. 
In this research, several methods were used to evaluate the serious gaming environments, but mainly 
they were observational, experimental and testing. More detail about serious gaming environment 
design is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
4. Research Contributions – 
Effective design-science research must provide clear and verifiable contributions in the areas of the 
design artefact, design foundations, and/or design methodologies. 
a. Design Artefact – the ability to reuse the artefact itself to solve other 
unsolved problems. 
b. Foundations – to create new constructs, models, methods etc. to extend or 
improve existing foundations.  
c. Methodologies – to produce new ways to evaluate and create new 
contributions to design science. An example is a framework for predicting 
and explaining why a particular information system will or will not be 
accepted in a given organisational setting (Venkatesh, 2000). 
 
5. Research Rigour – 
Design-science research relies upon the application of rigorous methods in both the construction and 
evaluation of the design artefact. 
 
6. Design as a Search Process – 
The search for an effective artefact requires utilising available means to reach desired ends while 
satisfying laws in the problem environment. 
 
7. Communication of Research – 
Design-science research must be presented effectively both to technology-oriented as well as 
management-oriented audiences. 
 
With reference to the points above, Hevner et al. (2004) explain that, because the creation of an 
innovative, purposeful artefact (Guideline 1) for a specified problem domain (Guideline 2) is 
purposeful, the artefact must yield utility for the specified problem. Hence, thorough evaluation of the 
artefact is crucial (Guideline 3). Novelty is similarly crucial, since the artefact must be innovative, 
solving a hitherto unsolved problem or solving a known problem in a more effective or efficient 
manner (Guideline 4). In this way, design-science research is differentiated from the practice of design. 
The artefact itself must be rigorously defined, formally represented, coherent and internally consistent 
(Guideline 5). The process by which the artefact is created, and often the artefact itself, incorporates or 
enables a search process whereby a problem space is constructed and a mechanism proposed or enacted 
in order to find an effective solution (Guideline 6). Finally, the results of the design-science research 
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must be communicated effectively (Guideline 7), both to a technical audience (researchers who will 
extend them and practitioners who will implement them) and to a managerial audience (researchers 
who will study them in context and practitioners who will decide if they should be implemented within 
their organisations). 
 
Hevner et al. (2004) conclude by recommending that design science should be paired with 
behavioural/natural science as well, since utilising design alone means taking a simplistic view of the 
people and the organisational contexts in which designed artefacts must function. In turn, they write 
that these must be combined with behavioural and organisational theories to develop an understanding 
of business problems, contexts, solutions and evaluation approaches adequate to servicing the IS 
research and practitioner communities.  
 
Peffers and colleagues (2007) have produced another design science methodology for IS. Similar to 
Hevner and colleagues (2004) they have chosen to produce a six-point structure to aid the development 
of the DSRM methodology, shown below and referred to as ‘activities’. 
 
1. Problem Identification and Motivation – 
Define the specific research problem and justify the value of a solution. Because the problem definition 
will be used to develop an artefact that can effectively provide a solution, it may be useful to atomise 
the problem conceptually so that the solution can capture its complexity. Justifying the value of a 
solution accomplishes two things: it motivates the researcher and the audience of the research to pursue 
the solution and accept the results, and it helps explain the reasoning associated with the researcher’s 
understanding of the problem. Resources required for this activity include knowledge of the state of the 
problem and the importance of its solution.  
 
2. Define the Objectives for a Solution – 
Infer the objectives of a solution from the problem definition and knowledge of what is possible and 
feasible. The objectives can be quantitative, such as terms in which a desirable solution would be better 
than current ones, or qualitative, such as a description of how a new artefact is expected to support 
solutions to problems not hitherto addressed. The objectives should be inferred rationally from the 
problem specification. Resources required for this include knowledge of the state of any given 
problem, current solutions, if any, and their efficacy. 
 
3. Design and Development – 
Create the artefact (constructs, models, methods or instantiations, each defined broadly) (Hevner et al., 
2004) or “new properties of technical, social, and/or informational resources” (Järvinen, 2007). 
Conceptually, a design research artefact can be any designed object in which a research contribution is 
embedded in the design. This activity includes determining the artefact’s desired functionality and its 
architecture and then creating the actual artefact. Resources required for moving from objectives to 
design and development include knowledge of any theory that can be brought to bear in a solution. 
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4. Demonstration – 
Demonstrate the use of the artefact to solve one or more instances of the problem. This could involve 
its use in experimentation, simulation, case study, proof or other appropriate activity. Resources 
required for the demonstration include effective knowledge of how to use the artefact to solve the 
problem. 
 
5. Evaluation – 
Observe and measure how well the artefact supports a solution to the problem. This activity involves 
comparing the objectives of a solution to actual observed results derived from using the artefact in the 
demonstration. It requires knowledge of relevant metrics and analysis techniques. Depending on the 
nature of the problem venue and the artefact, evaluation could take many forms. It could include items 
such as a comparison of the artefact’s functionality with the solution objectives from Activity 2, 
objective quantitative performance measures such as budgets or items produced, or the results of 
satisfaction surveys, client feedback or simulations. It could include quantifiable measures of system 
performance, such as response time or availability. Conceptually, such evaluations could include any 
appropriate empirical evidence or logical proof. At the end of this activity, the researchers can decide 
whether to iterate back to Activity 3 to try to improve the effectiveness of the artefact, or continue on to 
communication and leave further improvement to subsequent projects. The nature of the research 
venue may dictate whether such iteration is feasible or not. 
 
6. Communication – 
Communicate the problem and its importance, the artefact, its utility and novelty, the rigor of its 
design, and its effectiveness to researchers and other relevant audiences, such as practicing 
professionals, when appropriate. In scholarly research publications, researchers might use the form of 
this process to structure the paper, just as the nominal structure of an empirical research process 
(problem definition, literature review, hypothesis development, data collection, analysis, results, 
discussion and conclusion) is a common structure for empirical research papers. Communication 
requires knowledge of the culture of the discipline. 
 
Peffers and colleagues (2007) write that design science research comes from a history of design as a 
component of engineering and computer science research, while action research originates from the 
concept of the researcher as an ‘active participant’ in solving practical problems in the course of 
studying them in organisational contexts. In DS research, design and the proof of its usefulness are the 
central components, whereas in action research, the focus of interest is the organisational context and 
the active search for problem solutions therein. 
 
The design science methodology was used in this research to design and build the SA assessment 
framework and the serious gaming environment to apply the active SA theory into practice. More detail 
will be provided, later, in the research experiment and ASAM testing environment section. 
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3.1.2 Types of Research Approaches 
 
Fundamentally, there are two types of research approaches, inductive and deductive. Saunders et al. 
(2007) attribute positivism to deduction and interpretivism to induction, albeit with caveats, rendering 
such labelling potentially misleading.  
 
3.1.2.1 Deduction vs. induction 
 
From the very definition of deduction, and according to Saunders et al. (2007), this is the development 
of a theory that is subjected to a rigorous test. This ties in neatly with the research approach exhibited 
in natural sciences, where theorems and laws are built and tested against phenomena that might take 
the form of predicting their occurrences etc. In effect, it allows the researcher to test theories using the 
phenomena available. Therefore, this approach is adopted in this research so the active SA theories will 
be tested to understand why would active offensive intelligence gathering enhance cyber SA security 
and at the same time, find out how much better is the cyber SA.  
 
Induction differs from deduction in the sense that it concerns itself predominantly with building 
theories from the data and information collected, whereas deduction focuses on building theories that 
the collected data can later be used to test and prove/disprove accordingly. In inductive approaches it is 
more effective to use smaller samples of data to build theories from, whereas the opposite can be said 
for deductive approaches.  
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) provide three key reasons why a distinction between the above two 
approaches is important: one of them is that, if the researcher is particularly interested in why 
something is happening, rather than being able to describe what is happening, it may be more 
appropriate to undertake the research inductively rather than deductively. Therefore, this research is 
intended to describe how to achieve better cyber SA through utilising offensive capabilities, so 
deductive approach is most suitable for this matter. 
3.1.3 Types of Research Strategies 
 
A paper by Davison (1998) breaks down the popular research methodologies, in addition to 
categorising them into our two major types of natural science research theories: positivism and 
interpretivism. The table can be found below. 
 
 Table 3.1: Taxonomy of Research Methodologies 
Positivist Interpretivist 
 Lab Experiments 
 Field Experiments 
 Surveys 
 Case Studies 
 Theorem Proof 
 Forecasting 
 Simulation 
 Subjective/Argumentative 
 Reviews 
 Action Research 
 Case Studies 
 Descriptive/Interpretive 
 Futures Research 
 Role/Game Playing 
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A Taxonomy of Research Methodologies (Davison, 1998). 
 
Due to the nature of this research, survey and lab experiment strategies are the methodologies most 
suited to this research. This is due to fact that this study seeks to reach the community of cyber security 
subject matter experts from across the world to contribute in the development of active cyber SA 
theory. The following discussion is about different methodologies. 
 
3.1.3.1 Surveys 
 
Surveys (Davison, 1998) are a means of obtaining data via questionnaires and/or interviews. Multiple 
surveys can be conducted at different times in order to obtain an understanding of the individuals’ 
opinions and views at various stages of the investigation, a process which subsequently provides the 
means to track changes. Surveys do not have to only be an open-ended collection of texts; they can also 
ask the target audience to rate/grade items, which in turn will allow for quantitative analysis to occur. 
Surveys can also be produced in such a way that similar questions can be reworded and restructured, 
allowing the producer of the survey to double-check the answers and opinions of the target audience. 
Davison (1998) the main advantage of survey is that it is a cost effective way of obtaining data from a 
large number of respondents located across the world. In this research, cyber security experts’ 
contributions were really important, so a survey method was adopted. Another reason was efficiency:  
structure equation modelling would have required at least 200 participants, so the best way was to use 
an online questionnaire to reach the cyber security experts across the world. 
 
A key weakness in surveying is that it is very difficult to realise insights relating to the causes of or 
processes involved in the phenomena measured. There are, in addition, several sources of bias, such as 
the possibly self-selecting nature of respondents, the point in time when the survey is conducted and in 
the researcher him/herself, shown through the design of the survey itself.  
 
 
3.1.3.2 Case studies 
 
Soy (1997) describes the case study as a way that emphasises detailed contextual analysis of a limited 
number of events or conditions and their inter-relationships in qualitative way. Its aim is to examine 
contemporary, real-life situations and provide the basis for the application of ideas and extension of 
methods. Soy continues to state that researcher Yin defines the case study research method as an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used (Yin, 1984). This shows that a case study cannot be adopted, as active SA requires 
cyber security experts around the world to contribute into building the active SA. 
 
3.1.3.3 Action research 
 
Davison (1998) has provided a compilation from various sources of what action research is; Elden & 
Chisholm (1993) go on to note that action research is change-oriented, i.e. seeking to introduce changes 
with positive social values, the key focus of the practice being on a problem and its solution. Thus, 
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Sanford (1970) views action research as a form of problem-centred research that bridges the divide 
between theory and practice, enabling the researcher to develop applicable knowledge in the problem 
domain (Peters & Robinson, 1984). Again, due to the nature of this research, action research cannot be 
adopted due to the fact that SA literature already exists, and this research problem has been identified 
while studying the literature. 
3.1.4 Combining Natural and Design Science 
 
It is really important to point that natural science is core in developing the theory of active SA, while 
design science in this research was used to develop the SA assessment framework and serious gaming 
environment to put the active SA theory into practice. Therefore, combining both sciences was crucial 
for this research, and this is based on the evidence discussed by March & Smith (1995), who have 
explicitly pointed out two critical points pertaining to the interaction between and combination of 
natural and design science, as shown below. 
 
 Design science creates artefacts, giving rise to phenomena that can be the targets of natural 
science research. Group decision support systems, for example, foster user behaviours that are 
the subject of natural science investigations (George et al., 1988). 
 Since artefacts “have no dispensation to ignore or violate natural laws” (Simon, 1981), their 
design can be aided by explicit understanding of natural phenomena. Thus, natural scientists 
create knowledge which design scientists can exploit in their attempts to develop technology. 
To conclude, March & Smith (1995) provide an example from the field of medicine whereby 
the explanation of why a drug is effective in combating a disease may not be known until 
long after the drug is in common use. 
 
3.1.5 Techniques for Measuring Situational Awareness 
 
It is really important to review the current methods used on evaluating SA for developing active SA 
theory. This is due to the fact that the measurement of SA is important to identify how good participant 
SA is, so that active SA can be measured and evaluated. According to the current literature, two SA-
evaluation methods emerge as popular methods. The first of them is known as the Situation Awareness 
Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT), and the second is the Situational Awareness Rating 
Technique (SART). 
  
3.1.5.1 SAGAT 
 
As noted by Salmon et al. (2006), SAGAT is a freeze-probe technique, where random freezes are 
performed, blanking all screens and displays in a simulation, which is then followed by a list of SA-
related questions. SAGAT requires all participants to answer each question based on their perceived 
SA, and a score is calculated at the end of the trial. 
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SAGAT provides an objective measure of SA for knowledge labelling in manned simulations of the 
task environment, where it directly compares operators’ reported SA to reality. SAGAT intervenes in a 
human in-the-loop simulation at specific times, and queries the subjects by using a computerised tool 
for determining their current understanding of the situation at that particular point in time. In this case, 
SAGAT compares the answers of the subjects with the correct answers, which are simultaneously 
collected through the simulation computer. Such comparisons between real and perceived situations 
provide an objective, unbiased assessment of SA. Its random sampling method also ensures its validity 
and reliability.   
 
SAGAT queries require covering all levels of SA, such as perception, comprehension and projection, 
to provide an accurate measure of the operator’s SA, besides covering and reflecting on the wide range 
of the operators’ SA requirements, which are delineated through a goal-directed task analysis, which in 
turn identifies the operators’ goals, the decisions the operators must make to achieve those goals, and 
the information needed by the operators for decision making. The necessary information is the 
operators’ SA requirements, which form the basis for the development of the SAGAT queries.  
 
Various studies have tested SAGAT, in various forms, a fact that demonstrates its empirical validity 
(Endsley, 1989a, 1989b), predictive validity (Endsley, 1990a) – by linking its scores to subject 
performance – and content validity (Endsley, 1990b) – by exhibiting the appropriateness of the queries. 
The proven efficacy of SAGAT, therefore, automatically qualifies it as the tool to measure the efficacy 
of ASAM.  
 
3.1.5.2 SART 
 
SART provides a subjective measure of SA, and is capable of providing a critical link between SA and 
performance by measuring a person’s perceived quality of SA. However, Endsley’s (1990a) research 
findings point to the fact that it may not be possible to validate SART findings, since subjective and 
objective measures of SA cannot be correlated.   
  
Salmon et al. (2006) note that SART attempts to measure how aware a participant perceives himself or 
herself to be during the task, and does not refer to the different elements within the environment. 
Whilst questions on SAGAT might be similar to: “How many buildings did you notice”, a SART 
question would be along the lines of: “How changeable was the situation?” or “How much information 
did you gain through this trial?” all within a scale (e.g. 1-7). 
 
SARTs are usually carried out post-trial, and involve participants providing a subjective rating of their 
perceived SA via a rating scale. This differs to the interruption-based technique of SAGAT. 
 
3.1.5.3 Comparison of SAGAT and SART 
 
Table 3.2: Differences between SAGAT and SART 
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 SAGAT SART 
Technique Freeze Probe Technique Self-Rating Technique 
Performing the Measurements Simulations paused at random 
intervals, screens blanked and 
questions asked. Answers validated 
against actual, pre-determined 
results of simulation. 
Tests/questionnaires are carried out 
post-experiment.  
Advantages 
 
 Covers all levels of SA such as 
perception, comprehension and 
projection) 
 Removes issues associated with 
post-trial data collection 
 Easier to carry out SARTs 
 Non-intrusive (carried out at 
end of test and not in between 
like SAGAT)  
Disadvantages  Intrusion on task performance 
(during the freezes), which does 
not happen in real-world 
scenarios 
 Questions are asked on items 
that the participant might not 
have been aware of in the first 
place 
 Difficult to correlate SA with 
performance, such as the 
potential for poorly recalling 
the events 
Outcomes  Produces a score of 
participant’s ability to recall 
elements in the environment, 
their associated properties and 
how they are likely to act in the 
future.* 
 Produces a score of how aware 
participants felt they were 
during task performance * 
  SAGAT therefore compares 
participant SA against a 
normative ideal * 
 SART on the other hand makes 
no reference to any ideal, it 
merely tells us how aware 
participants felt they were * 
 
Differences between SAGAT and SART SA measurement techniques. * = Salmon et al. (2006) 
 
3.1.6 Assessing Situational Awareness 
 
Situational awareness is regarded as a fundamental concept in the field of human factors practice and 
research, with the impacts of ever-increasing situational and technological complexity on the human 
agent recognised as a pivotal concern. As a result, valuable and meaningful SA measures are needed in 
order to evaluate the effects of new training methods, system designs and more. However, the question 
is then posed as to how an individual’s SA can be assessed, as well as on what scientific basis it can be 
stated that an individual has a greater SA than another. On the other hand, how can it be suggested that 
a new data system has resulted in decision-makers demonstrating greater SA than previously? 
Importantly, SA evaluation is complex, which owes, in some regard, to the multifaceted nature of SA, 
as well as to the critical problems associated with observing and assessing what goes on in the mind of 
another individual.  
 
Over the last ten years, a number of different approaches have been introduced with the purpose of 
examining and evaluating situational awareness. Ultimately, these techniques boil down to three of the 
most commonly acknowledged, which may be identified in line with the types of evidence seeking to 
be established: 
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Inferential techniques aim to garner implicit SA-related evidence through observable correlates, with 
the behaviour, performance and physiology of an individual monitored as indirect evidence for the 
absence or presence of suitable SA. For instance, through the use of the SALIANT approach, it is 
suggested by Muñiz et al. (1998) that a team’s SA can be inferred through observed behaviours. 
Notably, the somewhat different SABARS (Situational Awareness Behaviourally Anchored Rating 
Scale) approach necessitates the involvement of professional observers with the objective of rating 
people according to various observable behaviours linked with SA processes (Strater et al., 2001). 
Although this is an unobtrusive approach, the restriction is that a performance error or SA-related 
behaviour omission does not ultimately suggest a lack of SA, whilst good performance does not 
necessarily suggest good SA (Baxter & Bass, 1998). A particular type of measurement intervention is 
commonly fundamental in attaining a good understanding of the SA of a person. 
  
Self-rating approaches aim to gather subjective proof of SA through insight into the self-perceptions 
of people. Such techniques are embodied in a number of tools, including the Participant Situation 
Awareness Questionnaire (PSAQ) used by Matthews et al. (2000), the Situational Awareness Rating 
Tool (SART) of Taylor (1990), and the Crew Awareness Rating Scale (CARS) presented by 
McGuinness & Foy (2000). These instruments differ in the number of scales utilised and the 
dimensions rates. SA self-ratings can be gathered immediately following an experimental run or 
exercise, or can also be gathered one or more times mid-run with comparatively minimal disturbance.  
 
Probe approaches or query approaches aim to gather direct evidence of the person’s SA content. 
These techniques involve extracting different data from the person relating to their understanding and 
viewpoints of the situation, and accordingly draw comparisons with this and the actual truth. There are 
two main types of probe. First, with supply probes, the person is asked to provide particular data 
relating to the situation; second, with labour-intensive probes, accurate data are presented to the person, 
in addition to a number of incorrect alternatives, with the individual asked to choose the correct one. 
The second approach adopts a multiple-choice format, as in the case of the Situation Awareness Global 
Assessment Technique (SAGAT) of Endsley (1995, 2000). Such a technique is recognised as being the 
most disruptive and intrusive, but ultimately creates an abundance of direct evidence relating to an 
individual’s SA state.  
 
Nevertheless, this study aims to establish the most significant effects of derived intelligence through 
utilising offensive approaches in the participants’ overall SA. Accordingly, the most suitable technique 
for such a study involves the application of a non-intrusive probe method, which helps to ensure the 
researcher captures all data necessary in order to evaluate the intelligence and draw a comparison with 
participants’ SA. The tool has been validated, as shown in this chapter, in light of the suggestions made 
by Churchill (1979) and McDaniel & Gates (2006: 224-227), where semi-structured questionnaires, 
complete with open-ended questions, were prepared for this part of the project, as will be elaborated on 
later in this chapter.  
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3.1.7 Structural Equation Models (SEM) 
 
In order to test and estimate causal relations of active SA hypothesised model and theory, this research 
utilised SEM. The reason behind utilising SEM is that SEM tests and estimates causal relations using 
combinations of statistical data and qualitative causal assumptions. Also, SEM’s stages, which will be 
described in this chapter, are the most suited for both theory testing and theory development. This 
research has conducted surveys across cyber-security subject-matter experts in CERT teams around the 
world so the hypothesised model produced can be tested using SEM. The following section discusses 
SEM in general, where detailed discussion will be covered later in this chapter in the quantitative data 
analysis section. 
 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a general statistical modelling technique widely used in 
behavioural sciences. From a broader perspective, it can be viewed as a combination of path analysis or 
regression and factor analysis as special cases of SEM (Steiger, 1987). It is a linear, cross sectional, 
statistical modelling technique. SEM is widely used by researchers to determine whether a given model 
is valid, and also in finding a suitable model in analysis. This often involves certain basic elements. 
Major interest in SEM focuses mainly on theoretical constructs, which are represented by latent factors. 
Path coefficients or regression between factors represent the relationship between theoretical 
constructs.  
 
SEM refers to the structure for the covariance between the observed variables. This provides an 
alternative name: covariance structural modelling (MacKinnon, 2008). In some cases, the model is 
extended to include means of factors in the model or observed variables. This results in covariance 
structure modelling having a less accurate name. Some researchers simply take these models as Lisrel-
models, which is less accurate as well. LISREL (linear structural relations) were used by Joreskog in 
one of the initial popular SEM programs. Currently, the research field, structural equation models are 
not necessarily required to be linear, while the possibilities of SEM extend far beyond the original 
LISREL program. Researchers such as Steiger (1987) have discussed the possibility of fitting nonlinear 
curves.  
 
The most recent development in this field is software that allows researchers to specify the model 
directly as a path diagram. However, although this works extremely well for simple problems, it 
becomes really complex with complicated models. In this regard, current SEM software supports the 
command or matrix style model specifications as well.  
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3.1.7.1 Advantages and disadvantages of SEM 
 
 
Table 3.3: The Advantages and Disadvantages of SEM (Author) 
Advantages Disadvantages 
 Validity 
SEM allows making use of several indicator variables 
per construct simultaneously; this results in more valid 
conclusions on the construct level. 
 Reliability/measurement of error  
SEM takes measurement of error into consideration by 
explicitly including measurement error variables that 
match the measurement error portions of observed 
variables. 
 Complex models  
SEM allows the researcher to model and test complex 
patterns of relationships, including a multitude of 
hypotheses simultaneously as a whole, including mean 
structures and group comparisons. 
 Confirmatory approach  
SEM allows the researcher to test complex models for 
their compatibility with the data in their entirety; this 
allows testing specific assumptions about parameters, 
such as whether they equal zero or if they are identical 
to each other, for their compatibility with the data. 
 Model identification/parameter 
identification 
It is not possible to estimate more model parameters 
than there are distinct entries in the empirical 
covariance matrix. 
 Estimation methods and estimation 
challenges 
The algorithms might not converge; this will result in 
no optimal solution being found. 
 Assumptions, single size and distributions  
Combining small sample sizes, non-normal data and 
weak empirical relationships between variables can 
lead to estimation problems and unreliable results.  
 Interpretation of results 
Decision problems may occur especially when there are 
two or more alternative models, making essentially 
different assumptions about the variables in causal 
relationships, but still leading to exactly the same 
model. This makes it hard to base a decision merely on 
statistical criteria (Schermelleh-Engel, 2009). 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of SEM 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Data were collected in this research using a combination of methods. Social sciences have provided 
evidence for the efficiency of using mixed-methods (Creswell, 2003) in a way that the reliability and 
validity of a construct is improved (e.g. Creswell, 2003; Churchill, 1979). It has been put forward by 
Morgan (1999) that when quantitative and qualitative methods are used simultaneously in the same 
research, their respective strengths are enhanced. These research approaches are considered to be at the 
two opposite extremes of the inquiry methods continuum (Krathwohl, 1997). The universal 
relationships of cause and effect between variables are verified through quantitative research. Educated 
estimations or hypotheses are formed by such research, after which they are used to analyse the data. A 
deductive approach is usually adopted by quantitative methods where development is guided by the 
explanation; the focus is chiefly on the statistical significance of the outcomes that have come about 
through empirical tests (Maykut & Morehouse, 1998). The purpose of qualitative research, on the other 
hand, is to identify meanings and patterns; the words of people, their actions and records are also 
closely examined. An inductive approach is normally adopted by qualitative research where data lead 
to explanation, which comes about through detailed observation and examination of the theme of the 
research (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). The quantitative approach is inclined towards positivist epistemology, 
while the qualitative method prefers a constructive/interpretive epistemology (Krathwohl, 1997). 
Qualitative data are considered by the positivists to be corresponding instruments that strengthen and 
illuminate the statistics that have been attained through the research instruments (Coolican, 2004). In 
addition, there are several possibilities, according to Bryman (1998), for using a qualitative method to 
test theories in a way that is normally associated with a positivistic approach (Myers, 1997).  
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Several researchers are in favour of using multiple research methodologies in the field of information 
systems research (Galliers, 1992; Hirschheim, 1992; Winfield, 1990; Straub & Carlson, 1989). Galliers 
(1992) asserts that the domain of information systems is fundamentally a pluralistic scientific domain 
which “can best be understood and analyzed only with the help of pluralistic models” (148). According 
to Winfield (1990), information systems are considered to be systems of social communication that are 
ingrained in a cultural context. This is why various perspectives and explanations need to be considered 
when studying this field, hence the need to use multiple research techniques. Krathwohl (1997) 
believes that an essential aspect of social science research is using a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques. He is of the view that not only can the weaknesses of a single method be compensated for 
through the use of a combination of methods, but diverse perspectives and details can be attained in 
this way.  
 
Based on the explanations presented above, the thesis under discussion uses a mixed approach that 
combines both quantitative and qualitative methods. This consists of employing different instruments 
of data collection. This research adopts positivism deduction as its research approach, while opting for 
mixed methods to avail of its proven advantages in the area of information systems. Altogether, the 
study manifests through two stages, where in the first stage it collected data using electronic survey, 
which was quantitative in nature, while in the second stage it used the results of the survey to design 
and develop the qualitative and quantitative instruments to test the effectiveness, efficacy and 
efficiency of active SA. Accordingly, Structure Equation Modelling (SEM) was used in the first stage 
to verify the theoretical model and test the causal relation, and its outcome was then used in the second 
stage to design the serious gaming environment, SA awareness behavioural anchor rating scheme and 
SA measurement and marking scheme, based on ground truth. 
 
The design science loop is related to the iterations followed in the development of the ASAM artefacts. 
The first iteration was the development of the hypothesised ASAM model based on the literature 
review. The second iteration was concerned with building a statistically significant theoretical model 
(i.e. the ASAM theory), using structural equation modelling (SEM), based on a survey of Cyber 
security experts. The third iteration was the practical validation of the ASAM theory and the 
development of the ASAM derived SA assessment framework by employing the Cyber range in serious 
gaming experiment where Cyber security practitioners, drawn from a sample frame of international 
CSIRTs, were used to assess the practical value of the emergent design science research artefacts i.e. 
the ASAM theory and its concomitant SA assessment framework. 
 
In the second stage, the study adopted Independent Sample T-test to underpin the differences between 
Active and Passive conditions, as well as to underpin the differences between military and non-military 
background conditions. Alongside, One-Way ANOVA was used to underpin the differences between 
the control group (Blue Team) and the participants regarding utilisation of the deception in real-time 
cyber situation. Figure 3.2 outlines this research method and instrument and summarised the coming 
section in this chapter.  
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Figure 3.2: Research Method Outlines (Source: Author) 
 
 
3.2.1 Sampling Techniques 
 
This study utilises a non-random sampling approach, referred to as a convenience samples. It is 
suggested by Bryman & Bell (2007: 198) that “convenience samples are very common and indeed are 
more prominent than are samples based on probability sampling”. Such an approach has been selected 
for this research owing to the fact that it has sought subjects’ permission prior to survey completion. 
Upon the agreement of the subjects to take part in the survey, the research was initiated; if they wished 
to pull out, the research would stop and other subjects would be sought out. 
 
3.2.1.1 Appropriate number of participants 
 
In a sample size, the most suitable number of subjects is a complicated and not always straightforward 
decision. Accordingly, the decision was made that the research would adopt the most commonly 
adopted approaches when establishing the most suitable number for a sample. Importantly, the 
suggestion is typically made that researchers should follow pre-defined rules when establishing the 
most suitable sample size. In this regard, Roscoe (1975) provides four different rules of thumb for use 
when establishing the most suitable sample size (N). 
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 The number of participants should be smaller than 500 but greater than 30.  
 If there is more than one group to be involved in the study, the suggestion is made that each 
group utilise more than 30 subjects.  
 When utilising multivariate analyses, researchers are advised to utilise a larger sample, which 
is at least 10 times that of the number of variables adopted in the analysis. Moreover, it is 
further implied by Stevens (1996) that 15 cases per construct be utilised in order to calculate 
the most suitable sample size. In addition, researchers are advised that the sample size be 
established in regard to the number of parameters in place (Bentler & Chou, 1987). 
Importantly, if the data are distributed normally, at least five cases per parameter are 
considered suitable.   
 If a simple laboratory experiment is to be carried out, and where various conditions are to be 
controlled, the most appropriate sample size should range between 10 and 20 subjects, as 
suggested by Roscoe (1975). A number of other academics, such as Krejcie & Morgan 
(1970), for example, suggest the use of a table in order to establish the most suitable sample 
size (S) derived from a population (N).  
 
The second approach adopted by academics when establishing the most appropriate sample size rests 
on the data analysis approach to be implemented (Hair et al., 2006). With this taken into account, the 
research describes the five considerations Hair et al. (2006) suggest when establishing the proper 
sample size when utilising Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) methods. Primarily, these scholars 
highlight that, if the data distribution diverges from the multivariate normality assumption, the 
proportion 15 individuals for every parameter is considered a suitable number; this will help to reduce 
the issue associated with straying from the norm. Secondly, the sample size should be in the range of 
150-400 subjects when there is the application of the estimation technique. To put it another way, SEM 
is centred on the MLE (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) approach, which provides suitable results if 
150-400 subjects are used. Thirdly, there is the consideration of model complexity, which centres on 
the number of constructs to be adopted in the analysis; otherwise stated, a larger number of parameters 
should be utilised in the analysis when the model has a larger number of constructs, meaning a greater 
sample size would be required in order to complete the analysis. Furthermore, as highlighted by Hair et 
al. (2006), if a researcher adopts a multi-group analysis, a suitable sample size for each group is 
necessary. Fourthly, it is emphasised by the same researchers that a larger sample size is required when 
there is more missing data. In addition, the suggestion is made that commonalities need to be 
considered prior to establishing the size of sample to be utilised. Importantly, commonalities need to be 
in excess of .5 (Hair et al., 2006: 741) (equals .7 standardised loading estimates); if this is not ensured, 
a greater sample size would be necessary. For example, it is suggested by Hair et al. (2006) that, if any 
commonality is found to be between .45 and .55, or if the model comprises constructs with fewer than 
three items, the sample size would then need to be more than 200. Conversely, if commonalities are 
found to be below .45, the minimum sample size should then be more than 300. 
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In addition, researchers Durso et al. (1999), Endsley et al. (1999), Endsley & Garland (2000) and 
Salmon et al. (2009) measured SA performance using sample size range from 8-20 participants. This is 
due to the fact that the targeted sample in their studies was highly specialised personnel, where a small 
group can represent the whole population. This study, as described in the sample frame, uses highly 
specialised cyber security and cyber defence experts with not less than two years’ experience. Due to 
this requirement, the sample size for the lab experiment in this research is similar to what has been 
adopted in previous researches. Also, according to Chow et al. (2003) and Rosner & Bernard (2011), 
the required sample size can be estimated using the formula given below. 
𝑛 = (
𝑍1−𝛽 +  𝑍1−𝛼
2⁄
𝜇0  −  𝜇1
)
2
. 𝜎2 
𝑛: The sample size. 
𝑍𝛼
2⁄
: The critical value. 
𝜎: The standard deviation. 
𝜇
1
: The mean. 
𝜇
0
: The estimated mean. 
𝛼: Significance level (1 - degree of confidence  (1- .95 = 0.05)). 
1 − 𝛽: The power for detecting significant difference (power = 80%). 
Applying this equation using the data found from the pilot, the result is: 
𝑛 = (
. 84 + 1.96
93 − 67.93
)
2
.  26.0072 = (
2.8
25.07
)
2
.  676.3640 = 8.436996 ≈ 9 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
In consideration of the discussion provided above, and in mind of the fact that this study is centred on 
the utilisation of SEM, T-Test and ANOVA, this research utilised a sample size of more than 200 for 
the first stage to get the structural model, and a sample size of 20 or more for the lab experiment 
session. 
3.2.2 Targeted Population and Piloting 
 
The primary survey was circulated among a number of different cyber security firms for piloting, with 
30 professionals in this arena targeted by the study. Notably, the researcher utilised the means and 
resources of the university and its contacts in order to generate the sample of cyber security 
organisations. Moreover, the survey was sent to a number of different reputable security businesses in 
the field, including UK-Cert, UAE-Cert and UK cyber securities firms, as well as various EU cyber 
security organisations and governmental entities. A number of other firms were Italian cyber security 
firms, UAE governments’ cyber security organisations and the US-Cyber Security Institute (US-Cert), 
as well as firms operating in various other countries, including Australia, Germany, India, the 
Netherlands and Singapore.  
 
The observations detailed below were made. 
 
 The key respondents were professionals and experts in the field of cyber security, and all had 
at least 3 years’ experience in the arena.  
 The survey detailed questions linked with personal data; in other words, questions were 
demographic in nature. 
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 Sensitive questions were directly associated with active and offensive approaches, and other 
questions sought to determine whether businesses implemented such approaches.  
 
3.2.2.1 Piloting 
 
Piloting was carried out on the experiential session with the aim of underlining any issues that the 
participants would come across either in the experiential setting itself or in comprehending the survey 
items. The significance of piloting with respect to estimations of the time needed for the entire process, 
examination of any possible problems, and assessment of the reliability and consistency of survey 
items has been emphasised by McDaniel & Gates (2006) and Hair et al. (2006). Pilot testing was 
carried out on the two experiential survey sessions of this research with 30 participants at the first stage 
and 10 at the second stage, all of whom were part of cyber security and cyber incidents response. Those 
participating in the piloting phase were encouraged to give their feedback on the procedures, tasks and 
the survey.  
 
The pilot questionnaire established that a significant number of respondents in the stage one survey did 
not want to be involved owing to the sensitive questions posed. Equally, some questions were believed 
to provide researchers with the opportunity to access firms’ profile information, which could put them 
in a vulnerable position in terms of exploitation. 
In mind of the factors highlighted above, the decision was made by the researcher to remove 
demographic questions, as well as any questions that probed whether firms implemented certain 
methods, from the first survey.  
3.2.3 Purifying Measures 
 
The framework introduced by Churchill (1979) seeks to purify the measurement scales by confirming 
and validating the overall reliability associated with each of the scale items. As has been highlighted by 
McDaniel & Gates (2006: 224-227), validity is explained as being “the degree to which what the 
researcher was trying to measure was actually measured”. With this noted, this paper has carried out 
two different validation approaches through the use of a main survey and lab experiment survey: 
content validity and face validity. In contrast to these, however, reliability is defined by the 
aforementioned scholars (McDaniel & Gates, 2006: 222) as being “the degree to which measures are 
free from random error and, therefore, provide a consistent data”. In this regard, this paper calculates 
the reliability test through the use of Cronbach’s Alpha, which should be at least 0.70 (Hair et al., 
2006). Through the adoption of reliability and validation instruments, as considered above, the ways 
discussed below have purified the scales.  
 
3.2.3.1 Qualitative assessment 
 
Throughout the qualitative assessment approach, the research has examined two different forms of 
validity, namely content validity and face validity. Markedly, scholars McDaniel & Gates (2006) 
explain content validity as being “the responsiveness, or sampling adequacy, of the content of the 
measurement instrument” (225), whilst face validity is highlighted as “the degree to which a 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 96 
measurement seems to measure what it is supposed to measure” (225). Both approaches have been 
utilised for all constructs through the submission of the items for assessment by the academics and 
professionals in the arena of cyber security. The sample considered the questions appropriate for 
construct measurement, and adequate in this regard for both instruments used in this research. 
 
3.2.3.2 Quantitative assessment 
 
During the examination of the pilot study (Stage one n = 40) and (Stage two n = 10), Cronbach’s Alpha 
reliability and factor analysis was carried out in regard to each construct alone. Cronbach’s Alpha has 
been found to provide a value of in excess of 0.8 for all of the constructs, which is notably above the 
suggested threshold of 0.7 recommended by Hair et al. (2006). 
 
3.2.3.3 Justification for using a 5-point Likert scale 
 
A 5-point Likert scale is adopted for this research. It is common for such a scale to be utilised, as it 
facilitates the simple gathering of data from subjects through the use of a survey (Preston & Colman, 
2000; Sekaran, 2000). Importantly, the rationalisation behind utilising such a scale has been debated 
widely (Cox, 1986). For instance, it is held by some that a scale utilising seven, nine or sometimes 
more points is preferable, whilst others believe a lower number is more acceptable. Importantly, a 
greater number of points on the scale means greater validity and power of discrimination (Preston & 
Colman, 2000). On the other hand, however, a response rate is usually greater when five points are 
utilised (Hartely & Mclean, 2006). Furthermore, the empirical research carried out by Dawes (2002) 
highlights a change in validity and reliability when there is the use of a seven-point scale when 
compared with a five-point scale. In this vein, Dawes (2002) suggests that such a Likert scale will 
produce greater validity and reliability. Furthermore, Dawes also emphasises that, when implementing 
an 11-point Likert scale, the same mean is achieved as when a 5-point scale is adopted. Furthermore, 
kurtosis and skewness are seen to show unsystematic differences. With this in mind, it is noted by 
Neumann (1983) that the use of a 5-point and 11-point Likert scale provides comparable findings, such 
as in relation to the correlation coefficients and means. Furthermore, the author suggests that a 5-point 
Likert scale be utilised when attitudinal studies are being conducted.  
3.2.4 Quantitative Data Analysis Techniques and Statistical Packages 
 
Owing to the fact that a mix of data-gathering approaches are utilised throughout the course of this 
study, it should then be recognised that both quantitative and qualitative strands of analysis have been 
adopted. The key quantitative data analysis was carried out through the use of the SEM (Structural 
Equation Modelling), whereas an analysis was utilised with qualitative analysis in mind, and 
participants involved in filling 4 SA questions using SAGAT technique; then, based on their answers, 
participants were marked objectively using the research scale, so that independent sample T-Test and 
One way ANOVA could be used to analyse the findings. This section considers the application of such 
methods throughout the two study stages.   
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An SEM was carried out through the use of a statistical software package developed by IBM called 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), version 20.0. SPSS was adopted for primary data 
analysis, with SEM adopted in order to test the structural model and measurement model. In addition to 
this, a modular add-on to SPSS, referred to as AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structure) version 20.0, 
was employed with the aim of establishing the goodness-of-fit of indexes associated with the suggested 
framework, and to test the hypotheses suggested in the ASAM framework. It is designed primarily for 
SEM, path analysis and covariance structure modelling. (University of Texas at Austin, 2010).  
The use of these statistical packages allowed for better management of the data and the ability to 
handle large amounts of data that could be imported directly from Excel and other spread sheets. The 
appropriateness of utilising SPSS has been recognised and verified by a number of different academics 
(Field, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), and SPSS was adopted in this research for various reasons, 
namely for coding, checking missing data and editing, as well as for checking the assumptions of 
linearity, multicolinarity, normality and outliers. Greater detail about the tests can be seen in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2.4.1 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
 
SEM was adopted with the aim of testing the causal relations outlined in the ASAM framework. In line 
with the view of Tabachnick & Fidell (2007: 676), SEM is described as being a “collection of 
statistical techniques that allow a set of relationships between one or more independent variables, either 
continuous or discrete, and one or more dependent variables, either continuous or discrete, to be 
examined”. SEM is an approach that aims to highlight the data gathered in regard to various structural 
parameters, namely those defined through a hypothesised, underpinning framework. Essentially, SEM 
is considered a theory-based approach, which has the capacity to amalgamate theory and data 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). Moreover, SEM is recognised for its capacity to conduct simultaneous 
analysis, where the links between dependent and independent constructs are modelled simultaneously. 
This capacity varies significantly from the majority of first-generation statistical measures such as 
correlation, factor analysis and regression, which have the ability to examine at any one time only one 
layer of linkage between dependent and independent variables (Chin, 1998). Importantly, SEM has 
enabled social scientists to carry out path analytic modelling with latent variables; subsequently, this 
has resulted in this approach being described as an example of a second-generation form of 
multivariate analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). 
 
The causation between independent and dependent constructs, namely Structural Modelling Analysis, 
is not examined by SEM as a sole activity; rather, SEM also assesses measurement loadings in regard 
to their expected constructs (measurement model analysis). Accordingly, in the context of SEM, 
hypotheses and factor analysis are tried and examined in the same stage. In line with the work of Gefen 
et al. (2000), the combined analysis and measurement of the structural model facilitates the observed 
variables’ measurement errors to be examined as a key aspect of the framework, in addition to the 
combination of factor analysis in one operation alongside hypothesis testing. The result is a more exact 
and precise analysis of the research hypothesised model suggested, with an overall improved 
methodological assessment established afterwards (Bollen, 1989). 
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Unsurprisingly, SEM tools are becoming more and more widely utilised in the context of behavioural 
science studies for the causal modelling of complex and multivariate data sets where the research 
gathers a number of different measures for the proposed constructs (Hair et al., 1998). In the view of 
Gefen et al. (2000), an informal review of the IS literature suggests that SEM has become recognised 
widely in terms of assessing and verifying tools and examining the links between constructs. Moreover, 
a significant increase in SEM utilisation has become recognised widely in IS journals. In contrast, 
however, SEM analysis’s application in the IS domain has increased significantly, owing to the 
availability of various software packages with the capacity to carry out SEM, namely AMOS, LISREL 
and PLS-Graph (Chin, 1998).  
 
The adoption of the SPSS and SEM for this research was a decision made on the basis of various 
factors, and by considering the works of Hair et al. (2006) and Tabachnick & Fidell (2007). Primarily, 
the simultaneous capacity of SEM to test a number of different dependent links between the latent 
variable and observable indicators, as well as to test the links between latent variables is better when 
contrasted alongside other statistical packages, such as SPSS, with many analysing only one link at any 
one time. Second, SEM has the capacity to assess the reliability, unidimensionality and validity of each 
construct on an individual basis. Third, SEM has the capacity to test the confirmatory factor analysis as 
opposed to the exploratory factor analysis, which adds a further benefit. Fourth, SEM is able to predict 
the total indirect and direct effects, which means SEM has a number of advantages over other statistical 
packages. Finally, in contrast with other multiple variance approaches, SEM is able to calculate error 
variance and measurement error parameters, and delivers a generalised goodness-of-fit for the models 
tested.  
 
3.2.4.1.1 Stages in Structural Equation Modelling 
 
This study has incorporated three different phases for the analysis of SEM data. Primarily, the thesis 
has been initiated through examining the measurement model for all of the constructs; in other words, 
calculating confirmatory factor analysis. This action has been adopted for two different reasons: 
 
1. To ensure that the link between every unobserved construct and its observed items has 
attained the unidimensionality assumption. Throughout this phase, CFA (Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis) was adopted in order to ensure standardised factor loadings values would be more 
than .60, which is known to imply a significant link between the items and their respective 
construct (Hair et al., 2006).  
2. To perform a calculation to determine each construct’s reliability and validity. Although this 
research is conducted through the use of EFA (exploratory factor analysis), CFA is viewed as 
being more valuable than EFA (Hair et al., 2006). 
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Notably, a structural framework is adopted in order to test the casual or hypothesised links between any 
concealed constructs. Critical ratio values, namely t-values, are adopted in order to establish the 
importance, or lack of importance, associated with the links between the unobserved (latent) constructs.   
 
Goodness-of-fit criteria and unidimensionality were adopted with the aim of assessing the 
measurement framework along with its specifications. In one regard, there was the evaluation of 
unidimensionality through reliability tests, namely Cronbach’s Alpha reliabilities and composites, and 
factor loadings for all of the constructs – but each in isolation. In contrast, a number of goodness-of-fit 
criteria have been selected in this study, owing to the fact that it is difficult to rely on a single-fit index 
when seeking to establish the best model (Byrne, 2001). This paper has directed attention to three 
different forms of goodness-of-fit, namely absolute fit indices, incremental fit indices and parsimony fit 
indices.  
 
First, in the view of Hair et al. (2006: 706-708), absolute fit indices are utilised with the aim of 
measuring “the overall goodness-of-fit for both the structural and measurement models collectively”. 
Furthermore, these indices suggest the extent to which “the hypothesised model reproduces the sample 
data” (Shah & Goldstein, 2006: 159). In short, absolute fit indices independently assess the goodness-
of-fit associated with a certain model distinct from any other model. This paper has adopted the 
absolute fit indices shown below. 
 
1. The chi-square (χ2) test is linked with the “fit between the sample covariance matrix and the 
estimated population covariance matrix”, as recognised by Tabachnick & Fidell (2007: 715). The 
notable differences between the matrices should not be seen to be the same statistically (p > .05). 
Nevertheless, adopting such a fit in order to evaluate the overall goodness-of-fit framework has 
been the focus of much criticism, owing to the fact that sample size has an impact on chi-square 
(Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Accordingly, in order to quantify the degree of fit, 
a number of academics have neither accepted nor rejected a framework considering only the χ2 
value, but rather utilise a mix with other indices.  
2. GFI (Goodness-of-Fit Index) is concerned with the measurement of the appropriate amount of 
covariance and variance in the sample matrix, and is described jointly through a population matrix 
(Byrne, 2001, p. 82). The values of GFI span 0-1, with those values greater than, or equal to .9 
recognised as good fit (Byrne, 2001; Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
3. AGFI (Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index) is, in the context of this study, adopted in addition to 
GFI. Notably, the main difference between AGFI and GFI is the fact that the latter, in the specific 
model, adjusts in line with the degrees of freedom (Byrne, 2001: 82). Markedly, AGFI values 
spanning 0-1, with values equal to or greater than .9, are recognised as being a good fit (Byrne, 
2001; Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
4. As has been noted by different scholars (Byrne, 2001; Hair et al., 2006), consideration needs to 
be made of RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation), which considers “the error of 
approximation in the population, and asks the question: how well would the model, with unknown 
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but optimally chosen parameter values, fit the population covariance matrix if it were available?” 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993: 137-138, cited in Byrne, 2001: 84). RMSEA shows the degree of fit 
between a model and a population (Hair et al., 2006: 748). Furthermore, RMSEA communicates 
the fit per degree of freedom, and is known to be sensitive to parameters applicable (MacCallum, 
Browne & Sugawara, 1996). Markedly, RMSEA with values of less than .05 showing a good fit 
and values ranging .05-.08 are considered acceptable, whilst values of more than .08 are 
recognised as being poor, and therefore showing an unacceptable fit (Byrne, 2001; Hair et al., 
2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
 
Second, it is acknowledged that incremental fit indices are utilised in terms of “assessing how well a 
specified model fits relative to some alternative baseline model” (Hair et al., 2006: 749). Owing to the 
fact that the absolute fit indices are unable to draw a comparison between frameworks to a particular 
null model 3 (i.e. unlike incremental fit indices), incremental fit indices have been utilised by this 
research, as well as absolute fit indices. More specifically, this study has centred on a number of 
different incremental fit indices, namely Normed Fit Index (NFI), which draws a comparison between 
nested frameworks to put it another way, NFI draws a comparison between the framework’s χ2 value 
of the model with the χ2 value of the independence model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007: 716). It is 
known that the values of NFI range from 0-1, with values greater than or equal to .9 regarded as being 
a sound fit (Byrne, 2001; Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
Owing to the fact that the NFI index is unable to control for various degrees of freedom, and 
underestimates the fit when the sample utilised is small (Byrne, 2001), it is held that the CFI 
(Comparative Fit Index) may prove to be a better version of the NFI index. The values of the CFI span 
0-1 with values greater than or equal to .9 are acknowledged as being a good fit (Byrne, 2001; Hair et 
al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Lastly, the TLI (Tucker-Lewis Index), also referred to as the 
Non Normed Fit Index (NNFI), draws a contrast between the model’s χ2 value with that of the 
independence model, and takes into account degrees of freedom for both frameworks (Bentler, 1990), 
as is the case in the context of this study. Notably, TLI index values span 0-1, with values greater than 
or equal to .9 recognised as good fit (Byrne, 2001; Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Third, wherever applicable, this study utilises parsimony fit indices, especially normed chi-square χ
2/df, in order to determine which of the frameworks of those competing is considered the best (Hair et 
al., 2006). Notably, χ2/df ratios on the order 3:1 or less are acceptable (Hair et al., 2006: 748). 
Goodness-of-fit criteria are summarised in Table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.4: Goodness-of-Fit Criteria Adopted in the Study  
Fit Index Recommended Value (Hair, 
2006) 
χ 2 Non-significant at p <0.05 
Degrees of Freedom (DF) n/a 
χ 2 /df <5 preferable <3 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) >0.90 
Adjusted Goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) >0.80 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >0.90 
Root Mean Square Residuals (RMSR) <0.10 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) 
<0.08 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) >0.90 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) >0.60 
 
Chapter 4 of the study provides an in-depth insight into the findings of both the structural and 
measurement frameworks. The chapter considers the ways in which the analysis results in added value 
in terms of examining the study framework regarding the hypotheses’ rejection/acceptance of the use 
of SEM (Structural Equation Modelling), whereas another analysis used in Chapter 5 is utilised in 
terms of qualitative analysis used to mark participants’ SA performance using the quantitative 
instruments designed based on SEM findings.  
 
3.2.4.2 Lab experiment data analysis techniques (T-Test & ANOVA) 
 
This study consisted of two stages, as explained above. In the first stages, an electronic survey was 
distributed to a group of cyber security experts asking about Active Situational Awareness and SA 
agility and quality. The first stage data were then analysed by conducting a SEM analysis that we 
covered earlier. The result of this analysis was used in the second stage, where the artefact (Data 
capturing script: appendix 3) had been designed to capture expert SA while applying the Active SA 
model in the testing environment. Also, the first stage data informed the second stage in building the 
Behavioural Anchor rating scale and the SA assessment metrics that could capture and assess 
participants’ SA performance. Data collected from this stage were then analysed using an independent 
sample t-test and ANOVA to identify whether there were significance differences between Passive SA 
and Active SA. In another words, finding any significant differences between winning attitudes 
introduced by ASAM and preventive attitudes used currently by cyber defence personnel. Finally, data 
analysis was conducted in order to study the effect of participants’ background and deception and blue 
team utilisation in enhancing cyber SA. Chapter 5 of this study shows the results of this stage of the 
analysis. 
 
3.2.5 Scenario Development 
 
The use of the ‘scenario’ concept is widely used in different areas, such as military, the theatre and 
software development (Pesonen, 2000). Bartusik & Cabala (1997) describe a ‘scenario’ as “[o]ne 
possible picture of future conditions of the object and its environment; above mentioned conditions are 
described by characteristics of the results of given sequences of events (situations) and factors which 
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disturb the natural run (evolution) of these sequences”. Von Reibnitz (1991) describes a scenario as a 
description of a future situation and a description of the way that leads to it. Borjeson et al. (2007) 
created a scenario typology, as shown in Figure 3.6 below. This typology describes the possible future 
as a result of a scenario. “Predictive scenarios answer the question: ‘what will happen?’ Exploratory 
scenarios answer: ‘what can happen?’ Normative scenarios answer: ‘How can a specific target be 
reached?’” (Borjeson et al., 2007). Therefore, the scenario that will be explored as part of this research 
concerns the future of the situation that occurs in the present, through playing a cyber game that 
reconstructs well-known cyber attacks. The main aim of the scenario is to allow the researcher to 
measure the effectiveness, efficacy and efficiency of Active intelligence in enhancing cyber situational 
awareness.  
 
The Futures Group (1994) has proposed sets of processes for developing a scenario. These steps can be 
summarised as follows. 
 
 Define the scenario space or domain. 
 Define key measurements and events. 
 Documentation. 
 
This research has followed these steps and developed the required scenario, which will be discussed in 
the section below. The scenario will be designed to allow attacks against the system and breach of 
network confidentiality. In addition, it will ensure that attacks against the system’s integrity and 
network availability are also included (Tracy, 2009). 
 
Figure 3.3: Scenarios Topology, adopted from Borjeson et al. (2007) 
 
 
  
3.2.5.1 The scenario 
 
The scenario selected by the research revolves around the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX). The 
ADX is a leading stock exchange market in the UAE and their mission is to “lead the development of 
the capital market in UAE through well-regulated marketplace in a lawful environment that ensures 
integrity, transparency and disclosure”. The ADX offers many online services to its customers, 
including online trading, market news and investor portals, amongst others. In addition, the ADX has 
provided services to brokers who use the ADX infrastructure to buy and sell stocks in real-time. 
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Recently, the UAE suffered from political tensions between some external political parties, which did 
not like the UAE’s support for people demanding their freedoms and getting rid of those who used 
religion to control the people and the country. The UAE stood strongly against those parties by 
utilising the media and attempting diplomatic solutions; however, a new wave of failed cyber attacks 
hit UAE cyber resources, but no damage has been reported yet. As a result, the Dubai stock market and 
ADX agreed to collaborate on and share intelligence about the cyber attacks, and, based on that 
agreement, each party agreed to report any cyber incident instantly through a common and accessible 
intelligence reporting system. 
 
3.2.5.2 Building the scenario 
 
In order to build the scenario, there is a need to specify a set of criteria to validate it against. The 
criteria will mostly be modelled against the five characters as noted by (MNE7 Campaign Lexicon, 
2013) which are: Contested, Congested, Cluttered, Connected and Constrained.  
 
Character Across all Domains Research Domain 
   
Contested The ability to access, manoeuvre and 
influence will be fought for.  
Access to the ADX is controlled at different 
layers according to service and privilege.  
   
Congested People will be unavoidably drawn into 
urban areas, the littoral and lower airspace.  
For the ADX relates to the congestion of 
data/traffic and is critical due to the time 
sensitive nature of the information and 
market data. Delays could have a 
detrimental effect on the reputation and 
usefulness of the data provided. 
   
Cluttered A mass of ambiguous targets challenge the 
ability to understand and discriminate.  
Due to the multi-tier nature of ADX, it can 
become difficult to distinguish between 
investors, brokers, employees and casual 
(front-end) users.  
   
Connected All activity, including that of adversaries, 
will rely on inter-connected networks.  
Services provided by the ADX are not 
limited by geography or any other category.  
   
Constrained Legal and social norms will place 
constraints on the conduct of operations.  
Finance has an added complication in which 
there are fine-lines and compliance issues 
that might not be immediately obvious to 
the untrained individuals.  
   
 
Table 3.5: The Criteria of Scenario Development (Source: Author) 
Providing further background to the criteria above, it is important to note the following. 
 
Contested: Regarding the layering of access to the ADX, the various levels would be the front-end, 
which would provide website and emailing facilities. This is for the casual reader or individual 
requiring more information via email communication. Secondly, there would be a service level that 
provides registered investors and organisations such as auditors with access to various market data and 
trading services. Lastly, there would also be the internal level, which is restricted to employees and the 
management of the ADX, such as reconciliation and end of day processes. 
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Congested: For the ADX this is quite critical due to the time sensitive nature of the information and 
market data. Data sources travel from various systems and throughout the various “offices” of the 
ADX, such as front office, middle office and back office operations. In a given trading day, especially 
during peak trading hours, the volumes of messages that would pass through the ADX would be very 
large. 
 
Cluttered: Due to the multi-tier nature of ADX it can become difficult to distinguish between investors, 
brokers, employees and casual (front-end) users. The nature of finance also makes it difficult to 
distinguish between the various authorised/favourable users, malicious hackers (technical perspective), 
money-launderers (financial-perspective) and insider-traders (both) for example. 
 
Connected: Services provided by the ADX are not limited by geography or any other category. Foreign 
banks or non-domicile investors are able to use the information offered. In addition, orders can be 
routed by various third-party providers and brokers, which can obfuscate the source of the data. 
 
Constrained: Finance has an added complication in that there are fine lines and compliance issues that 
might not be immediately obvious to the untrained individuals, as well as legal requirements such as 
Know Your Client (KYC) checks, Politically Exposed Person (PEP), insider trading (providing 
important information that will unfairly bias a market) and bribery tactics (again a fine line between 
gifting and bribing).  
 
3.2.5.3 Validating the scenario 
 
The proposed scenarios would need to address each point, which in turn would lead to a validated 
approach. Key items of the mission and objects are noted below. 
 
1. Ensure ADX remains up and running. 
2. Ensure ADX is secure from cyber attacks. 
3. Ensure partners and investors are able to access the services during critical trading periods. 
4. Ensure Auditing companies are able to access the services securely. 
5. Ensure critical news portal service is accurate and valid. 
 
3.2.5.4 The mission and objectives 
 
The experiment mission as a cyber commander is to ensure that the ADX system stays up and running, 
secure from cyber attacks, and able to handle the fact that the ADX has databases accessed by many 
partners remotely, where partners’ IPs are dynamic. The availability of the system is crucial during the 
trading period, and its integrity is important as well.  
 
An additional complication is that the ADX allows auditing companies to access their networks using a 
VPN service, whereby the username and password are the only authentication methods used for this 
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service. Auditing usually starts after trading period, where all data will be audited during that time. 
Finally, the ADX portal is a critical news portal for traders, as the ADX provides investors with the 
latest news about registered companies. 
   
The objective of this scenario in this research is to allow participants to employ an active C2 new 
approach towards cyber security discussed in this research, as well as identifying the significance of 
situational awareness and showing how active intelligence can help in enhancing organisations’ cyber 
situational awareness quality and agility. Moreover, the scenarios have been designed with the aim of 
establishing whether participants can detect cyber attacks and are able to predict the cyber situations 
throughout the scenario.    
 
Last of all, the participants are required to watch the testing environment and make sure of the 
availability, integrity and confidentiality of its data. Also, participants must utilise the new features 
added to defend and respond to cyber attacks using the offensive methods. As described, this 
experiment is about testing the new, winning attitude instead of the current, defensive approach. More 
detail can be found in appendix 3. 
3.2.6 Data Gathering Instruments Adopted in this Thesis 
 
A critical process of a research project, as stated by Krathwohl (1997), is collecting data through 
inquiry methods that are guided by the purpose of the research and which are influenced by the 
investigation of the researchers. The instruments for data gathering (methods of inquiry) of the current 
research were accordingly chosen on the basis of its research goals and philosophy. This research 
mainly uses the survey method, as it was considered to have greater advantages compared to other 
instruments (Krathwohl, 1997; Galliers, 1992). The first survey was circulated as an electronic survey 
amongst cyber security experts to establish an early theoretical model that could be validated. This 
survey had closed questions, and was entirely quantitative in nature. Serious gaming environment was 
designed and developed so the causal model of active SA can be validated in practice. A semi-
structured survey that had open-ended questions, and was followed up by a qualitative approach (4 
main SA questions), was the second instrument of data collection, used during the lab experiment, 
which was then used to measure participants’ SA using the quantitative instruments developed during 
this study. This section further elaborates on these instruments of data collection. 
3.2.6.1 Stage one: data instruments 
 
Section 3.1 of this chapter discussed how important it is to utilise the collection of knowledge from 
existing literature, and argued that the researcher needs to learn from the pioneering works of the 
earlier research. Chapter 2 focused purely on building the theoretical framework of active SA on 
previous existing literature and critically designing the conceptual hypothesised active SA model. 
Section 2.5 critically analysed the current literature and provided the theoretical framework of active 
SA. The variables extracted there were grouped into tables 6 and 7. Therefore, the following statements 
have been designed based on information derived from a critical review of literature and the initial 
online survey to shape the hypothesised model of this research study. The data derived from this survey 
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are then analysed using SEM, to test and estimate the causal relations of the active SA model. Check 
Chapter 2 and Appendix one for more detail. 
 
Table 3.6 shows the survey code sheets and how they are related to literature. 
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Table 3.6: Initial Survey Statement (more detail in Appendix 1) 
Construct Items 
Variable 
Description 
Question Source (Ref) 
Quality and Agility (QA) ES1 Timeliness 
Situational Awareness is agile when Situational Awareness achieved in a 
timely manner. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125; Endsley, 
2000 
 
ES2 Responsiveness 
Situational Awareness is agile when an organisation has the capability to 
act within a window of opportunity during the cyber incident. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125 
 
ES3 Adaptability 
Situational Awareness is agile when an organisation can adapt to 
changes quickly. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125 
 
ES4 Quality Accuracy High quality Situational Awareness relies on accurate information. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125; Lehr & 
Pupillo, 2009 
 
ES5 
Quality 
Reliability 
The reliability of the source is needed to produce high quality Situational 
Awareness. 
GAO, 2000 
 
ES7 
Quality 
Timeliness 
High quality information provided in timely manner helps to enhance 
cyber Situational Awareness. 
Albert & Hayes 2006: 125 
 
Intelligence  
    
1- Passive Intelligence 
(PI) 
in1 
Intelligence 
Timeliness 
A good intelligence is one that has been provided in a timely manner and 
is useful for an organisation to enhance its cyber Situational Awareness. 
Peterson, 2013 
 
in2 Enemy IP 
IP (Internet Protocol) identification is a key factor to build cyber 
Situational Awareness. 
Gordon, 2005 
 
in3 Enemy Motive 
Identifying the motive behind a cyber incident is vital for an organisation 
to build a strong Cyber Situational Awareness. 
Varon, 2002; GAO, 2000 
 
in4 
Passive 
Intelligence 
Gathering 
Capability 
Intelligence gathering capabilities during a cyber incident is important 
for an organisation to handle enemy attacks. 
Huey & Rosenberg, 2004: 598; 
Beaver et al., 2011 
 
in5 
Intelligence 
Sharing 
Sharing intelligence resources and capabilities are required to build 
strong and reliable cyber Situational Awareness. 
House.gov, 2013: 3 
 
in6 
Intelligence 
Collaboration 
Cyber collaboration is important to build strong and reliable cyber 
Situational Awareness. 
Kaser, 2012: 3 
 
in7 
Interaction 
Capability 
The more interaction an organisation has with the enemy, the more 
knowledge an organisation can gather about the enemy. 
Huey & Rosenberg, 2004 
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2- Active Intelligence 
(AI) 
in8 
Enemy 
Capabilities 
Information about the enemy’s capabilities (operating system, services 
running, tools used) enables a defending organisation to evaluate the 
threat possibilities, which helps to enhance cyber Situational Awareness. 
Holdaway, 2001 
 
in9 
Enemy 
Weaknesses 
Identifying enemy weaknesses during a cyber incident helps an 
organisation to enhance Situational Awareness based on enemy 
vulnerabilities. 
Holdaway, 2001 
 
in10 
Intelligence 
Accuracy 
Intelligence accuracy in cyberspace is vital in order to enhance cyber 
Situational Awareness. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125 
 
in11 
Intelligence 
Completeness 
Completeness of cyber intelligence is required to enhance an 
organisation’s Situational Awareness 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125 
 
in12 
Information 
Gathering 
Within an offensive approach, a deceptive capability (active intelligence 
gathering) provides superior information that enhances cyber Situational 
Awareness 
Chen, 2010 
 
in13 Destroy 
Information about how to destroy an enemy in cyber space helps in 
enhancing the defending organisation’s Situational Awareness 
Holdaway, 2001; Gary, 2011 
 
in14 
Active 
Intelligence 
Gathering 
Capability 
Active Situational Awareness through active intelligence gathering is 
required for future cyber security. 
Chen, 2010; Varon, 2002 
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3- Intelligence Gathering in15 
Resources 
Availability 
Resource availability helps to enhance cyber Situational Awareness. Theohary & Collins, 2011 
 
in16 
Non Cyber 
intelligence 
Combining other non-cyber related sources of intelligence helps to 
enhance an organisation’s cyber Situational Awareness. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125 
 
in17 
Enemy Geo 
Location 
The attacker’s geographical location helps an organisation to enhance 
cyber Situational Awareness. 
Gordon, 2005 
 
in18 
Enemy Attack 
Variation 
The defending organisation with deception capabilities can enhance 
cyber Situational Awareness by deceiving an enemy to identify all 
possible enemy attack variations. 
Chen, Tan, Xing, Wang & Fu, 2010: 
1739 
 
in19 
Enemy Attack 
Consistency 
The defending organisation with deception capabilities can enhance 
cyber Situational Awareness by deceiving an enemy to identify enemy 
attack consistency. 
GAO, 2000 
 
in20 
Granular Level of 
Threat Detail 
A granular level of threat detail helps to enhance an organisation’s 
defence. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125 
 
in21 
Enemy Possible 
Attack 
Within an offensive approach, information about a possible attack which 
has an impact on enemy resources helps the defending organisation to 
enhance its Situational Awareness. 
Salerno & Tadda, 2009: 1 
 
in22 
Enemy Attack 
Timing 
The defending organisation with deception capabilities can enhance 
cyber Situational Awareness by deceiving an enemy and so identify 
enemy attack timing. 
GAO, 2000 
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Situational Awareness 
(SA) 
S1 
Perception 
Correctness 
Perceiving incorrect data leads to poor cyber Situational Awareness, so 
training techniques and procedures employed by the defending 
organisation help to avoid such an issue. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125 
 
S2 
Perception 
Completeness 
Poor cyber Situational Awareness results from perceiving incomplete 
data, so training techniques and procedures employed by the defending 
organisation help to avoid such an issue. 
Albert & Hayes, 2006: 125 
 
S3 
Previous 
knowledge 
An organisation that has rich and accessible previous information (such 
as vendor reports, previous cyber incidents, risk assessment reports, cert 
reports etc.) allows an organisation to build strong cyber Situational 
Awareness. 
Nonaka & Nishiguchi, 2001 
 
S4 Skill 
Comprehension of the cyber incident situation is gained when an 
organisation relies on skilful and experienced employees. 
Nonaka & Nishiguchi, 2001 
 
S5 
Analysis 
Capability 
Cyber threat analysis is key to the comprehension of the cyber incident Endsley, 2000 
 
S6 Confidence 
Cyber Situational Awareness requires both willingness and trust to use 
cyber intelligence. 
Tadda, 2008; Albert et al., 2006 
 
S7 Projection (intent) 
Estimating the enemy’s intent towards the defending organisation’s 
assets can enhance Situational Awareness. 
Salerno & Tadda, 2009: 1 
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3.2.6.2 Stage two: research experiment environment development and data instruments  
 
This section discusses the second stage methodology adopted in this research. SEM results in this 
research are used to develop the serious gaming environment, the active SA behavioural anchor rating 
scale and the SA assessment metrics. The serious gaming environment is an environment that allows 
researchers to assess participants’ SA in regard to cyber incidents. In the current research, the 
environment was developed through several stages, as described in this section. The SEM result also 
informed the development of SA assessment scales, where factor loading was used to define the weight 
of each variable in the active SA model, and the factor coefficients of determination and causal 
relations were used to determine how much each factor contributes to the active SA model. This 
section will provide more insight into the stage two experiment and instruments. 
 
Problem Identification and Motivation: Malicious attacks on computer network systems pose immense 
threats to the computer networks of any organisation. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that 
extraordinary measures be deployed to ensure that these risks are properly mitigated. However, before 
designing the measures, it is important that all situations posing threats to the computer network 
systems of an organisation are determined. Only then can benchmarks be established, statistics 
generated and success rates determined.  
 
Situational awareness (SA) is crucial in aiding organisations to come up with the awareness of various 
threats and scenarios, besides conducting an exclusive estimation of the various implications of 
imminent attacks. The use of SA also helps to create heightened awareness and understanding of all 
situations that might be risky to the security of any information system. 
 
Current cyber situational awareness models were built with passive defence in mind, and that simply 
cannot provide the necessary capabilities to deter advanced cyber threats. Chapter 2 discussed some of 
the issues related to cyber security and cyber SA and its limitations within current SA model, and the 
problem is that most current cyber security SA models are passive character and not aligned correctly 
with doctrine, which makes them vulnerable to modern evolving cyber attacks. In a world of rapid 
change and increased resources, it is imperative that Active SA is employed to stay ahead of the game 
and adapt ahead of the threats, whilst still taking advantage of past knowledge. Static and passive 
systems are incredibly slow to adapt, and, in the case of cyber war, which is a war of information, the 
side that has more information simply wins. This is the reason why active defence (offensive 
approach), employed with a winning attitude, should be in place. A situational awareness model should 
be designed with a winning attitude that aligns correctly with doctrine which provides superior quality 
information in a timely manner that eventually provides an organisation with the agility to respond to 
an attack. This preventive attitude is discussed in Chapter 2 – as the name suggests, it prevents 
defenders from being able to predict future events/targets of cyber attacks. Therefore, the sort of 
winning attitude discussed in Chapter 2 is the most suitable option for cyber security, and helps the 
defender gain advantages over attackers. 
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Sun Tzu discussed the importance of having good intelligence about the enemy to win a war, and he 
went further, by making intelligence the central point in defeating an enemy. Endsley (2000) argues 
that, from an intuitive point of view, SA is all about “knowing what is going on”, and her research 
shows the importance of information flaws so that an organisation can get a better understanding of the 
environment it deals with. Tadda’s (2008) SA model describes the importance of cyber sensors in the 
network in order to activate SA. This ensures that information is captured locally in order to determine 
the situation in the network environment. Using such technology would help to solve the complexity of 
the digital world and identify the offender. Palermo & Kocsis (2005) argue that local sensors such as 
IDS, firewalls and system logs are crucial in any cyber defence, as these tools shape importance 
sources in investigating cyber attacks, and also help in identifying the IPs and location of the offenders, 
and even sometimes help in understanding their method of attacks (Jone et al., 2006; Da-Yu Kao & 
Shiuh-Jeng Wang, 2009).  
 
In ethical hacking, hackers usually start penetrating after gathering some intelligence about the target. 
The main intelligence they pursue is the target’s IP and ports (Gordon, 2005). In this thesis, active 
intelligence is about collecting intelligence about an enemy by using an aggressive method. The local 
sensor would help in capturing the suspect IP (Jones et al., 2006) that will allow the defending 
organisation to start attacking and gathering intelligence in the same way that hackers do.  
 
Albert & Hayes (2006) argue that agility and quality of information should be considered when 
building cyber SA, and that intelligence is the centre point of doing that. Accuracy, timeliness, 
responsiveness and reliability of intelligence are all important if SA is to be achieved in a quality and 
agile manner. From the above discussion, and from the previous literature discussed in Chapter 2, a 
theoretical model was developed (Figure 3.4) and designed to align with military doctrine in order to 
overcome the limitations of the Cyber SA model by introducing a winning attitude that would use 
offensive measures to gather intelligence from the enemy’s domain. This model answers all questions 
concerning the design science early stages.  It also provides guidance on building research instruments 
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Figure 3.4: Active Situational Awareness Hypothesised Theoretical Model (Source: Author) 
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Experiment Aim &Objective: The aim of this experiment is to test the usefulness of the active SA in 
building cyber situational awareness through the utilisation of an active offensive approach. The main 
objectives are as follows. 
 
1. Capture participants’ SA to measure SA effectiveness and efficacy. 
2. Capture participants’ decisions and actions. 
3. Measure participants’ SA quality and agility.   
 
Hypothesis: Active Intelligence Gathering using Offensive Hacking techniques helps to Enhance Cyber 
Situational Awareness through enhancing an organisation’s Agility and Quality in dealing with cyber 
incidents. 
 
3.2.6.3 Design and development of research serious gaming environment 
 
This part of this section will cover all the aspects of developing the serious gaming environment that 
meets this research requirement. The theory of active SA and SEM structural model informed directly 
the development of this research serious gaming environment through providing main factors and 
components that required for active SA environment. Also the scenario of this research covered earlier 
in section 3.2.5 informed the development as it identified the main objective of the serious gaming 
environment. This part of this section will provide more insight into the serious gaming environment 
infrastructure and components. 
 
System Requirements: The required system can be described as an intelligence gathering system, using 
multiple sources of intelligence to deliver high quality and agile situational awareness to cyber 
commanders, as recommended by Alberts (2002). This system relies on three different intelligence 
sources: 
 
1. Active intelligence gathering using offensive hacking and deception techniques, providing 
cyber commanders with intelligence from enemy domain (Cahanin, 2011; Nakashima, 2010; 
Thomas, 2009).  
 
2. Passive intelligence based on local security controls (Li et al., 2009) and sensors providing 
cyber commanders with local captured intelligence. 
 
3. Intelligence sharing and collaboration across partners (Kaser, 2012: 3) that allows cyber 
commanders to have more capability to handle cyber conflict.   
 
The system should provide varieties of monitoring solutions that allow operators to monitor the entire 
organisational network’s assets with sufficient visualisation tools, and it should be designed to enhance 
cyber commanders’ situational awareness by utilising multiple sources of intelligence in a clear and 
consistent manner. It is hypothesised that the active components in this system will give commanders 
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competitive advantages over their opponents, where intelligence can be taken from the enemy domain 
using active offensive techniques. 
  
Based on what has been discussed in this chapter, in order to test ASAM, the following requirements 
should be considered while developing the testing environment: 
 
 A computer network environment that reflects the real, physical world with real assets. 
 Real network traffic with real noise. 
 Network and security alerts dashboard. 
 Network and security monitoring dashboards. 
 Central point of control of the entire environment. 
 Intelligence reporting system to deliver intelligence across participants. 
 Sharing and collaboration regarding cyber security incidents across different stakeholders. 
 Offensive capabilities with advance hacking tools and deception capabilities. 
 Network and system control capabilities. 
 Capabilities to freeze and stop the entire network environment without altering its normal 
execution. 
 Red team (enemy) to attack the designed system from the Internet.  
 An instrument to capture expert participation and SA. 
 
In order to achieve the above, the system requires highly sophisticated technologies that can provide 
real-time awareness of a particular cyber incident. This can be achieved by integrating different types 
of technologies that offer real-time network monitoring and visualisation services.  
  
The use of an intelligence reporting platform is crucial for cyber commanders because such a platform 
would allow the intelligence feeds to be delivered in a timely manner. Therefore, due to these complex 
requirements, this researcher decided to include the following characteristics into the system design. 
 
1- Intelligence reporting system: 
This system allows intelligence to flow across participants in timely manner, with functionality to 
receive, store and send intelligence within a central database. The system would help cyber 
commanders to have access to important intelligence so better situational awareness can be achieved. 
Speed and efficiency would be paramount, especially over time when the data consumed and processed 
would greatly increase and the system would still continue to behave consistently as per the user’s 
expectations. 
 
2- Blue Team: 
A blue team enabled cyber system gives the cyber commander the ability to act in an enemy network. 
Intelligence from such a source would allow an organisation to enhance its defence, and be able to 
tackle a cyber incident in a more sufficient way, as well as to be able to build up an enemy’s profile. 
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a. Passive security controls 
IDS, firewalls and other monitoring technologies are important sources for spotting suspicious 
activities that cyber commanders can rely on. In this system, different tools are integrated to provide 
high visualisation results of the network activities.  
 
b. Intelligence sharing and collaboration: 
Partners can provide high value intelligence that organisations can rely on in improving cyber 
capabilities. This system provides such services and makes them available to cyber commanders so that 
better resource utilisation and defence can be achieved. 
 
c. Deception center (cloned controlled DMZ) 
This service is available to cyber commanders to utilise during cyber incidents. This would allow 
intelligence to be gathered as enemy activities are monitored and controlled. 
 
3- Red Team: 
A red team in this experiment will act as an enemy. The main objective of this red team is to penetrate 
the testing environment and challenge commanders and their security controls. 
 
3.2.6.4 Operation of serious gaming environment 
 
1- Pre-cyber conflict: 
The system operates with a winning attitude in mind. A cyber commander of a cyber operation is 
responsible for providing clear mission objectives and focusing the people in charge so that high 
quality and agile SA can be achieved (Sawyer, 1994). Blue team is in charge of utilising all possible 
skills and deploying new sensors or monitoring pre-existing sensors to gather intelligence from the 
enemy domain, and providing this intelligence to cyber commanders. Cyber commanders may direct 
blue team in their mission so the required intelligence can be provided. In case of enabling deception 
services, blue team should be in charge of monitoring enemy activities and providing cyber 
commanders with the latest intelligence report. On the other hand, operators in this system are in 
charge of keeping the organisation’s network system safe and up and running through the utilisation of 
the local security sensors. The available resources in this system are capable of keeping the cyber 
commanders updated with the status of the system’s health and performance. Also, they can provide 
the necessary intelligence in case of a cyber breach. Intelligence provided by partners whom agreed to 
share cyber breach intelligence is vital to allow cyber commanders to build strong situational 
awareness, and so such intelligence should be examined and assisted by cyber commanders, who may 
ask members of the team to validate it. This intelligence could direct cyber commanders to effect 
changes in the operation’s plan or even help in updating the organisation’s security defence. Deception 
services can only be activated by a cyber commander who is in charge and who can give operators the 
order to channel suspicious traffic towards the deception centre. The blue team is responsible for 
monitoring the deception service, and provides the intelligence about enemy movements to the cyber 
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commanders. In this exercise, one person will fulfil the role of providing the offensive capabilities 
service to the cyber commanders (participants). Red team, in this experiment, is in charge of 
penetrating and challenging the participants’ network, and will be handled by a different person.  
 
2- Cyber conflict: 
 
During a cyber conflict, the active SA system would provide superior intelligence at the operational 
and tactical level, as recommended by Parks & Duggan (2001) and Sawyer (1994). The system would 
help cyber commanders to enhance intelligence gathering, and hence inform the commanders’ 
decision-making process. Target acquisition in this system means having an ear on the enemy domain, 
where blue team uses it to extract intelligence and deliver it to the cyber commanders to exploit. Also, 
the system would direct cyber commanders in setting priority, and influence commanders in giving 
orders and direction during cyber conflicts. With respect to the control group, the serious gaming 
environment will provide only passive components. The cyber commanders in this case will try to 
defend the organisation assets using passive security controls only. The blue team (offensive 
capabilities) and deception service will be disabled. 
   
3.2.6.5 Employment of serious gaming environment 
 
In order to get the full benefits from the system, the commander’s structure needs to be defined and 
authorisation distributed based on needs (Albert & Hayes, 2006). Also, the Active SA system requires 
a winning attitude to be adapted so the cyber team can utilise all available resources when needed. In 
this system we have three main players, as described below. 
 
Cyber Commanders: in charge of monitoring network assets and the intelligence reporting system. 
Also in charge of leading both the blue team and cyber operators. The commanders (participants) in 
this experiment act as incident handlers, vulnerabilities and threats analysts and decision makers. 
Therefore, participants are going to act as a cyber commanders and cyber operators.  
 
Blue Team: in charge of monitoring organisation networks, and use offensive hacking and deception 
techniques to gather more intelligence from enemy domains. Obey the commander’s instructions and 
update him with real-time intelligence feeds. 
 
Cyber Operators: in charge of monitoring the organisation network and trying to spot any suspicious 
activities by using the provided monitoring and visualisation technology. Obey the cyber commander’s 
instructions and do the required changes in the network environment. Therefore, cyber commanders 
should give other cyber staff some responsibility and authorisation, especially the blue team, where fast 
decisions should be made when it comes to intelligence gathering from the enemy domain. 
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3.2.6.6 System coverage 
 
The system will cover organisation networks assets by utilising local sensors. Also, the system would 
allow an organisation to act in the enemy domain by utilisation of remote sensors used by blue team. 
Partner’s intelligence is covered in this system as a subscriber can enjoy the benefits of intelligence 
feeds and support from other cyber operation centres. 
 
3.2.6.7 Experiment sequence 
 
The experiment has been designed based on the requirements discussed earlier. Most of its sequence 
derived from or rely on existing literature in the area of ethical hacking, networking, command and 
control, security and situational awareness. The scenario employed in this thesis was designed based on 
principles employed by military that cover concept of use, concept of employment and concept of 
operation. The red team in this research is the enemy that will be launching attacks using kill chains, as 
described by Kjaerland (2005). It worth’s to note that different scholars have different labelling for the 
kill chain, however the process is still the same. The attacks in this experiment are categorised as 
following: attacks against system and network confidentiality; attacks against system integrity; attacks 
against system and network availability (Tracy, 2009). The research scenario development relied on 
these attacks to come up with a scenario that reflects the real world situation, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. Sommers et al. (2004) argue that “the ability to generate repeatable, realistic 
network traffic is critical in both simulation and testbed environments” in order to make the 
environment behave like or reflect the real situation. In this research, traffic generation is real traffic 
coming from clients both in and outside the testing network, accessing available resources. Figure 3.5 
below shows the sequence of the ASAM experiment that summarises 6 points, starting by providing 
participants’ information about the experiment and clarifying the aims and objectives of this 
experiment. It then provides more detail about the testing environment by allowing them to read the 
system specification and documentation. Data collection for each session is divided into 3 stages. It 
starts with pre-survey, collecting demographic data of participants. The second stage is more concerned 
about participant SA and intelligence. Finally, at the end of the experiment, participants are asked some 
questions related to SA and their point of view regarding the aSA approach to cyber security. In the 
instrument section that follows, more detail will be provided.  
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Figure 3.5: Experiment Sequence (source Author): 
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3.2.6.8 Development of the experimental testing environment and piloting 
 
By following Peffers and colleagues’ (2007) recommendation, the system and the SA assessment 
framework were developed in accordance with the requirements described in this section. During its 
development, the researcher managed to expose the system and SA assessment metric to cyber security 
experts for the purpose of making sure that it reflected real network behaviours and the metric is valid 
for evaluating cyber SA. Many enhancements were made until the researcher managed to deliver the 
final product. The system has been piloted, and the researcher made sure that participants could easily 
understand how to operate it. Moreover, due to SAGAT requirements, Endsley’s (1990a), to capture 
participants’ SA, the system includes a feature that allows the researcher to freeze the testing 
environment and save a copy of its execution without affecting its integrity. Therefore, the proposed 
system in this research would allow the researcher to put the theoretical model into practice and 
validate it. 
 
Theory is important for design science (Venkatesh, 2000), as it acts as starting point to understand what 
artefact is needed.  In this research it is clear that the main requirement is to develop an assessment 
metric that allows to quantify SA and develop a system with an active intelligence features, and which 
is capable of capturing all the required measurements. The theoretical active SA model inform the 
development of this testing environment as it is clear main active components should be included in 
any active SA environment. In order to do so, the process model set out below (Figure 3.6) was 
developed to the aSA theoretical model (Figure 3.4) in practice. (More details of this model are in 
Chapter 2). 
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Figure 3.6: The Process Model of ASAM (Source: Author) 
 
The following section will discuss the serious gaming environment design and development where 
system components and network typology used for testing active SA approach are described in detail.  
 
a. System infrastructure components: The development of testing environment requires tools and 
devices similar to those tools used by any organisation complex network. This research thought to 
build a cost effective serious gaming environment that reflects real organisation network but in 
virtualised environment which is considered cheap and cost effective technology to mimic a real 
network assets using few hardwares. Due to the nature of this research, security controls will be 
included in the environment, such as IDS, network monitoring tools and antivirus. This research 
considered using commercial-like security controls products that are available for free as open source, 
where a community of security experts participates in developing such tools. In order to achieve the 
required features the below components were integrated. 
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 Gateway: Linux based gateway called (Zentyal) used as an internet gateway and client LAN 
gateway. 
 IDS: Snort and suricate. 
 IDS Visualization: Snorby and Squi. 
 Firewall and antivirus: Zentyal (Linux open source edition). 
 Network Monitoring and Analyser: Cola Soft (Capsa). 
 Freezing and revert option: this feature has been added so the entire environment can be 
controlled. The script has been written using a shell that relies on vmrun package. 
 Kill chains: used by red team and blue team where each scenario will be played in a fully 
automated way. However, human involvement is required to execute shell scripts and select 
the proper attack needed. 
 Virtualization: Vmware workstation (8&9) and Virtualbox. 
 Vswtiching: Vmware and other Linux based. 
 OS: Ubuntu, Windows server 2008, Windows 7 Windows XP, Debian, Fedora and other 
Linux based OS. 
 Servers: Windows server 2008, Windows 7, PPTP server and Ubuntu. 
 IDS OS: Debian. 
 VM OS: Ubuntu. 
 Clients: Windows 7, Windows XP and Ubuntu. 
 Red Team: Windows XP, Backtrack, Ubuntu. 
 Blue Team: Kali Linux, Backtrack and Ubuntu. 
 Other Tools: MSQL Client, Browser, Email Client, Shell and Python. 
 Intelligence Reporting System: (Subscriber System, Provider System, Blue Team 
intelligence reporting system) system used to distribute or share intelligence with DM. This 
system has been design using shell script (for more details see appendix 3). 
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b. Network typology: 
 
Figure 3.7: Serious Gaming Environment Network Typology (Source: Author) 
 
In this research experiment we followed two phases, as described in this chapter, where the first phase 
was to develop the theoretical model, and to test estimate and causal relations, using SEM, to 
determine the goodness-of fit, and examine the relationships among multiple independent and 
dependent constructs. The combined summary of all the results of this phase can be found in Chapter 4, 
and ultimately the results were used to shape the system design of ASAM. This was done primarily by 
using the metrics identified, and the system was validated against it throughout all phases of the design. 
 
The second phase was to put the results of SEM into practice, where the researcher captured the 
experts’ view of active intelligence. SAGAT provides an objective measure of SA for knowledge 
labelling in manned simulations of the task environment, where it directly compares operators’ 
reported SA to reality. SAGAT intervenes in a human-in-the-loop simulation at specific times, and 
queries the subjects by using a computerised tool for determining their current understanding of the 
situation at that particular point in time (Endsley, 1990a). Therefore, this research adopted SAGAT to 
capture participants’ results using a semi-structured survey (more details about SAGAT have been 
discussed earlier in section 3.1.5 and will be discussed further in the section 3.2.6.11). 
 
3.2.6.9 Lab experiment stage two instrument 
 
The participants in the experiment were required to provide some demographic information, such as 
their name, age, gender, job role, education etc. During the experiment, one of the research groups 
recorded the participants’ activities and captured the timestamp of each event. A different person 
recoded the time log of the red team. Finally, the participants were required to repeatedly answer the 
following questions whenever they encountered a suspicious event, which was a non-intrusive SAGAT 
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techniques, and the questions were used to help identify the perception, comprehension, projection and 
action/decision of the participant, as described by Endsley (1995) (Appendix 3) 
 
What is going on in the network? What do you see?  
What does it mean?  
What is your Situational Awareness?  
What is your action?  
 
Based on the above questions, the participants’ behaviour was estimated using the Behaviourally 
Anchored Rating Scale (SA BARS) that describes a participant’s performance in response to cyber 
incidents based on ground truth, shown in Table 3.7, below. The experiment kill chains was developed 
and validated through subject matter experts where group of cyber security experts participated to 
develop this research kill chain. As discussed earlier, different scholars have different kill chains but in 
reality it is just a different labelling of the same process. 
 
Table 3.7 Experiment Kill Chains 
 
Reconnaissance 
    Scenario 
Ref Scanning  Fingerprinting 
Payload 
Prep. 
Attack 
Execution  
Attack 
Type Exploit 
ASAM01 2 mins.  2 mins. 3 mins. 90 secs. 
Denial of 
service 
(system 
level) 
Desktop 
Communication 
Service 
ASAM02 2 mins. 2 mins. 5 mins. 6 mins. 
Database 
brute force 
and 
unauthoris
ed access 
Windows 2008 
SQL server 
ASAM03 2 mins. 2 mins. 3 mins. 5 mins. 
PPTP VPN 
brute force PPTP Server 
ASAM04 2 mins. 2 mins. 90 secs. 3 mins. 
Escalating 
privilege 
attack Windows Share  
ASAM05 2 mins. 2 mins. 90 secs. 1 mins. 
Denial of 
service 
(system 
level) Windows BIOS  
 
3.2.6.10 SA BARS 
 
The researchers at the University of Queensland were among the first to develop a Situational 
Awareness Behaviour Anchor Rating Scale (SA/BARS), using it to measure the SA performance of the 
members of Air Services, Australia. This technique involves expert observers rating individuals on the 
basis of the 28 observable behaviours (Table 3.8) that are indexed to SA processes (Mathews et al., 
2000). It uses a 5-point Likert scale, where the performance in terms of specified behaviours is rated as 
either very poor, poor, borderline, good or very good. One view of the 28-framed SA behaviours 
suggests that it can also be generalised for other networks.  
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Table 3.8: SABARS Rating Items (Example. Mathews et al., 2000) 
1. Sets appropriate levels of alert. 
2. Solicits information from squad leaders. 
3. Solicits information from civilians. 
4. Solicits information from commanders. 
5. Effects coordination with other platoon leaders.  
6. Communicates key information to commanders.  
7. Communicates key information to squad leaders. 
8. Communicates key information to other platoon leaders.  
9. Monitors company net.  
10. Assesses information received.  
11. Asks for pertinent intelligence information.  
12. Employs squads tactically to gather needed information.  
13. Employs graphic or other control measures for squad execution.  
14. Communicates to squads overall situation and commander’s intent.  
15. Utilises a standard reporting procedure.  
16. Identifies critical mission tasks to squad leaders.  
17. Ensures avenues of approach are covered.  
18. Locates self at vantage point to observe main effort.  
19. Deploys troops to maintain platoon communications.  
20. Uses assets to effectively assess environment.  
21. Performs a leader’s recon to assess terrain and situation.  
22. Identifies observation points, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment.  
23. Assesses key finds and unusual events.  
24. Discerns key/critical information from maps, records and supporting site information.  
25. Discerns key/critical information from reports received.  
26. Projects future possibilities and creates contingency plans.  
27. Gathers follow-up information when needed.  
28. Overall situation awareness rating.  
 
 
 
SABARS was derived from the researched instruments of individual assessment, such as the 
Comprehensive Assessment of Team Member Effectiveness (CATME), which is founded on the 
teamwork literature and on the Likert-scale format, with an aim to identify the possible ways to 
enhance the effectiveness of a team. This instrument forms the basis of one of the SA BARS that 
assesses five broad areas of team-member contribution, where the people who perform the rating 
activity are required to make only five decisions about each person they rate (Campbell et al., 1973; 
Loughry, Ohland & Moore, 2006).  
 
The main advantages of SABARS are that its rating scale uses ‘behavioural anchors’, it is relatively 
simple to use and it is unobtrusive. Altogether, the usefulness of SABARS rests on the fact that they 
facilitate a detailed measurement of the major SA behaviours of an individual, which in turn 
contributes to strengthening SA management. Since SABARS involves expert observers, the outcomes 
are expected to be highly reliable, and observer-rating techniques have become more common for their 
usefulness, such as in facilitating ‘on-field’ SA assessments by subject matter experts (SMEs), who 
observe the participants performing tasks under analysis before rating each participant. SABARS’ non-
obtrusive nature, detailed approach to assessment, ability to measure SA in real time, and high 
compatibility with the C4i environment (Command, Control, Communication, Computers and 
Intelligence) are its main advantages (Salmon et al., 2006). 
 
Table 3.9 shows the Active SA BARS, where standard operation procedure is shown next to each point 
in the rating scale. The SA BARS is this research has been identified and developed using group of 
security experts who participated directly during the pilot. The Standard operation procedures for the 
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giving anchors were also identified as cyber security experts participated during the process. In Chapter 
4 of this study covered that the quality and agility variables are the measure of SA performance. 
Therefore, Active SA BARS used these variables to in order to determine the participants SA 
performance. Active SA BARS used in this research to objectively measure and capture participants 
SA performance toward cyber incidents. This rating scale is completed by the researcher through 
examining participants answers to the questions discussed in section 3.12.2 and these answers are 
mapped into the scenario and experiment kill chains (Table 3.9) that participants are involve in. Active 
SA BARS is an objective measures developed and guided by the result extracted from the structural 
model of active SA explained in Chapter 4, section 4.5.4, where SA factor variables, quality and agility 
factor variables, and intelligence-related variables used from the structural model to evaluate the active 
SA theory in practice. Chapter 5 of this research shows the analysis where this rating scale is applied 
and the data from this and subsequently analysed using the t-test and ANOVA analysis to determine 
how well active SA group compared to the passive SA group performed in the experiment.
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Table 3.9: Active SA BARS 
   
SOP(Passiv
e) 
SOP(Activ
e) 
Perception The correctness of the perception Correctness   
  
1- Failed to perceived     
  
2- Perceived false data P   
  
3- Perceived some of the truth but not sufficient to deter incident P   
  
4- Perceived some of the truth but sufficient to deter incident P A 
 
5- Perceived correct data   A 
The completeness of the 
perception Completeness 
 
 
1- Participant failed to detect suspicious activities     
  
2- Perceived unrelated data P   
  
3- Perceived incomplete data but not sufficient to deter cyber incident P   
  
4- Perceived incomplete data and it is enough to deter incident   A 
  
5- Participant managed to get clear picture of the suspicious activities   A 
  
  
  
Comprehensi
on Participant analysis capability  Analysis    
  
1- Failed to understand what’s going on in the network     
  
2- Wrong judgement toward understanding the situation P   
  
3- Part of the truth has been identified, where participants failed to provide clear picture 
of the situation P   
  
4- Successfully understood the situation   A 
  
5- Clear understanding of the situation and willingness to take action   A 
 
Participant comprehension Confidence   
  
1- Participants failed to come up with a correct conclusion toward the situation      
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2- Hesitation to take action P   
  
3- Several hypotheses has been made P   
  
4- High self confidence toward participant finding   A 
  
5- trust in participant finding and willingness to take action   A 
SA quality 
The accuracy of captured 
information Accuracy    
  
1- Failed to capture the truth     
  
2- Part of truth has been captured but with wrong judgement  P   
  
3- Part of truth has been captured with successful judgement P   
  
4- Accurate information has been captured    A 
  
5- Participant managed to captured accurate information that allowed him to predict 
future   A 
 
The reliability of captured 
information Reliability    
  
1- Failed to capture reliable information     
  
2- Non reliable information has been used that leads to poor judgement P   
  
3- Semi reliable information has been captured P   
  
4- Reliable data has been captured    A 
  
5- Captured information were reliable enough to predict future and control cyber 
incidents   A 
 
The timeliness of captured 
information Timeliness    
  
1- Failed to provide the information     
  
2- Information has been provided after the cyber incidents  P   
  
3- Information has been provided during cyber incidents P   
  
4- Information has been provided during cyber incidents where incident can be controlled   A 
  
5- Information has been provided before cyber incidents    A 
SA agility Timeliness of awareness building Timeliness   
  
1- Failed to provide SA     
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2- Partial of SA has been achieved after cyber incidents P   
  
3- Partial SA has been achieved during cyber incidents P   
  
4- SA has been achieved during cyber incidents   A 
  
5- SA has been achieved prior to cyber incidents   A 
 
Capability to act Responsiveness     
  
1- Failed to response to cyber incidents      
  
2- Response and action was not appropriate to cyber incidents P   
  
3- Response to cyber incidents was late P   
  
4- Proper response was in place during cyber incidents   A 
  
5- Proper response was in place prior to cyber incidents    A 
 
Capability to adapt changes Adaptability     
  
1- Failed to adapt new measures      
  
2- Not sufficient measure has been adopted  P   
  
3- New measure adapted P   
  
4- Adaptability to new measure was in place during cyber incidents    A 
  
5- Adaptability to new measure was in place prior to cyber incidents   A 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Usage of resources Security Controls     
  
1- Failed to utilise security dashboards     
  
2- Used dashboards to find if there are suspicious activities after cyber incidents P   
  
3- Used dashboards to find there are suspicious activities during cyber incidents P   
  
4- Used dashboards to find the source of suspicious activities before execution of cyber 
attacks   A 
  
5- Utilisation of security controls to control cyber incidents (block or deceive)   A 
  
Deception  
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1- No deception has been used P   
  
2- Deception not used correctly   A 
  
3- Deception used after cyber incidents   A 
  
4- Deception used during cyber incidents   A 
  
5- Deception used prior to cyber attacks    A 
  
Blue Team 
 
  
1- Failed to utilise blue team P   
  
2- Poor and unclear commands were given to blue team   A 
  
3- Normal passive orders were given to blue team   A 
  
4- Active and offensive orders were given to blue team after cyber incidents    A 
  
5- Active and offensive orders were given to blue team during cyber incidents    A 
  
Intelligence Report 
 
  
1- Did not rely on it P   
  
2- No confidence in using it   A 
  
3- Checked its validity through exploring dashboards    A 
  
4- Confident in taking action   A 
  
5- Used it without hesitation   A 
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3.2.6.11 Overall participant SA measurement method 
 
The significance of measuring the efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness of the participants’ SA 
performance with regard to new systems rests on the fact that the largest gap in current research is in 
how to perform situation projection, or, rather, to anticipate what to do in a sudden situation (Tadda, 
2008). Such a state of affairs not only demands the application of collective knowledge, but also the 
synchronisation of efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness among the group of operators engaged in 
manning a particular network. The importance of measuring the above qualities in the participants in 
this research becomes even clearer if one extends the connotation of group synergy into a kind of fully 
aligned SA agility and SA quality among the group of operators.  
 
It has already been observed that SA projection involves extensive use of tacit and explicit knowledge, 
and it is virtually impossible for team members to go for such knowledge exchange unless all of them 
are attuned to one another in terms of efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness. For that matter, it is crucial 
to measure individual levels of those elements, since this knowledge would enable the network 
management to underpin the individual advantages and disadvantages of the operators and to work on 
tuning the same for optimising their real-time SA performance (Endsley, 2000). 
   
Furthermore, the security factor of a network also requires measuring the efficiency of the operators, 
since there is very little margin for error in managing a cyber attack. In fact, all instances of cyber 
attacks can be attributed to the lack of appropriate SA projection, which in turn can be attributed to a 
lack of team synergy, typically caused by the failure of the network’s management to estimate the 
capacity and capability of the individuals who were given the charge to protect the network, where 
even the attitude of the operator is considered a crucial factor (Tadda, 2008).  
 
Performance measures are based on tactical performance during missions and/or exercises, and 
accordingly the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) (Endsley 2000), 
provides an objective measure of individual SA performance, covering all levels of SA, namely 
perception, comprehension and projection, to provide an accurate measure of an operator’s SA. It also 
covers and reflects on the wide range of an operator’s SA requirements that are derived from a goal-
directed task analysis, which in turn underpins the operator’s goals, the decisions that must be taken to 
achieve those goals, and the information needed by the operator for decision making. Successful 
validation of SAGAT through various tests (Endsley, 1989a, 1989b) clearly posits the fact that there 
exist differences in individual SA performance, and measuring tools like SAGAT can help in 
identifying and improving the SA performance of an individual. Therefore, it is important to build a 
measurement scale for active SA model that would allow observers to objectively measure the 
performance (efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness) of participants’ SA. Using statistics and the SEM 
results in this research is the main source for the measurement scale adopted as the metrics used in this 
research relied on the result of exploratory factor analysis and SEM. The following part of this chapter 
will discuss this approach in detail.  
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In this research, exploratory factor analysis was conducted, as discussed in Chapter 4 section 4.4. This 
analysis confirmed the existence of five factors that makes active SA model. Also, confirmatory factor 
analysis, discussed in Chapter 4, confirmed that all factors are critical for building an active cyber SA. 
In addition, the structural model achieved for active cyber SA discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.5.4, 
Figure 4.4 reveals the causality that confirms the existence of strong causality and the criticality of all 
factors. The causality model of SEM determines the criticality and causality for achieving enhanced 
cyber SA and evaluating the overall cyber SA. Since all factors are critical success factors, and are 
essential for evaluating and achieving active cyber SA, it means all are needed and one cannot be 
prioritised above any other. Therefore, they all make an equal contribution to active cyber SA, very 
much like summative scale. In this research, the contribution of each factor was given equal rank 
because all factors are critical to overall cyber SA, and because they all impact on each other directly 
and indirectly, as shown in Figure 4.4 of Chapter 4. Also, the model discussed in this research is a 
thinking framework, and should be used by a cyber commander as guidance rather than as a process 
model. This is due to fact that active cyber SA is a mixture of all types of intelligence, technology and 
people involvement in understanding and building awareness regarding cyber incidents. If we take the 
case of cyber commanders, active cyber SA models allow a commander to request more active 
intelligence regarding an intelligence that comes from either local passive controls or other non cyber 
intelligence; thus, due to such interdependency of the model factors and their equal critical importance 
to the model, it is not possible to rank the factors. Therefore, an equal contribution was given to each of 
the active cyber SA model factors.  
Variables weight is measured using the results of factor loading extracted from exploratory factor 
analysis, discussed in Chapter 4, Table 4.5. The weight during the development of the measurement 
scale was measured as described above, using the following equation: 
 
Weight = 100 .∑(
𝐹𝐿𝐼
|∑ 𝐹𝐿𝑣𝑖
𝑉𝐼
𝑣𝑖=1 |
)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
I: Number of variables 
𝐹𝐿𝐼 : Variable factor loading  
𝐹𝐿𝑉𝐼: Total factor loading  
 
Example: 
Quality and agility 
Variables Loading Weight 
ES3 0.944 19.94506655 
ES2 0.857 18.10690894 
ES4 0.798 16.86034228 
ES5 0.752 15.88844285 
ES7 0.7 14.78977393 
ES1 0.682 14.40946546 
 Total 4.733  
X= Sum (factor loading) = 4.733 
ES1 (timeliness of captured information) = (.944/4.733)* 100 = 
19.94506655 
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Table 3.10: Techniques to Measure Variable Weight  
Total SA can be measured by the sum of each observed item of the factor’s variable 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹 captured 
from the participant SA multiplied by the weight of the factor’s variable 𝑊𝑉𝐹  measured using the factor 
loading as describe previously, then divided by the total number of observed items of the factor’s 
variable |𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑉𝐹|. Regarding to SA efficiency, the formula will be the same as total SA, except the 
sum of each observed item of the factor’s variable 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹  will be replaced with the sum of each 
observed item describing the efficiency 𝐸𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹  of the factor’s variable, and this applies to the SA 
efficacy and SA effectiveness. 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐴 =∑ 
𝐹
𝑖=1
𝐶𝐹 .
(
 
 
∑(∑𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹
𝐼𝑉𝐹
𝑘=1
. (
𝑊𝑉𝐹
|𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑉𝐹|
))
𝑉𝐹
𝑗=1 )
 
 
 
F: Number of analysed factors. 
𝐶𝐹: Factor contribution. 
𝑉𝐹: Number of analysed variables per factor. 
𝐼𝑉𝐹: Number of items per variable. 
𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹: Score of observed items per variable. 
𝑊𝑉𝐹: Observed variable weight measured by the factor loading. 
𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑉𝐹: Total number of observed items per variable. 
𝑆𝐴 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =∑ 
𝐹
𝑖=1
𝐶𝐹.
(
 
 
∑(∑𝐸𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹
𝐼𝑉𝐹
𝑘=1
. (
𝑊𝑉𝐹
|𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑉𝐹|
))
𝑉𝐹
𝑗=1 )
 
 
 
𝐸𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹: Score of observed efficiency item per variable. 
𝑆𝐴 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦 = ∑ 
𝐹
𝑖=1
𝐶𝐹 .
(
 
 
∑(∑𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹
𝐼𝑉𝐹
𝑘=1
. (
𝑊𝑉𝐹
|𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑉𝐹|
))
𝑉𝐹
𝑗=1 )
 
 
 
𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹: Score of observed efficacy item per variable. 
𝑆𝐴 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =∑ 
𝐹
𝑖=1
𝐶𝐹 .
(
 
 
∑(∑𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹
𝐼𝑉𝐹
𝑘=1
. (
𝑊𝑉𝐹
|𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑉𝐹|
))
𝑉𝐹
𝑗=1 )
 
 
 
𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑉𝐹: Score of observed effectiveness item per variable. 
  
Cyber SA should be measured based on knowing the impact of each variables on cyber SA. This was 
achieved in this research by examining the results of exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor 
analysis and SEM. This value tells how much each variable contributes to the cyber SA model, and 
how much it explains the model. Therefore, using such techniques in this research it is possible to 
determine the real contribution of each variable to participants’ cyber SA, and therefore the cyber SA 
was objectively measured. Table 3.11 shows the active SA measurement technique that contains the set 
of items describing each factor. Also, the table shows a colour coding for a set of items describing the 
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items that contribute to measuring (SA efficiency (red), SA efficacy (purple) and SA effectiveness 
(blue)). 
 
This measurement metric was developed and guided by the results extracted from the structural model 
of active SA theory discussed in Chapter 4 and subject matter experts were used to identify the items 
which has been validated through the pilot. The variables used in this metric are those variables that 
this research used to evaluate cyber SA, which were again extracted from the structural model. Also, 
the items in these metrics were derived based on the scenario’s ground truth, as explained in section 
3.2.5 and 3.2.6, where participants’ scores in SA BARS, SA-related questions answers and researcher 
observations helped in filling these metrics to extract the overall cyber SA performance. The results 
from this metric are used later, in Chapter 5’s analysis, to determine how good the active offensive 
posture is in enhancing cyber SA. 
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Table 3.11: Active SA measurement metrics: 
Weight 
     14.7897739 Timeliness of Captured Information  0 or 1  
    Detecting Network Scanning within 1 min 1 
    Detecting Fingerprinting within 1 min 1 
    Detecting Attack Execution within 30 sec 1 
    Information about attack provided within 2 min 1 
    Total  4 
14.4094654 Timeliness of Awareness Building  0 or 1  
    Data have been perceived within 90 sec 1 
    Data have been analysed with 90 sec 1 
    SA and projection achieved with 2 min 1 
    SA achieved correctly within 2 min 1 
    Total  4 
18.1069089 Response  0 or 1  
    Response was enough to deter cyber incidents 1 
    Effective utilisation of resources in incident response 1 
    Proper Action made within 2 min 1 
    Total  3 
19.9450665 Adaptability  0 or 1  
    Changes to network were sufficient 1 
    Changes to network were made within 2 min 1 
    Total  2 
16.8603422 Accuracy of Captured Information 0 or 1  
    Scanning was Detecting within 1 min 1 
    Source IP of attack was detected within 1 min 1 
    Attacking port was identified within 1 min 1 
    Attack type identified within 1 min 1 
    Accurate Intelligence was provided 1 
    Total 5 
15.8884428 Reliability 0 or 1 
    SA achieved and reliable to deter cyber incidents 1 
    
SA achieved and reliable to deter cyber incidents 
within 2 min 1 
    Total 2 
14.7605924 
 
 Perception Correctness 0 or 1  
    Scanning was detected 1 
    Source IP of attack was detected 1 
    Attacking port was identified 1 
    Attack type identified 1 
    Intelligence was perceived within 2 min 1 
    High self confidence toward intelligence  1 
    Intelligence was perceived correctly 1 
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    Total  7 
13.9166379 Perception Completeness  0 or 1  
    Network scanning detected  1 
    Attacker IP identified 1 
    Type of attacks identified 1 
    Attacked service identified 1 
    Intelligence was provided within 2 min 1 
    Provided intelligence was complete 1 
    Total 6 
15.3461935 Analysis 0 or 1  
    Captured data analysed correctly 1 
    Captured data analysed correctly and within 2 min 1 
    Total  2 
28.4877712 Comprehension  0 or 1  
    Correct conclusion was made 1 
    
Data captured were analysed and understood within 2 
min 1 
    Total  2 
27.4888046 Utilisation of Resources 0 or 1  
    Utilisation of the deception service made correctly 1 
    
Utilisation of blue team offensive capabilities to extract 
intelligence 1 
    
Utilisation of security dashboards to validate provided 
intelligence 1 
    
Capabilities to focus into cyber incidents without 
ignoring cyber network 1 
    
Steady actions and responses to cyber incidents were 
made with confidence 1 
      Total 5 
  
 
 
    
Total SA value in %     100.000 
Total SA 
% 
 SA Efficiency Value %     49.96 100.00 
 SA Efficacy Value %     16.48 100.00 
 SA Effectiveness Value %     35.56 100.00 
   
3.3 CONCLUSION   
 
The aim of this research is to investigate whether an active offensive hacking method is more capable 
of enhancing cyber SA agility and quality than the existing SA models. This aim stems from an 
ultimate aim of contributing to understanding the concept of cyber situational awareness.   
 
This study adopts positivism as its research approach, while opting for mixed methods to avail of its 
proven advantages in the area of information systems. Altogether, the study manifested itself through 
two stages: in the first stage it collected data using an electronic survey, which was quantitative in 
nature; in the second stage it used the results of the SEM to design and develop the serious gaming 
environment with qualitative and quantitative instruments to test the effectiveness, efficacy and 
efficiency of active SA. Accordingly, the Structure Equation Modelling (SEM) was used in the first 
stage to verify the hypothesised theoretical model and test the estimate and causal relations, and its 
outcome was then used in the second stage to develop the SA awareness behavioural anchor-rating 
scale, and the SA measurement and marking scheme based on ground truth. 
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A clear justification has been provided within this chapter regarding the methods selected, and has 
shown how these methods are best suited to this research study. This research has three methodological 
contributions. First, this research provided techniques to measure the variable weight using the factor 
loading extracted from exploratory factor analysis. Second, design and develop an objective 
quantitative SA measurement metrics based on the result of SEM which provided a novelty as this 
method this research the ability to quantify SA. Finally, the development of the Serious Gaming 
Environment (SGE) enabled the validation of the research theory against real world physical networks 
and network assets in a small, controllable environment. The scenario chosen was the Abu Dhabi 
Securities Exchange, and this allowed for further, more detailed validation against the specific nuances 
of the ADX scenario involving the research on a more granular level. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS (SEM): ASA THEORETICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
4.0 OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter analyses the SEM results of the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 2, designed to test 
the suggested hypotheses between the underlying constructs in the ASAM. Hair et al. (2006) suggest 
using different elementary tests as guides before conducting the two phases for testing the proposed 
framework. Primarily, the measurement model should be tested; this model helps to describe the link 
between the items observed and the unobserved (latent) construct. Furthermore, this phase specifically 
highlights the findings of the confirmatory factor analysis. The structural model is tested in the second 
stage, which seeks to describe the causal links between the recognised constructs. The following parts 
of this study describe the analyses and the findings of the tests. More detail is included in appendix 2. 
4.1 SAMPLE AND PROCEDURE 
 
A quantitative approach was adopted for the current research in order to test the proposed model 
(Figure 1). A non-probabilistic sample was collected and can be considered as suitable for our research 
purpose. An electronic survey was used because of its various advantages, specifically in that it is 
possible for it to reach a wider audience, thus allowing a larger sample to be obtained for further 
analysis. Specifically, a self-administered questionnaire containing 42 questions was used to collect 
empirical data. The target sample for this survey was cyber security experts from different countries 
recognised as top ranking experts in cyber security, but mainly focusing on CERT’s personnel locating 
in the US, the UK, the EU and the UAE. Participation was on a voluntary basis, and no financial 
incentives were offered. A total of 600 self-administered questionnaires were distributed to the experts; 
the number of completed questionnaires returned was 312.  
4.2 DATA PREPARATION 
4.2.1 Data Coding and Editing 
 
In an attempt to ensure data consistency and comprehensiveness following data gathering, data editing 
was performed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Of note, this study comprises only respondents who 
successfully answered all the questions asked. Any data seen to be missing or incomplete have not 
been taken into account. Throughout the coding methodology, this study assigned each question 
answered with a specific number, which was then inputted into an SPSS file for statistical analysis. 
Following the coding of the data, this researcher carried out editing in order to ensure the effective 
completion of the coding process. In addition, for any value seen to be out of range, a validation of that 
value was assessed by reverting back to the original questionnaire.  
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4.2.2 Data Screening 
 
In the attempt to ensure that all data were properly and accurately entered, and that all variables were 
normally distributed, data screening was carried out. The aim was to establish whether or not there 
were any missing data, normality issues and/or outliers. The following sections describe this initial 
analysis.   
 
Treatment of Missing Data and Unengaged Responses 
 
Two different approaches have been described by Tabachnick & Fidell (2007: 62-63) in order to 
address the issue of missing data; i.e. when respondents do not successfully answer one or more of the 
survey questions. The primary approach is linked with the pattern of missing data, involving the 
researcher establishing the source of the missing data in line with non-random or random (i.e. related to 
specific items) occurrence. Otherwise stated, should the missing data be distributed randomly 
throughout the questionnaire, there would then be a lack of researcher bias. However, if the missing 
data were distributed throughout the questionnaire in a non-random way, this could impact on the 
overall generalisability and wider impact of the findings. The second approach is associated with the 
volume of data missing. Although the previously highlighted approaches are noted by Tabachnick & 
Fidell (2007), the point is nevertheless made that patterns of missing data are extremely more valuable 
than the volume of data found to be missing. In this study, data screening highlighted less than 5% 
missing values for all of the constructed questions; this percentage is regarded as acceptable (Churchill, 
1979). Missing-data randomness was evaluated in an attempt to ensure that no systematic errors were 
present (Hair et al., 2006). This study, as explained earlier, only accepted completed surveys, so no 
data treatment was required.  
 
In this study, 27 records with missing data were found, which accounted for 10% of all data. In an 
attempt to handle this situation effectively, the decision was made to delete these data based on the 
reasons discussed above. Specifically, three rows of questions were found to have missing data only in 
three questions; the most common response was utilised as a replacement, but the decision was to 
remove them from any further analysis.  
 
The unengaged response is the result of the zero standard deviation of a series, meaning that all of the 
series’ numbers are equal to the mean value of each of the numbers included in the series. Through the 
exercise of the survey, 14 rows had a standard deviation close to zero. Owing to the fact that this 
showed no variance, the decision was made to delete these data to avoid issues in SEM analysis.  
The final sample size contained 271 responders with clean and complete data (N = 271). 
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4.3 ASSESSMENT OF NORMALITY, LINEARITY, MULTICOLLINEARITY, 
OUTLIERS AND CRONBACH’S ALPHA FOR ACTIVE SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS MODEL  
4.3.1 Normality 
 
A normality test was completed in order to ensure that data did not violate the normality assumption. 
Attention was directed to the Jarque-Bera (skewness-kurtosis) test in order to ensure that all the 
constructs were within the acceptable limit of the skewness-kurtosis ranges (Table 4.1). The skewness-
kurtosis test draws a contrast between the study data distributions and normal distribution (Hair et al., 
2006). In one regard, skewness is able to deliver some insight into the symmetry and balance of the 
distribution, such as whether or not the distribution has shifted to a particular side. For instance, if there 
is a positive skew in the distribution (i.e. if the values are grouped to one side), this suggests a positive 
outcome/relationship. Kurtosis also delivers insight into the distribution height, referred to as 
‘peakedness’ or ‘flatness’. In this regard, positive values suggest peaked distribution, whilst a flatter 
distribution is seen through a negative kurtosis (Hair et al., 2006: 80). Skewness-kurtosis critical values 
have been discussed and examined by many different academics (Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007) and should be within the range of ± 2.58 at the 0.01 significance level. The skewness and 
kurtosis values of the constructs, shown in Table 4.1, were within these critical values, confirming that 
the data (univariate) were normally distributed.  
 
Table 4.1: The Mean, Standard Deviation, Variance, Skewness and Kurtosis of the Study 
Constructs 
Construct N Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Variance Skewness Kurtosis  
 Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. 
Error 
IG 271 2.151 0.04342 0.71471 0.511 0.813 0.148 0.936 0.295 
PI 271 3.0418 0.04465 0.73506 0.54 -0.082 0.148 -0.119 0.295 
AI 271 3.3512 0.04205 0.69231 0.479 -0.481 0.148 0.465 0.295 
SA 271 3.809 0.03498 0.57581 0.332 -0.731 0.148 1.321 0.295 
QA 271 3.9263 0.03767 0.62018 0.385 -0.632 0.148 1.305 0.295 
 
4.3.2 Linearity and Multicollinearity 
 
To examine the linearity of relationships between variables, this study utilised the bivariate correlation 
matrix at the 0.01 significance level (2-tailed) in an attempt to establish the linearity and 
multicollinearity of the Active Situational Awareness Model (ASAM) constructs. As can be seen in 
Table 4.2 below, a very low correlation with the independent variables was observed (Pearson’s 
correlation, r, is below 0.7), thus confirming that multicollinearity between ASAM constructs is not 
probable. 
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Table 4.2: ASAM Constructs Correlation and Pearson’s Correlation 
 IG PI AI SA QA 
IG 1     
PI .419** 1    
AI .256** .608** 1   
SA .297** .406** .532** 1  
QA .231** .367** .465** .647** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
4.3.3 Outliers 
 
Outliers are described as being the most extreme points of data that can greatly impact on the SEM, 
and thus on the overall findings and conclusions. Outliers are typically observed due to errors that may 
arise when respondents respond to subjects, or because of erroneous data recording. Furthermore, there 
may be instances of outliers when the various respondents represent a different population from the 
study population under examination. Corrective actions geared towards minimising outliers include 
data validation and correction (at the extremes), removal of the extreme data, definition of the 
population in question, or compilation of a model re-specification. Nevertheless, the corrective 
measure ultimately rests on the outlier’s source. Identifying an outlier through observation is neither 
simple nor straightforward, even if the data sample is large. One of the most common approaches to 
recognising outliers involves the boxpot outlier-labelling rule, initially presented by Tukey (1977), 
which has subsequently been altered and adapted into a proper outlier identification rule through the 
work of Hoaglin & Iglewiez (1987). Through the application of this rule, observations are recognised 
as outliers when they are found beyond the interval shown below. 
 
Q
1
− g(Q
3
− Q
1
), 
Q
3
+ g(Q
3
− Q
1
),  
 
Hoagin et al. (1986) 
 
Where Q
1 
and Q
3
  is the value of 25% and 75% respectively (Boris & Sharmila, August, 2001) 
 
Initially, the most widely used choice for g was 1.5, but observations have been flagged up with 3.0, 
after Hoagin et al. (1986) found issues with a g value of 1.5. This rule does not depend on the size of 
the sample; thus, it can vary from the standard outlier identification rule, positioned at a certain 
probability of outliers, or with none existing. Hoagin et al. (1987) then provided evidence for the fact 
that a g value of 2.2 was the most suitable choice; for the purposes of our research, this 
recommendation was applied. 
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In this study, it was established through the test that there were no outliers using the equation shown 
below. Moreover, the highest values did not exceed that of the upper limit, whilst the lowest value did 
not fall below that of the lowest value calculated. (Check Appendix 2). 
 
For the upper quartile u3 = Q
3
+ (2.2(Q
3
− Q
1
) 
Whilst for the lower quartile u1 = Q
1
− (2.2(Q
3
− Q
1
) 
4.3.4 Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Cronbach’s alpha is recognised as a construct reliability or consistency coefficient, but ultimately it is 
not a statistical test. A reliability coefficient of ≥ 0.70 is considered acceptable in social science study 
analysis (Bollen, 1989). Importantly, all of the values are seen to be greater than 0.7 when conducting 
the test, implying that the scale is reliable. In the following part, further insight will be given.  
4.4 FACTOR ANALYSIS (EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS) 
 
The main extraction method of this study is a maximum likelihood factoring approach, a form of 
common factor analysis, for a number of different reasons (Hair et al., 2006). Primarily, when drawing 
a contrast between a maximum factor likelihood approach and a principal factor approach, known to be 
another type of common factor analysis, there are desirable asymptotic properties supporting the 
former (Bickel & Doksum, 1977). Indeed, the majority of statisticians prefer maximum likelihood 
factor analysis because it requires a multivariate, normal distribution (Geweke & Singleton, 1980). In 
addition, whereas principal factor analysis takes into account the total variance (i.e. common, unique 
and error variances), maximum likelihood factor analysis is concerned with the common variance (Hair 
et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Finally, the maximum likelihood factoring approach 
considers the correlation matrix as a sample correlation matrix, with Fabrigar et al. (1999, p. 277) 
postulating that, should the data be distributed relatively normally, the maximum likelihood factoring 
approach is the most appropriate choice as it permits: 1) calculation of a number of different indexes of 
goodness of fit; 2) statistical tests of correlations and factor loadings between factors to be performed; 
3) calculation of confidence intervals. Appendix 2 of this study contains all the test result in detail. 
 
The creation of a correlation matrix was done to ensure the reliability of and test the links between the 
constructs. The findings associated with the bivariate correlation matrix highlighted that the constructs 
were not highly correlated with one another (r was below 0.7, indicating that multicollinearity is 
unlikely; see Table 4.2). Furthermore, the pattern matrix findings (exploratory factor analysis, Table 
4.5) emphasised that the constructs were not cross-loaded, suggesting that there was a distinction to be 
recognised between constructs. In addition, the confirmatory factor analysis findings confirmed that 
cross-loading between constructs was impossible, with each construct united alongside its own 
associated items (tables 4.10-4.14). Lastly, a discriminant validation analysis was carried out in order 
to ensure that constructs stood alone and did not interact with any other (Table 4.15). 
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It has been suggested by Field (2005) that three tests should be performed in order to establish the 
overall adequacy of the extraction approach in the context of factor analysis: 1) the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) test of sampling adequacy; 2) eigenvalue; 3) Bartlett’s test of sphericity. With the aim 
of establishing whether or not factor analysis extraction methods are considered acceptable, Field 
(2005) postulates that, if the amount of variables utilised in factor analysis is lower than 20 and the 
sample size is above 250, the average communality is equal to or greater than 0.6 and the Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity is significant, then factor analysis extraction is acceptable. Importantly, the conditions 
mentioned earlier, notably that the KMO of sampling adequacy is 0.923 (≥0.6 is acceptable in the 
view of Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and that the Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant (p < 0.001), 
have been adhered to in this study. Indeed, the results obtained from Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the 
KMO (Table 4.3) helped to validate the overall factorability of the correlation matrix, as the results 
confirmed that factor analysis was the most suitable option. Furthermore, the initial five elements 
explained more of the variation than the other remaining factors. To validate this finding, this study 
carried out reproduced correlations for the percentage of non-redundant residuals with an absolute 
value >0.05. Notably, (Table 4.6) the percentage was recognised as being considerably lower than 
50%, with a final score of 8%, thus, there was no requirement for the retention of additional factors.  
 
 
Table 4.3: KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy 
 0.923 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 7687.833 
 df 595 
 Sig. 0 
 
Table 4.4: Goodness-of-Fit Test 
Chi-Square Df Sig. 
944.284 430 0.000 
 
4.4.1 Factor Loading 
 
This study adhered to the guidelines provided in the academic literature (e.g. Hair et al., 2006; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) for establishing the most suitable loading between a variable and its 
associated factors (i.e. for each variable on each factor). In line with the guidelines presented by Hair et 
al. (2006) for establishing a significant factor loading, and in accordance with the sample size of this 
study (n = 271 cyber experts), the most suitable factor loading was recognised as 0.35 and above, at the 
0.05 significance level (see Table 4.5). Throughout the course of the test, three different variables were 
seen to demonstrate a low extraction (in 20, 21 and 22), which were recognised as potentially causing 
an issue through CFA. The choice was centred on retention, thus enabling greater examination at a later 
date.  
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The findings obtained through the rotation approach emphasised that SPSS rotated five factors, with all 
the loadings identified as being more than 0.35. The pattern matrix (see Table 4.5) shows the five 
individual rotated factors: 1) the Situational Awareness construct, which accounted for 34.775 of the 
total variance; 2) the Quality and Agility construct, which was responsible for 10.33% of the total 
variance; 3) the Active Intelligence construct, which explained 9.724% of the total variance; 4) the 
Passive Intelligence construct was 6.153% of the total variance; 5) the Intelligence Gathering construct, 
which accounted for 5.003 % of the total variance (64.984%) (see Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.5: Rotated Component Matrix. Pattern Matrix variable listed is labelled in section 3.12.2 
Variables 
Factor 
SA Quality & 
Agility 
Active 
Intelligence  
Passive 
Intelligence 
Intelligence 
Gathering 
Skill S4 .919     
Previous knowledge S3 .904 
Analysis Capability S5 .891 
Perception Correctness S1 .857 
Perception Completeness S2 .808 
Confidence S6 .750 
Projection (intent) S7 .677 
Adaptability ES3  .944 
Responsiveness ES2 .857 
Quality Accuracy ES4 .798 
Quality Reliability ES5 .752 
Quality Timeliness ES7 .700 
Timeliness ES1 .682 
Enemy Possible Attack in21 .562 
Granular Level of Threat 
Detail 
in20 .558 
Enemy Attack Timing in22 .490 
Active Intelligence 
Gathering Capability 
in14  .941 
Information Gathering in12 .867 
Destroy in13 .865 
Enemy Weaknesses in9 .862 
Intelligence Completeness in11 .831 
Intelligence Accuracy in10 .742 
Enemy Capabilities in8 .616 
Intelligence Collaboration in6  .878 
Intelligence Sharing in5 .861 
Enemy IP in2 .853 
Passive Intelligence 
Gathering Capability 
in4 .773 
Enemy Motive in3 .757 
Intelligence Timeliness in1 .641 
Interaction Capability in7 .574 
Enemy Geo Location in17  .914 
Enemy Attack Variation in18 .867 
Non Cyber intelligence in16 .867 
Enemy Attack Consistency in19 .866 
Resources Availability in15 .741 
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Table 4.6: Total Variance Explained 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues  Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings
a 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
1(SA) 12.611 36.030 36.030 12.171 34.775 34.775 8.744 
2(QA) 4.058 11.593 47.623 3.615 10.330 45.104 8.278 
3(AI) 3.285 9.387 57.010 3.053 8.724 53.828 8.531 
4(PI) 2.471 7.061 64.071 2.153 6.153 59.981 7.693 
5(IG) 2.001 5.718 69.789 1.751 5.003 64.984 5.339 
6 .847 2.420 72.209     
7 .767 2.192 74.401     
8 .668 1.909 76.310     
9 .650 1.858 78.168     
10 .631 1.803 79.972     
11 .594 1.697 81.668     
12 .531 1.518 83.186     
13 .486 1.389 84.576     
14 .434 1.241 85.817     
15 .417 1.192 87.009     
16 .381 1.089 88.098     
17 .377 1.076 89.174     
18 .345 .985 90.159     
19 .338 .965 91.124     
20 .322 .920 92.045     
21 .291 .831 92.875     
22 .279 .798 93.674     
23 .252 .721 94.394     
24 .231 .659 95.053     
25 .214 .612 95.665     
26 .202 .578 96.243     
27 .193 .551 96.794     
28 .177 .505 97.299     
29 .166 .473 97.773     
30 .165 .471 98.244     
31 .151 .432 98.676     
32 .142 .406 99.082     
33 .125 .356 99.438     
34 .110 .314 99.752     
35 .087 .248 100.000     
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4.5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING 
(SEM) 
 
This study utilised SEM with the aim of testing the hypotheses between the underlying constructs in 
the ASAM. Hair et al. (2006) suggest that two individual phases can be utilised in order to test a 
proposed framework with the use of SEM. First, the measurement model should be tested; this model 
helps to describe the link between the items observed and the unobserved (latent) construct. 
Furthermore, this phase notably links the findings of the confirmatory factor analysis with the 
structural model tested in the second stage, which seeks to describe the causal links between the 
recognised constructs. The following parts of this study describe the analyses and the findings of the 
frameworks.  
4.5.1 Measurement Model 
 
Unidimensionality and goodness-of-fit criteria were adopted with the aim of assessing the overall 
measurement model and its criteria. In one regard, unidimensionality was examined through the 
application of reliability tests (i.e. composite and Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities), with factor loadings 
adopted for all of the constructs but on an individual basis. In contrast, a number of goodness-of-fit 
criteria were selected in this study, as it was difficult to rely on only a single fit index when 
establishing the most appropriate framework (Byrne, 2001). This study centred on three different types 
of goodness-of-fit criteria, namely absolute, incremental and parsimony. In line with the study by Hair 
et al. (2006: 706-708), absolute fit indices are adopted when seeking to examine the overall goodness-
of-fit for the measurement and structural frameworks collectively. Nevertheless, the absolute fit indices 
assess goodness-of-fit of a particular framework individually from another framework. Essentially, it 
may be stated that the incremental fit indices are adopted when evaluating how well a particular 
framework fits in line with a number of other, alternative baseline frameworks. Owing to the fact that 
the absolute fit indices do not draw a comparison between frameworks and a particular null model, this 
study utilised incremental fit indices as well as absolute fit. When possible, use of parsimony fit 
analysis was conducted in order to establish which of the models was most suitable (Hair et al., 2006). 
The table below provides an overview of the key goodness-of-fit criteria adopted in this study. 
Table 4.7: Goodness-of-Fit Criteria Used in this Research 
Fit Index Recommended Value (Hair, 2006) 
χ 2 Non-significant at p <0.05 
Degrees of Freedom (DF) n/a 
χ 2 /df <5 preferable <3 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) >0.90 
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index 
(AGFI) 
>0.80 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >0.90 
Root Mean Square Residuals (RMSR) <0.10 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
<0.08 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) >0.90 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) >0.60 
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4.5.2 Initial CFA Model 
 
A good fit was not recognised through the initial framework (see Table 4.8 and Appendix 2). Taking 
into account various statistical parameters, the standardised residual covariance of some of the 
variables was not within the range of ± 2.58; the standardised regression weight of three variables 
identified earlier in section 4.4.1 (in20, in21 and in22) was less than 0.5; the SMC (squared multiple 
correlations) was less than 0.5. Moreover, the modification indices (MI) showed a high covariance, 
thus signifying high covariance. Accordingly, the decision was made to remove these variables in order 
to have a good model fit. Furthermore, the GFI was found to be lower than 0.9, with the AGFI less than 
0.8, the CFI and NFI less than 0.9 and, finally, the RMSEA no less than 0.08. These parameters failed 
to fulfil the suggested measure, as shown previously in Table 4.7, and thus the model needed to be 
revised in order to achieve a satisfactory fit. Accordingly, the following measures were adopted to 
achieve required fit (Figure 4.2): 
 
 The standardised residual covariance was adjusted to be within the range ± 2.58 (Byrne, 
2006). 
 Factor loading (standardised regression weight) needed to be larger than 0.5 and preferably 
above 0.7 (Byrne, 2006). 
 The SMC value required to be larger than 0.5 (Byrne, 2006). 
 The MI which revealed a very high covariance and demonstrated high regression weights 
should be omitted from further analysis (Byrne, 2006; Hair et al., 2010).   
 
Table 4.8: Initial CFA Model Result 
 
Fit Index Result 
χ 2 /df 2.712 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) 0.754 
Adjusted Goodness-of-fit 
Index (AGFI) 
0.719 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.874 
Root Mean Square 
Residuals (RMSR) 
0.075 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
0.08 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.815 
Parsimony Normed Fit 
Index (PNFI) 
0.753 
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a. Acceptable Measurement Model 
 
Figure 4.2: Measurement Model (Table 4.5) (Source: Author) 
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Table 4.9: Measurement Model Result 
Fit Index Result 
χ 2 /df 1.558 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) 0.868 
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit 
index (AGFI) 
0.843 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.965 
Root Mean Square 
Residuals (RMSR) 
0.032 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
0.045 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.908 
Parsimony Normed Fit 
Index (PNFI) 
0.813 
 
Figure 4.2 displays a measurement model comprising 32 different indicators, whilst Table 4.9 provides 
a summary of the fit index results of the acceptable measurement framework. It is recognised that the 
GFI needs to be at least 0.9, which has not been achieved through this model (Hair et al., 2006); as 
other indexes showed a good fit, this study nonetheless recognised this framework as a good fit. The 
tables below, i.e. Table 4.10 through to Table 4.14, detail the findings of the measurement framework, 
including the standardised factor loadings (λ), estimates, standard errors (SE), critical ratios (CR), 
squared multiple correlations, average variance extracted (AVE), and composite and Cronbach’s alpha 
reliabilities for all of the constructs of interest. The tables help to display a number of findings, as 
follows. 
 
Each of the construct indicators’ factor loadings was significant. The confirmatory factor analysis was, 
for all of the constructs, sufficient in the context of performing structural modelling, and was also 
found to be significant. The standardised factor loading (λ) had a value exceeding 0.70, which 
suggested a key link between the construct and its factors. The critical ratio (or t-values) was found to 
be over 1.96 for the entire factor loadings, which implied statistical significance, as recognised by 
Byrne (2001) and Hair et al. (2006). The AVE (Average Variance Extracted) highlighted the data 
relating to the amount of variance captured by the construct in regard to the variance degree owing to 
measurement error (Fornell & Larker, 1981: 45). AVE is also known to represent a greater indicator of 
the construct’s reliability, as opposed to the composite’s reliability (Fornell & Larker, 1981). The 
findings presented here illustrate that the average variance from the extracted values of all model 
constructs suggest a span from between 0.591 and 0.72; this surpassed the minimum value of 0.50 or 
more suggested by Fornell & Larker (1981). Composite reliabilities for all of the constructs ranged 
from 0.902 to 0.938, thus surpassing the minimum value of 0.70 suggested by Hair et al. (2006). 
Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for all of the constructs ranged from 0.903 through to 0.943, which also 
surpassed the minimum value of 0.70 suggested by Field (2005). Moreover, with the average variance 
extracted, Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities and composite reliabilities signified acceptable levels of both 
validity and reliability suggested by Fornell & Larker (1981) and Hair et al. (2005). (Table 4.10-14) 
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Table 4.10: Agility and Quality Construct 
Table 4.11: Situational Awareness Construct 
Table 4.12: Active Intelligence Construct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reliability Cronbach’s alpha = .903 Composite reliability = .902    
Standard factor loading ( λ) Estimate S.E. C. R. P SMC Average variance extracted 
ES3 <--- QA 0.853 1    0.513 
0.607 
ES2 <--- QA 0.808 0.931 0.049 18.858 *** 0.531 
ES4 <--- QA 0.742 0.899 0.067 13.323 *** 0.666 
ES5 <--- QA 0.816 0.912 0.06 15.189 *** 0.551 
ES7 <--- QA 0.728 0.837 0.063 13.364 *** 0.653 
ES1 <--- QA 0.716 0.84 0.064 13.068 *** 0.727 
 
Reliability Cronbach’s alpha = .942 Composite reliability = .938    
Standard factor loading ( λ) Estimat
e 
S.E. C. R. P SMC Average variance extracted 
S5 <--- SA 0.83 1    0.504 
0.685 
S4 <--- SA 0.906 1.11 0.059 18.682 *** 0.752 
S1 <--- SA 0.819 1.01 0.063 15.967 *** 0.589 
S3 <--- SA 0.877 1.102 0.062 17.681 *** 0.769 
S6 <--- SA 0.768 0.937 0.056 16.658 *** 0.671 
S2 <--- SA 0.867 1.078 0.062 17.492 *** 0.82 
S7 <--- SA 0.71 0.824 0.063 13.115 *** 0.689 
 
Reliability Cronbach’s alpha = .939 Composite reliability = .935    
Standard factor loading ( λ) Estimat
e 
S.E. C. R. P SMC Average variance extracted 
in14 <--- AI 0.8 1    0.641 
0.672 
in9 <--- AI 0.887 1.19 0.07 16.989 *** 0.786 
in12 <--- AI 0.801 1.094 0.059 18.628 *** 0.642 
in11 <--- AI 0.892 1.037 0.061 17.134 *** 0.796 
in13 <--- AI 0.777 0.972 0.046 20.948 *** 0.604 
in10 <--- AI 0.82 1.088 0.071 15.233 *** 0.673 
in8 <--- AI 0.751 1.017 0.075 13.53 *** 0.564 
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Table 4.13: Passive Intelligence Construct 
Table 4.14 Intelligence Gathering Construct 
 
*** P-value < 0.001  
Reliability Cronbach’s alpha = .913 Composite reliability = .909    
Standard factor loading ( λ) Estimat
e 
S.E. C. R. P SMC Average variance extracted 
in2 <--- PI 0.85 1    0.722 
0.591 
in6 <--- PI 0.819 1.019 0.064 16.038 *** 0.671 
in5 <--- PI 0.786 0.975 0.065 15.017 *** 0.617 
in3 <--- PI 0.777 0.904 0.061 14.886 *** 0.603 
in4 <--- PI 0.809 0.949 0.06 15.821 *** 0.655 
in1 <--- PI 0.667 0.73 0.053 13.808 *** 0.445 
in7 <--- PI 0.649 0.763 0.066 11.614 *** 0.421 
 
Reliability Cronbach’s alpha = .928 Composite reliability = .928    
Standard factor loading ( λ) Estimat
e 
S.E. C. R. P SMC Average variance extracted 
in17 <--- IG 0.906 1    0.821 
0.72 
in18 <--- IG 0.841 0.982 0.051 19.094 *** 0.708 
in19 <--- IG 0.831 0.937 0.05 18.594 *** 0.69 
in16 <--- IG 0.877 1.154 0.055 20.988 *** 0.769 
in15 <--- IG 0.782 0.986 0.059 16.766 *** 0.612 
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4.5.3 Reliability and Validity of Constructs 
 
As highlighted by various scholars (Hair et al., 2006; Fornell & Larckers, 1981), evaluating construct 
validity is an outcome of two component validities: convergent and discriminant. 
 
a) Convergent validity 
Convergent validity is associated with the internal consistent validity between all of the construct 
items, such as low or high correlations (Fornell & Larckers, 1981). In this research, convergent validity 
was evaluated in line with the indicators’ estimated coefficients for all of the measurement scales 
(composite reliability), which included the average variance extracted as well as Cronbach’s alpha. 
Interestingly, tables 4.10-4.14 help to illustrate that the composite reliability for all constructs exceeded 
0.902, with an average variance of more than, or at least equal to, 0.5, whilst Cronbach’s alpha was 
above 0.7. All these results were regarded as sound indicators of the convergent validity (Fornell & 
Larckers, 1981). 
 
b) Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity was carried out with the aim of ensuring that all of the constructs and their 
associated indicators in the suggested framework varied from others and their indicators. The 
discriminant validity for all of the ASAM model’s constructs is summarised in Table 4.15; no validity 
concern was seen in the framework presented. Moreover, the diagonal line highlights the squared roots 
of average variance extracted (SRAVE) for all of the constructs, which is greater than any link value 
below it; this suggests an acceptable level of discriminant validity (Fornell & Larckers, 1981). 
 
Table 4.15: Discriminant Validity 
Construct CR AVE MSV ASV PI QA SA AI IG 
PI 0.909 0.591 0.319 0.182 0.769     
QA 0.902 0.607 0.366 0.177 0.335 0.779    
SA 0.938 0.685 0.366 0.211 0.380 0.605 0.828   
AI 0.935 0.672 0.319 0.205 0.565 0.431 0.506 0.820  
IG 0.928 0.720 0.152 0.084 0.390 0.212 0.282 0.240 0.848 
4.5.4 Structural Model: Hypotheses Testing 
 
The ASAM findings are described in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. These findings of the suggested 
conceptual framework highlighted a chi-square of 691.547 (degrees of freedom, df = 444; p <.001), 
GFI of 0.868 (not >0.9, as recommended, but still an improvement on the initial 0.754), AGFI of 0.843, 
CFI of 0.965, NFI of 0.902, incremental fit index (IFI) of 0.965 and χ2/df = 1.558. Importantly, all of 
the indices showed a good model fit (e.g. AGFI, NFI, CFI and IFI should be equal to or greater than 
0.9, according to Byrne, 2001 and Hair et al., 2006). Moreover, the RMSEA provided a value of 0.045 
(notably, an acceptable level needs to fall below 0.08, in line with the suggestion of Hair et al., 2006). 
All fit indices established throughout the course of this study were recognised as being within the 
acceptable limits (Byrne, 2001; Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
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Figure 4.4 details the final framework, comprising the coefficient of determination (𝑅2) and structural 
path coefficients. All the conceptual model hypotheses were statistically supported (p < 0.001). In 
addition, as emphasised in Table 4.16, the Intelligence Gathering (IG) construct highlighted a notably 
positive impact on the Passive Intelligence (PI) and Situational Awareness (SA) constructs (H2a: t = 
7.577; H2b: t = 3.296). Interestingly, the PI construct had a significant and positive impact on the 
Active Intelligence (AI) construct (H1a: t = 12.582). The AI construct itself provided significant 
positive effects on the SA and the Quality and Agility constructs (QA; H3a: t = 9.346; H3b: t = 3.115). 
Finally, the SA construct provided a significant and positive impact on the QA (H4: t = 10.254). 
 
Figure 4.3: The Theoretical Model and Research Framework (Source: Author) 
 
Model Hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Passive Intelligence (PI) positively impacts on Active Intelligence (AI). 
H1b: Passive Intelligence (PI) positively impacts Situational Awareness (SA). 
H1c: Passive Intelligence positively impacts on the Quality and Agility of SA (QA). 
H2a: Intelligence Gathering (IG) positively impacts on Passive Intelligence (PI). 
H2b: Intelligence Gathering (IG) positively impacts on Situational Awareness (SA). 
H2c: Intelligence Gathering (IG) positively impacts on the Quality and Agility of SA (QA). 
H3a: Active Intelligence (AI) positively impacts on Situational Awareness (SA). 
H3b: Active Intelligence (AI) positively impacts on the Quality and Agility of SA (QA). 
H4: Situational Awareness (SA) positively impacts on the Quality and Agility of SA (QA). 
 
 
The above qualitative model hypotheses were discussed earlier in chapter 2 section 2.5.1 where a 
conceptual hypothesise active SA model that shows the causal relations between the Active SA model 
constructs used as SEM required qualitative hypothesis. Therefore, the fitness of structural model can 
be determined and causal effect of each construct can be identified. 
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Figure 4.4: The Results of the Structural Model, the Standardised Path Coefficient between Constructs 
and R2 (Source: Author) 
 
Where CMIN/DF (χ 2 /df ) = 1.558, RMR = 0.032, GFI= 0.868, AGFI = 0.843, CFI = 0.965, NFI= 
0.908, PNFI = 0.813, RMSEA = 0.045);  P < 0.001. 
 
Table 4.16: Hypotheses Testing 
Standardised Regression Paths (β) Estimate S.E. C.R. P Hypothesis 
H2a PI <--- IG 0.431 0.057 7.577 *** Supported 
H1a AI <--- PI 0.573 0.046 12.582 *** Supported 
H3a SA <--- AI 0.406 0.043 9.346 *** Supported 
H2b SA <--- IG 0.139 0.042 3.296 *** Supported 
H3b QA <--- AI 0.15 0.048 3.115 0.002 Supported 
H4 QA <--- SA 0.601 0.058 10.354 *** Supported 
H1b SA <--- PI 0.052 0.053 0.987 0.323 Not Supported 
H2c QA <--- IG 0.007 0.044 0.166 0.868 Not Supported 
H1c QA <--- PI 0.05 0.052 0.975 0.33 Not Supported 
 
The AI construct (standardised path coefficient, β = 0.17, p < 0.001) and the SA construct (β = 0.56, 
p < 0.001) together were responsible for 44% of the QA (coefficient of determination, 𝑅2 = 0.44). As a 
direct result, two hypotheses were validated: specifically, H3b and H4. The SA construct was estimated 
with the use of the AI (β = 0.49, p < 0.001) and IG constructs (β = 0.17, p < 0.001); this accounted 
for 31% of the SA construct (𝑅2  = 0.31). Accordingly, this finding aided in the validation of 
hypotheses H3a and H2b. In addition, the PI construct (β = 0.42, p < 0.001) was estimated with the 
use of the IG construct, which explained 18% of the PI construct (𝑅2  = 0.18), thereby supporting 
hypothesis H2a. Finally, the AI construct (β = 0.61, p < 0.001) was estimated using the PI construct, 
which was responsible for 37% of the AI construct (𝑅2  = 0.37), allowing hypothesis H1a to be 
supported. In contrast, H1b, H1c and H2c hypotheses were not supported by this research, and were 
therefore removed from the structural model. 
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4.6 CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter, SEM was used to validate the hypothesised, theoretical model of Active Situational 
awareness. The exploratory factor analysis reshaped the proposed model and broke down the 
intelligence into three component parts. This was deemed realistic because the variables grouping 
reflected three different types of intelligence, as explained in this chapter. Moreover, the perception, 
comprehension and projection that emerged in the hypothesised model came together into one 
construct, which reflects the Situational Awareness. In regard to Quality and Agility, the exploratory 
factor analysis merged them into one factor to create enhanced SA measured by quality and agility 
variables.  
 
Active intelligence is the most significant construct to directly affect situational awareness and SA 
quality and agility, as this factor is considered to be the force multiplier that a defender should utilise 
when dealing with cyber attacks. Simply put: when cyber commanders rely on intelligence coming 
from an enemy domain, rather than from local sensors alone, then their SA will definitely be enhanced. 
The findings in this chapter show how important it is for the defender to interact with the enemy during 
cyber incidents in order to be able to identify an enemy’s intention and motives behind the cyber 
attack, so that new knowledge can be gathered and cyber SA can be enhanced. 
 
Both passive intelligence (PI) and intelligence gathering (IG) constructs are important to SA, as they 
both impact on SA and active intelligence. The reason is that active intelligence (AI) requires a 
direction in order to execute offensive attacks against an enemy; information that passive intelligence 
(PI) provides in the form of an enemy’s IP address. Also, non-cyber intelligence is crucial in cyber SA, 
similar to the importance of resource availability, which is explained in terms of (IG) construct, as both 
impact intelligence and SA quality and agility.  
 
To date, much has been discussed about the importance of SA in cyber security, but this the first time 
that a theory for active SA has been built that explicitly depicts the principal factors and their causal 
relationships as a structural equation model. Also, the model resulting from this chapter shaped the 
foundation for this research from which to develop and design techniques and methods for data 
collection, so that theory can be put into practice. The SEM model is used in this research to guide and 
inform the development of the serious gaming environment, SA BARS, and SA assessment metrics, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 of this study will apply the causality model into the serious gaming 
environment in order to put the theory into practice through collecting data from participants using the 
above-mentioned instruments. 
 
The results of the analysis revealed the importance of Active Offensive Intelligence gathering 
capability in enhancing cyber SA, which is predicted by measuring Situational Quality & Agility (QA). 
The SEM showed there is a significant impact on SA Agility and Quality from Active Intelligence 
gathering activities. Active defence is required for future cyber security. However, this trend towards 
the militarisation of cyberspace demands new or updated laws and regulations at an international level. 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 157 
Active intelligence methods now determine the principal capability that must be at the core of new 
active situational awareness (aSA) models if they are to deliver enhanced agility and quality in cyber 
SA.
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CHAPTER 5: SERIOUS GAMING TESTING ENVIRONMENT 
ASAM EXPERIMENT RESULTS  
5.0 EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
This chapter examines the results of the lab experiment conducted to test and verify the causal model 
derived from SEM, in order to see how active intelligence gathering enhances cyber SA agility and 
quality to deter cyber attacks. The experiment session was held between two controls. The first group 
was not exposed to an active environment, and participants dealt with cyber incidents using defensive 
techniques, whereas the second group were given access to the active component of a serious gaming 
environment more detail discussed earlier in chapter 3 and detail about the experiment is also attached 
in appendix 3. The following part of this study describes the analysis and findings of the experiment 
that used the causal model derived from SEM and put it in practice. 
5.0.1 Participants 
 
20 cyber security male experts taking from the original survey sample frame, with more than two 
years’ experience apiece, participated in this study, as discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.2.The mean age 
was 25 (SD = 0.44). Of these 20 participants, ten were experts with a military background. The 
recruiting process for this experiment used the department’s relations with cyber security firms.  
5.0.2 Procedure  
 
Participants were briefed about the experiment, as discussed in section 3.2.6.2 of Chapter 3. The 
researcher verbally and practically took participants through the experimental procedure in order to 
clarify the task at hand. In order to build familiarity with the serious gaming environment developed 
for the study, the researcher explained the system components in detail. This was achieved by 
including practical demonstrations, which also helped to highlight the functionalities of each tool in the 
system. Participants were given 15 minutes to acclimatise to the system and test its capabilities in real-
time. In addition, during the initial briefing the researcher verbally explained how the data would be 
collected during the experiment, and explained to the participants how to use the data-gathering tool. 
The latter point aids the researcher to objectively measure participants’ SA using a behavioural anchor 
rating scale. Finally, prior to the experimental phase, all participants were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire which contained demographic information.  
5.0.3 Experiment execution  
 
The Active SA theory was deployed in the experiment where different players have different roles. The 
Cyber Commander in the experiment was responsible to monitor the ADX system using the IDS 
(Snoby), Network monitoring tool (Capsa), System Log (SQL, Windows server 2008, Windows IIS 
server) in order to identify any suspicious activities in ADX system. Blue Team (one certified ethical 
hacker) as discussed earlier in chapter 3 section 3.2.6.2, was responsible to take offensive task orders 
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from cyber commander and provide the required intelligence. Cyber operators in the experiment were 
two people who assisted the cyber commander in monitoring the ADX system. Red team was another 
certified ethical hacker who has the role to launch the cyber attacks according to the experimental 
scenario using the script developed for this purpose. The data collecting instrument was filled by the 
cyber commanders during the experiment where timestamp was captured using the script that ask 
participant to answer the 4 main SA question as discussed in chapter 3 section 3.2.6.9. The researcher 
during the experiment was observing the participants performance and record their activities as 
participant were ask to speak loud during the exercise. The control group during the experiment had no 
access to the serious gaming environment active components (Deception and blue team) where cyber 
commanders were restricted with passive defence (Blocking).  
 
After the experiment, the researcher went through participates SA results and observation notes in 
order to objectively mark them using SA BARS as discussed in chapter 3 section 3.2.6.10 which was 
developed in this research through exploiting the result of SEM and pilot it using subject matter experts 
in order to be able to identify the proper anchors and the standard operation procedures. Once the 
researcher completed the SA BARS, the result then fused into SA assessment metric (section 3.2.6.11) 
to measure the SA performance (efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness) which provided a quantifiable 
measures for Cyber SA. This chapter is going to discuss the analysis conducted for the result captures 
front the experiment. 
5.0.4 Simulation and Experiment Network  
 
Generation of realistic network traffic is crucial for any simulation environment. The serious gaming 
environment in this research achieved that by using different methods. First, the environment built with 
three networks as described in figure 3. In the internet, there were 7 legitimate users who accessed the 
experiment network assets during the experiment where normal traffic is generated. Also, some up-
normal traffic such as failed log-in was generated when legitimate user from the Internet type in a 
wrong password. In addition, in this experiment, the attacker was generating malicious traffic when 
he/she conducted the cyber attack against ADX assets. Second, there were 7 local legitimate users 
within the LAN that were accessing the ADX resources and other resources in the internet. During the 
experiment, these local users accessed the ADX resources (web server, SQL server) and Internet 
(YouTube, Google, Sound cloud). Therefore, The IDS, Network monitoring and System log were 
getting load of information and that was enough to confuse the Cyber commander which is enough to 
represent a real case scenario. 
5.0.5 Materials 
 
As explained in the methodology chapter section 3.2.6.2.4, this study involved the design and 
development of a serious cyber-gaming, war-based environment based on the result found on the SEM 
analysis. In this study, participants were asked to act as cyber commanders. Their objective was to 
defend the serious gaming environment network assets using the available resources provided. A 
command and control centre was set up wherein participants were granted access to the latest 
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visualisation tools for both network and system monitoring. In addition, access was given to the 
network and system threat alert tools. During the control group (passive) exercise, the cyber 
commander had access to the IDS, firewall, system and network monitoring systems, and s/he was able 
to use these tools to try to detect any network threat and build situational awareness. On the other hand, 
the experimental group (active) was given access to the deception and offensive capabilities through 
the advance intelligence reporting system, which allowed sharing cyber intelligence with stakeholders 
and the blue team. In addition, for this experiment, this research designed and developed an 
assessments metrics and data capturing instruments in order to evaluate the performance of participants 
adapting active SA theory in practice and determine how active SA improves or enhances SA as 
discussed previously in section 3.2.6.2.5 of chapter 3 where quality and agility factor variables were 
used to develop the required metric which was piloted and validated by cyber security experts as 
discussed in chapter 3 section 3.2.6.2.5. In general, this informs what training, techniques and practices 
people need to go through to enhance their performance in future. 
5.1 DATA PREPARATION 
 
Section 3.2.6.2 of chapter 3 explained what instruments used for this analysis. Data were gathered from 
participants using an open-ended questionnaire and computerised tool was developed for this purpose 
to ensure data captured correctly and timely (appendix 3). Also, the performance of the participants and 
actions were recorded by researcher observation as participants were asked to speak loud while dealing 
with the environment. Later, this result were analysed to fill this research SA BARS which has been 
developed to understand how participant performed while dealing with the cyber scenario given as 
described in section 3.2.5 of chapter 3. Finally, the finding of the above instrument fused into SA 
measurement framework so cyber SA can be measured in quantitative manner. This process of 
gathering and generating result allowed this research to objectively mark participants as SA BARS was 
validated by SME’s and SA measurement metrics were developed based on the cyber scenario where 
scores are either 0 and 1. Therefore, bias is not possible in this research. (Section 3.2.6.2.5) 
5.1.1 Data Coding and Editing 
 
In an attempt to ensure data consistency and comprehensiveness, this study carried out both editing and 
coding of the collected dataset after the researcher had objectively marked the performance of the 
participants using the instruments designed for this research. Missing or incomplete data were not 
taken into account, as this study analysed only complete datasets. In the event of any observable 
outliers, validation of why the outliers had surfaced was carefully inspected by re-examining the 
original questionnaire. 
5.1.2 Data Screening 
 
5.1.2.1 Normality test 
 
A normality test was carried out in order to ensure that the data did not violate the normality 
assumption. The Jarque-Bera (skewness-kurtosis) test was applied to the data to ensure that they were 
within the acceptable limit of the skewness-kurtosis range (Hair et al., 2006). Skewness-kurtosis 
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critical values have been discussed and examined by many different academics (Hair et al., 2006; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), and were within the range of ± 2.58 at the 0.01 significance level. The 
skewness and kurtosis values of the constructs in this study were identified as being between the 
recommended critical values, confirming that the data were (univariably) normally distributed. 
Furthermore, for this study normal probability plots were performed for each construct alone. The 
findings highlighted no significant deviation from normality. Thus, results from the normal probability 
plots implied that data transformation was not essential (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
5.1.2.2 Reliability test 
 
Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for all of the constructs were above 0.943, thus surpassing the minimum 
value of 0.70 suggested by Field (2005). 
5.2 ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
 
The analysis involve comparing two groups (active and passive) where Data from SA BARS and SA 
assessment metric were used during the analysis to identify the differences in participants performance. 
Section 4.5.3 of chapter 4 verified the causality model of active SA theory, and the main aim of this 
research is to determine whether active SA enhance cyber SA and find out the degree of enhancement. 
Therefore, this section is going to discuss about the results found while applying the active SA theory 
and causality model into practice. This achieved in this research by conducting lab experiments using 
the serious gaming environment developed for this research as discussed in chapter 3 section 3.2.6.2.4. 
The following analyses are looking for differences between experiment group and control group, which 
look into how much cyber SA, enhance when active posture and active components utilised. Also, it 
will look into other issues such as how deception adoption impacts the cyber SA. Finally, the utilisation 
of blue team which in this research is the offensive capabilities that can be used to attack back the 
enemy and collect active intelligence from cyber enemy domain as discussed in section 3.2.6.2.4.4 of 
chapter 3. 
5.2.1 Independent Sample T-Test 
 
In this section, the analysis of passive and active conditions applied to the two independent groups 
revealed that there is a significance difference between the passive group and active group. The result 
of this analysis shows that there was a significant enhancement in cyber SA performance among 
experiment group (Active) and this supported by dramatic enhancement in participants cyber SA 
perception, comprehension and response by around 40%. The enhancement of overall cyber SA 
performance was around 35% where the active group significantly outperformed the passive group. 
Therefore, this confirms the research main question where active offensive intelligence gathering 
enhances cyber SA and this confirms that Active SA is a force multiplier that helped the active group 
to perform better than passive group. 
 
Another analysis conducted in this research was for military and non-military conditions to determine 
how education background impact in the performance of cyber SA using both active and passive group. 
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The results show that, a participant who comes from military background performed better than those 
who have civilian background. The military group in this analysis scored 25% more in overall cyber 
SA performance. The result also confirmed that military group had more tendency to apply offensive 
methods comparing with non-military who hesitated to adopt such service. This tells us that training 
and education is required for non-military organisations that might wish to adopt the active cyber SA. 
 
a. Passive and Active conditions: 
 
As describe earlier this test was performed using Data captured from SA BARS (Table 3.9) and Data 
calculated using SA assessment frameworks (Table 3.11). Therefore, an independent sample t-test was 
performed to see whether there were significant differences between the passive and active groups in 
the participants’ perceptions of correctness and completeness, their analysis capabilities and also in 
their degree of comprehension and confidence. Independent sample t-tests were also used to assess 
whether any differences existed in the accuracy and timeliness of captured information, the timeliness 
of awareness building, the capability to act and respond, the capability to adapt to changes, the total 
SA, SA efficiency, SA efficacy, SA effectiveness and, finally, the overall participant SA and action in 
deterring cyber incidents in both Active and Passive intelligence gathering and defence conditions. The 
results showed significant differences in the scores for active and passive conditions (Figure 5.1, Table 
5.1). 
Figures 5.1: Means (Passive, Active) (Source: Author) 
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Figures 5.1.1: Means (Passive, Active) (Source: Author 
 
Table 5.1: Independent Sample T-Test (Passive, Active) 
Independent Samples Test (Active, Passive) T df Sig. (2-tailed) 
The correctness of the perception -2.249 18 0.037 
The completeness of the perception -2.102 18 0.05 
Participant analysis capability -2.283 18 0.035 
Participant comprehension -2.114 18 0.049 
The accuracy of captured information -2.959 18 0.008 
The timeliness of captured information -2.249 18 0.037 
Timeliness of awareness building -3.748 18 0.001 
The capability to act -2.672 18 0.016 
The capability to adapt -3.421 18 0.003 
Total SA value % -3.268 18 0.004 
SA efficiency value % -2.847 18 0.011 
SA efficacy value % -2.030 18 0.057 
SA effectiveness value % -3.588 18 0.002 
Overall participant SA and action in deterring cyber incidents 3.286 18 0.004 
The reliability of captured information -2.959 18 0.008 
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Table 5.1.1: Means and SD (Passive, Active) 
With respect to table 5.1-5.1.1 and figure 5.1-5.1.1, the results from the participants’ total SA [t(18)=-
3.268, p= 0.004], SA Efficiency [t(18)=- 2.847, p= 0.011], SA Efficacy [t(18)= 2.030, p= 0.05] and 
finally SA Effectiveness [t(18)= 3.588, p=0.002] highlight a significant effect on and improvement in 
active group’s SA. Overall the active group in the serious gaming experiment scored higher than the 
passive control group. This is due to enhancements of the participants’ SA building process; 
specifically, the Behaviour Anchor Rating (BAR) revealed that participants’ perception correctness 
[t(18)=-2.249, p= 0.037] and completeness [t(18)=-2.102, p= 0.050] were both markedly improved 
during the active session, as participants were alerted to a sufficient amount of data/intelligence to 
enable them to prevent the potential cyber incident i.e. the cyber threat..  
 
Another possibility to explain the improvement in the participants’ SA was the effect of their analysis 
capabilities [t(18)=-2.283, p= 0.035], comprehension and confidence [t(18)=-2.114, p= 0.049]. The 
results reveal that these were significant effects, and also suggest that the Active offensive defence 
group managed to understand the situation with greater confidence than the Passive group, where the 
latter hesitated to take action during the experiment. Also, this confirms the fact that the active group 
had a force multiplier shaped in offensive capabilities that allowed participants to generate more 
intelligence which eventually enhanced their understanding regarding the given scenario.   
 
The accuracy of captured information [t(18)=-2.959, p= 0.008] revealed one significant effect by which 
Active offensive defence aided the enhancement of the accuracy of information gathered about cyber 
incidents. In addition, the results of the timeliness of captured information [t(18)=-2.249, p= 0.037] 
demonstrate the greater effectiveness of Active offensive defence in capturing incident information. 
The reliability of the garnered information [t(18)=-2.959, p= 0.008] showed that there was a significant 
effect whereby Active offensive defence aided the enhancement of the reliability of information 
gathered about cyber incidents. These results were reflected in the test for Timeliness of Awareness 
building [t(18)=-3.748, p= 0.001], which revealed a significant consequence of building situational 
Variables Conditions (Means and SD) 
Total SA value % Passive (M=47.4821, SD=25.6144), Active (M=79.56705, SD=.17.547514) 
SA efficiency value % Passive (M= 47.4820, SD= 25.6143), Active (M= 79.57, SD= 17.55) 
SA efficacy value % Passive (M= 35.294, SD= 21.1), Active (M= 69.48, SD= 24.59) 
SA effectiveness value % Passive (M= 36.69, SD= 19.11), Active (M= 72.55248619, SD= 27.42) 
The correctness of the perception Passive (M=3.10, SD=1.10050), Active (M=4.100, SD=.8756) 
The completeness of the perception Passive (M=3.20, SD=1.03280), Active (M=4.100, SD=.87560) 
Participant analysis capability Passive (M=2.50, SD=1.17851), Active (M=3.60, SD=.96609) 
Participant comprehension Passive (M=2.70, SD=1.33749), Active (M=3.90, SD=1.19722) 
The accuracy of captured information Passive (M=2.40, SD=.84327), Active (M=3.60, SD=.96609) 
The timeliness of captured information Passive (M=2.9, SD=1.10050), Active (M=3.90, SD=.8756) 
The reliability of captured information Passive (M=2.40, SD=.84327), Active (M=3.60, SD=.96609) 
Timeliness of awareness building Passive (M=2.40, SD=.96609), Active (M=4, SD=.94281) 
The capability to act Passive (M=2.6, SD=1.26491), Active (M=3.90, SD=.8756) 
The capability to adapt Passive (M=2.6, SD=1.17379), Active (M=4.10, SD=.73786) 
Overall participant SA Passive (M=1.70, SD=.48305), Active (M=1.10, SD=.31623) 
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awareness in a timely manner: Active defence was significantly faster and stronger in SA building as a 
result. Consequently, the capability to both act and respond [t(18)=-2.672, p= 0.016], and the 
participants’ capability to adapt to changes [t(18)=-3.421, p= 0.003], were significantly improved 
during the active sessions in which the group that employed Active offensive defence capabilities 
scored higher, as compared to the passive control group, thus, showing the importance of active 
defence in cyber security. 
 
Finally, the results from overall Participant SA and action in deterring cyber incidents [t(18)=3.286, p= 
0.005] is a significant effect and confirmed the importance of adopting a winning attitude; i.e. utilising 
an offensive method to defend cyberspace is better than adopting the traditional view of passive 
defence. 
 
 
 
a.1 Effect Size: 
 
In order to determine the effect size between active and passive group, Cohen's d effect size for t-test 
was adopted using the following formula for the total SA performance: 
𝑑 =  
| ?̅?1 + ?̅?2 |
√( 𝜎1
2 + 𝜎2
2)
2
=  
| 47.482 + 79.567|
√( 25.6141
2 + 17.5472
2)
2
=  1.46145126 
Where x1 and x2 are the means of group 1 and group 2, and σ12 and σ22 are the variances of group 1 
and group 2. The result of the effect is greater than .8, which reveals there is a large effect. (Cohen, 
1988). 
 
b. Military and non-military conditions: 
 
Independent sample t-tests were conducted to compare the military and non-military groups to 
determine whether there were differences in participants’ perception correctness and completeness, 
analysis capabilities, comprehension levels and self-confidence. T-tests were also performed to assess 
whether there were any significant differences in the accuracy and timeliness of captured information, 
the timeliness of awareness building, the capability to act, respond to and to adapt to changes, and the 
total SA in a participant’s background (military/non-military) conditions. As this research previously 
established, the attitude to cyber defence should be changed from preventive, passive defence to a 
winning attitude: one that seeks to use offensive countermeasures against cyber attack. The results 
highlight a significant difference in the scores between military and non-military conditions in favour 
of the military group (Table 5.2, 5.2.1, Figure 5.2, 5.2.1). 
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Figure 5.2: Means (military, non-military)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.1: Means (military, non-military)  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Independent Sample T-Test (military, non-military) 
Independent Samples Test (Military, Non Military) T df Sig. (2-tailed) 
The correctness of the perception 2.882 18 0.01 
The completeness of the perception 2.741 18 0.013 
Participant analysis capability 2.867 18 0.01 
Participant comprehension 3.138 18 0.006 
The accuracy of captured information 2.959 18 0.008 
The timeliness of captured information 2.249 18 0.037 
Timeliness of awareness building 2.427 18 0.026 
The capability to act 3.308 18 0.004 
The capability to adapt 2.2 18 0.041 
Total SA value % 2.16 18 0.044 
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Table 5.2.1: Means And SD (military, non-military) 
With respect to table 5.2-5.2.1 and figure 5.2-5.2.1, the results from the participants’ perception 
correctness [t(18)=2.882, p= 0.010], and participants’ perception completeness [t(18)=2.741, p= 0.013] 
demonstrate a significant effect on participant perception correctness and completeness. This implies 
that those who had a military background and a military way of thinking scored higher than those with 
a non-military background. With regards to participant analysis capabilities [t(18)=2.867, p= 0.010] 
and participant comprehension and confidence [t(18)=3.138, p= 0.006], the results show a significant 
effect on a participant’s ability to understand the situation. The findings from the accuracy of captured 
information [t(18)=2.959, p= 0.008], the timeliness of captured information [t(18)=2.249, p= 0.037], 
and the timeliness of awareness building [t(18)=2.427, p= 0.026] indicate that there were significant 
effects on a participant’s performance with regards to both information capturing and predicting future 
incidents. In addition, a participant’s capability to act and respond [t(18)=3.308, p= 0.004], and their 
capability to adapt to changes [t(18)=2.200, p= 0.041] could be compared; the results of these 
comparisons reveal significant differences, suggesting that those participants who had a military 
background were significantly better in responding to cyber incidents. Finally, results obtained from 
participants’ total SA [t(18)=2.160, p= 0.044] reveal the significant effect of participants’ backgrounds 
on their total SA. The findings overall support the argument of this research outlined earlier: that a 
winning attitude, i.e. using offensive countermeasures enhances a commander’s situational awareness. 
5.2.2 One-Way ANOVA 
 
In this section one-way ANOVA analysis was performed to determine how deception and blue team 
with offensive capabilities impact cyber SA performance. With respect to blue team utilisation, the 
results confirm that there was a significant effect in participant cyber SA performance which reveal 
that participants who utilised offensive active capabilities during the experiment scored better in 
overall cyber SA performance and managed to deter cyber attack in an efficient and effective way 
compare to those who either failed to utilise or decided to use passive features of the blue team. This 
result also confirms that training and practice is required in order to be able to gain full advantages of 
active cyber SA. 
 
The second analysis in this section was to determine how deception impacts participant’s performance 
during the experiment. The result in this analysis revealed that participant’s who utilised deception 
Variables Conditions (Means and SD) 
Total SA value % Military (M=75.453, SD=18.938), non-military (M=51.59, SD=29.34384) 
The correctness of the perception Military (M=4.20, SD=.63246), non-military (M=3, SD=1.1547) 
The completeness of the perception Military (M=4.20, SD=. 63246), non-military (M=3.100, SD=1.1005) 
Participant analysis capability Military (M=3.70, SD=.82327), non-military (M=2.40, SD=1.17379) 
Participant comprehension Military (M=4.10, SD=.56765), non-military (M=2.50, SD=1.50923) 
The accuracy of captured information Military (M=3.60, SD=1.07497), non-military (M=2.40, SD=.69921) 
The timeliness of captured information Military (M=3.90, SD=1.10050), non-military (M=2.90, SD=.8756) 
Timeliness of awareness building Military (M=3.80, SD=1.22927), non-military (M=2.60, SD=.96609) 
The capability to act Military (M=4, SD=.81650), non-military (M=2.50, SD=1.17851) 
The capability to adapt Military (M=3.9, SD=1.19722), non-military (M=2.80, SD=1.03280) 
 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 168 
service correctly performed better other who failed to utilise this service. The results also show that 
there was around 40% enhancement in participant’s cyber SA performance when deception was used 
correctly. However, the results confirm that when deception is not used correctly due to false positive 
issue, participants’ cyber SA dropped dramatically which shows that deception capability is a double 
edge sword so it should be utilised carefully. Also, this confirms training is necessary for participants 
to learn how to use deception to avoid making mistakes in future. 
 
a. Utilisation of the blue team capability conditions: 
 
In this analysis a one-way ANOVA (Dependent: Total SA, SA efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness, 
Independent: blue team utilisation conditions) was performed in order to compare the effect of 
utilising the blue team (Grouped based on SA BARS) with offensive capability among participant to 
determine whether there were a significance differences in participants total SA, SA efficiency, SA 
efficacy and finally SA effectiveness. Further, a one-way ANOVA was used to determine whether any 
significant differences existed between the way participants utilised blue team capabilities: specifically, 
comparing the effect of blue team utilisation conditions on each participant’s perception correctness, 
perception completeness, analysis capabilities and comprehension and confidence, as well as the 
accuracy of captured information, the timeliness of captured information, the timeliness of awareness 
building, the participant’s capability to act and respond, and finally his/her capability to adapt to 
changes. The analysis (Table 5.3) revealed that there was a significant effect of arming the blue team 
with offensive capability on total SA, SA efficiency, SA efficacy and SA effectiveness at the P<0.05 
level for the way participants utilise blue team capability conditions [Total SA F (2,17)=10.179, P = 
0.001], [SA Efficiency F(2,17)=14.263, P = 0.000],[SA Efficacy F(2,17)=14.607, P = 0.000], [SA 
Effectiveness F(2,17)=10.777, P = 0.001]. The results also indicated that there were significant effects 
on participants’ perception correctness [F (2,17)=6.573, P = 0.008], perception completeness 
[F(2,17)=6.345, P = 0.009], analysis capabilities [F(2,17)=7.362, P = 0.005] and [F(2,17)=6.345, P = 
0.009], the accuracy of captured information [F(2,17)=14.140, P = 0.000], timeliness of captured 
information [F(2,17)=7.012, P = 0.006], timeliness of awareness building [F(2,17)=15.036, P = 0.000], 
and the participant’s capability to act and respond [F(2,17)=7.726, P = 0.004] and adapt to changes 
[F(2,17)=8.184, P = 0.003] under these conditions. Interestingly, these results highlight the fact that 
participants’ total SA, SA efficiency, SA efficacy, SA effectiveness, participant’s perception 
correctness, participant’s perception completeness, participant’s analysis capabilities, participant’s 
comprehension and confidence, accuracy of captured information, timeliness of captured information, 
timeliness of awareness building, capability to act and respond, and the capability to adapt to changes 
were dramatically enhanced as their performance as a consequence of utilising active blue team 
capability for deterring cyber attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 169 
Table 5.3: One-Way ANOVA (blue team utilisation conditions) 
ANOVA 
  Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
The correctness of the perception Between groups 9.943 2 4.971 6.573 0.008 
Within groups 12.857 17 0.756     
Total 22.8 19       
The completeness of the perception Between groups 8.784 2 4.392 6.345 0.009 
Within groups 11.766 17 0.692     
Total 20.55 19       
Participant analysis capability Between groups 12.508 2 6.254 7.362 0.005 
Within groups 14.442 17 0.85     
Total 26.95 19       
Participant comprehension Between groups 15.473 2 7.736 6.345 0.009 
Within groups 20.727 17 1.219     
Total 36.2 19       
The accuracy of captured 
information 
Between groups 13.74 2 6.87 14.14 0.000 
Within groups 8.26 17 0.486     
Total 22 19       
The timeliness of captured 
information 
Between groups 10.306 2 5.153 7.012 0.006 
Within groups 12.494 17 0.735     
Total 22.8 19       
The reliability of captured 
information 
Between groups 13.74 2 6.87 14.14 0.00 
Within groups 8.26 17 0.486     
Total 22 19       
Timeliness of awareness building Between groups 18.655 2 9.327 15.036 0.000 
Within groups 10.545 17 0.62     
Total 29.2 19       
The capability to act within a window 
of opportunity during a cyber 
incident 
Between groups 14.166 2 7.083 7.726 0.004 
Within groups 15.584 17 0.917     
Total 29.75 19       
The capability to adapt to changes 
quickly 
Between groups 14.005 2 7.002 8.184 0.003 
Within groups 14.545 17 0.856     
Total 28.55 19       
Total SA value % Between groups 7532.959 2 3766.48 10.179 0.001 
Within groups 6290.356 17 370.021     
Total 13823.315 19       
SA efficiency value % Between groups 9560.262 2 4780.131 14.263 0.000 
Within groups 5697.273 17 335.134     
Total 15257.535 19       
SA efficacy value % Between groups 10419.056 2 5209.528 14.607 0.000 
Within groups 6063.124 17 356.654     
Total 16482.179 19       
SA effectiveness value % Between groups 9751.037 2 4875.518 10.777 0.001 
Within groups 7690.522 17 452.384     
Total 17441.559 19       
Overall participant SA and action in 
deterring cyber incidents 
Between groups 2.618 2 1.309 10.2 0.001 
Within groups 2.182 17 0.128     
Total 4.8 19       
 
 
 
 
The effect of the blue team provided with offensive capability on the overall participant SA and on the 
action in deterring cyber incidents was conducted using a one-way ANOVA to determine whether there 
were any significant differences with how participants utilised blue team capability conditions. The 
analysis indicates that there was a significant effect of blue team utilisation on the overall participants’ 
SA and action in deterring cyber incidents at the P<0.05 level [F(2,17)=10.20, P = 0.001]. 
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Figure 5.3: Blue Team Utilisation Conditions and Situational Awareness 
Figure 5.3.A: SA Effectiveness: 
 
Figure 5.3.B: SA Efficacy: 
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Figure 5.3.C: SA Efficiency: 
 
Figure 5.3.D: Total SA: 
 
Figure 5.3.E: SA Overall: 
 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 172 
Figure (5.3 A,B,C,D,E) shows that participants who utilised offensive, or active, defence, were more 
likely to deter cyber incidents from occurring, and demonstrated overall more correct and strong SA as 
compared with participants who did not employ this method. This result supports the proposed research 
proposition that using offensive countermeasures in cyber defence is effective, as it helps prove that 
this method is a robust way for acting in such a complex domain. In addition, it was clear from the 
figures that those who utilised blue team’s capabilities scored highly with regards to situational 
awareness, SA efficiency, SA efficacy and SA effectiveness; overall, participants’ SA and actions 
during cyber incidents were significantly enhanced.  
 
b. Utilisation of the deception conditions: 
 
The effect of deception on participants’ SA, SA efficiency, SA efficacy, SA effectiveness, perception 
correctness, perception completeness, analysis capabilities and participants’ comprehension and 
confidence, and on the accuracy and reliability of captured information, the timeliness of captured 
information, the timeliness of awareness building, participants’ capability to act and respond ability to 
adapt to changes were tested using a one-way ANOVA in order to determine whether significant 
differences existed between the way participants utilised cyber deception capability conditions. The 
results confirm that there was a significant effect of deception on total SA, SA efficiency, SA efficacy 
and SA effectiveness at the P<0.05 level for the way participants utilised cyber deception capability 
conditions [Total SA F(3,16)=6.86, P = 0.003], [SA Efficiency F(3,16)=11.18, P = 0.000], [SA 
Efficacy F(3,16)=9.886, P = 0.001], [SA Effectiveness F(3,16)=7.284, P = 0.003]. The results also 
indicate that there was a significant effect of deception on participants’ perception correctness 
[F(3,16)=4.130, P = 0.024], perception completeness [F(3,16)=4.156, P = 0.023], analysis capabilities 
[F(3,16)=3.622, P = 0.036], and comprehension and confidence [F(3,16)=4.670, P = 0.016], and on the 
accuracy of captured information [F(3,16)=4.959, P = 0.013], timeliness of captured information 
[F(3,16)=3.543, P = 0.039], reliability of captured information [F(3,16)=4.959, P = 0.013] and 
timeliness of awareness building [F(3,16)=8.092, P = 0.002], and on participants’ capability to act and 
respond [F(3,16)=3.891, P = 0.029] and adapt to changes [F(3,16)=4.427, P = 0.019] at the P<0.05 
level when utilising deception capability conditions. Determining the effect of deception on 
participants’ overall SA and actions in deterring cyber incidents was conducted using a one-way 
ANOVA (Dependent: Total SA, SA efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness, Independent: utilisation of 
deception). 
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Table 5.4: One-Way ANOVA (Deception utilisation conditions): 
ANOVA 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
The correctness of the perception Between groups 9.95 3 3.317 4.13 0.024 
Within groups 12.85 16 0.803   
Total 22.8 19    
The completeness of the 
perception 
Between groups 9 3 3 4.156 0.023 
Within groups 11.55 16 0.722   
Total 20.55 19    
Participant analysis capability Between groups 10.9 3 3.633 3.622 0.036 
Within groups 16.05 16 1.003   
Total 26.95 19    
Participant comprehension Between groups 16.9 3 5.633 4.67 0.016 
Within groups 19.3 16 1.206   
Total 36.2 19    
The accuracy of captured 
information 
Between groups 10.6 3 3.533 4.959 0.013 
Within groups 11.4 16 0.713   
Total 22 19    
The timeliness of captured 
information 
Between groups 9.1 3 3.033 3.543 0.039 
Within groups 13.7 16 0.856   
Total 22.8 19    
The reliability of captured 
information 
Between groups 10.6 3 3.533 4.959 0.013 
Within groups 11.4 16 0.713   
Total 22 19    
Timeliness of awareness building Between groups 17.6 3 5.867 8.092 0.002 
Within groups 11.6 16 0.725   
Total 29.2 19    
The capability to act within a 
window of opportunity during a 
cyber incident 
Between groups 12.55 3 4.183 3.891 0.029 
Within groups 17.2 16 1.075   
Total 29.75 19    
The capability to adapt to 
changes quickly 
Between groups 12.95 3 4.317 4.427 0.019 
Within groups 15.6 16 0.975   
Total 28.55 19    
Total SA value % Between groups 7776.999 3 2592.333 6.86 0.003 
Within groups 6046.316 16 377.895   
Total 13823.315 19    
SA Efficiency Value % Between groups 10329.8 3 3443.267 11.18 0.000 
Within groups 4927.734 16 307.983   
Total 15257.535 19    
SA Efficacy Value % Between groups 10706.258 3 3568.753 9.886 0.001 
Within groups 5775.921 16 360.995   
Total 16482.179 19    
SA Effectiveness Value % Between groups 10069.178 3 3356.393 7.284 0.003 
Within groups 7372.381 16 460.774   
Total 17441.559 19    
Overall participant SA and action 
in deterring cyber incidents 
Between groups 2.7 3 0.9 6.857 0.004 
Within groups 2.1 16 0.131   
Total 4.8 19    
 
Moreover, the analysis indicates that there was a significant effect from the way participants utilised 
deception capability conditions on participants’ overall SA and the action they took to deter cyber 
incidents at the P<0.05 level [F(3,16)=6.857, P = 0.004]. This finding revealed that participants’ 
overall SA was enhanced when deception was utilised to deter cyber incidents. 
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Figures 5.4: Deception Utilisation Conditions and Situational Awareness: 
Figures 5.4.A: Total SA 
 
Figures 5.4.B: SA Efficiency 
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Figures 5.4.C: SA Efficacy 
 
Figures 5.4.D: SA Overall 
 
Figure (5.4 A,B,C,D) demonstrates that participants who utilised cyber deception managed to deter 
cyber incidents, and also exhibited correct and strong SA scores compared with participants who did 
not use it. Figure (5.4.A-D) reveals the importance of cyber deception in cyber security and active 
defence; the statistics show how participants’ SA, SA efficiency, SA efficacy, SA effectiveness and 
overall SA and action were all significantly improved by utilising deception methods. However, Figure 
(5.4.A-D) demonstrates a significant negative relationship with regards to participant performance and 
incorrectly applied deception which represent the false positive where a participant anticipate 
legitimate traffic to be malicious. Thus, deception capability is a double-edged sword, and it should be 
used carefully in order to take full advantage of its capability. 
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5.3 RESULT DISCUSSIONS  
The main purpose of this experiment in the research study was to validate the research hypothesis and 
answer the main research question by examining the role of active intelligence gathering using 
offensive hacking techniques to enhance cyber situational awareness agility and quality in dealing with 
cyber incidents. The results of the experiment, as described above, brought to light that participant 
situational awareness was significantly improved when a winning attitude (active offensive defence) 
was introduced. The independent sample t-test for active and passive conditions revealed that the 
participants’ total SA mean (M) (Figure 5.5-7) (Table 5.1 & 5.1.1 Figure 5.1 & 5.1.1) improved by 
32% where participants with a winning attitude scored a higher SA than the control group. In addition, 
participants’ SA efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness were all enhanced by 35%. Moreover, the 
analysis revealed that participants’ SA perception, comprehension and capability to project and deter 
cyber incidents were significantly improved in the experimental group; this eventually led to an 
enhancement of participants’ agility and quality in dealing with cyber incidents. This finding confirms 
that active intelligence gathering, in combination with offensive hacking, enhances situational 
awareness agility and quality, thus verifying our hypothesis.  
 
The second independent sample t-test (Table 5.2 & 5.2.1, Figure 5.2 & 5.2.1), performed on 
participants’ backgrounds (military or non-military), was used to explore the impact of ‘the military 
way of thinking’ in using active defence and dealing with cyber incidents. The results of this test show 
that those who had a military way of thinking managed to deter cyber incidents significantly better; the 
mean of participants’ total SA difference was 24% better than those who came from a non-military 
background. In addition, their situational awareness performance was significantly better, and helped 
them become more agile in preventing cyber incidents. This was because of their willingness to utilise 
both offensive methods and their skills in hacking.  
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Figure 5.5: Active Mean (Total SA, SA Efficiency, SA Efficacy, SA Effectiveness) 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Passive Mean (Total SA, SA Efficiency, SA Efficacy, SA Effectiveness) 
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Figure 5.7: Passive Mean vs. Active Mean (Total SA, SA Efficiency, SA Efficacy, SA Effectiveness) 
 
 
An additional test was conducted in this study: a one-way ANOVA was used to examine the impact of 
blue team’s use of offensive capabilities and deception. The results (Table 5.3) (Figure 5.3.A-E) 
demonstrate that the participants’ overall SA was significantly improved, suggesting that participants’ 
SA performance was achieved in a high quality and agile manner as compared to the control group. 
Therefore, blue team’s performance with offensive capabilities had a major impact on SA performance, 
and so it is a main factor that should be considered when active defence is adopted. With regards to the 
utilisation of deception, the analysis (Table 5.4.A-D) indicates that participants who utilised the 
deception service correctly performed significantly better than those who did not, or than those that 
used deception incorrectly, when it comes to SA performance. The analysis also helped to articulate the 
fact that deception services were used by participants to buy extra time, enabling them to better 
understand cyber incidents and so control the impact of these incidents more effectively. This 
highlighted the importance of deception in active cyber defence as a tool that enables cyber 
commanders to defend their network. However, the results (Figure 5.4.A-D) also reveal that incorrectly 
(false positive) utilising cyber deception resulted in participants failing to control cyber incidents, and 
their SA performance was poor in comparison to those who utilised it correctly. This shows how 
important strong cyber deception capability is in an active defence situation, but also demonstrates its 
limitations. In summary, deception capability is a double-edged sword, and it should be used carefully 
in order to take the full advantage of its capabilities. Cyber commanders should utilise it when 
convinced of the existence of suspicious network activities. 
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5.4 CONCLUSION 
First and foremost, it was of critical to determine whether any significant differences existed between 
active and passive intelligence gathering and defence conditions. For this, the participants’ perception 
of correctness and completeness, their analysis capabilities, comprehension and confidence, the 
accuracy and timeliness of the captured information, the timeliness of awareness building, their 
capability to act and respond and adapt to changes, the total SA, SA efficiency, SA efficacy and SA 
effectiveness, and the overall participant SA and action in deterring cyber incidents, were examined 
under prescribed simulation conditions. It became evident that, overall, during the active sessions 
participants perceived a sufficient amount of data, enabling them to deter cyber incidents more 
effectively than during passive sessions. Interestingly, further probing revealed that the active, 
offensive defence group managed to understand the situation at hand with more confidence, as 
compared with the passive group, where the latter showed hesitation in decision making. In addition, 
active offensive defence enhanced the accuracy of information gathered about cyber incidents, and the 
results also suggested that this strategy may well have been more effective for capturing incident-
related information; this highlights the importance of active defence in cyber security. The results also 
provide evidence demonstrating the importance of adopting a winning attitude (utilising offensive 
methods) rather than passive defence methods, to effectively defend cyberspace. 
 
The findings presented here also show that adopting a winning attitude is of importance with regards to 
the enhancement of a person’s situational awareness. This conclusion is connected more to participants 
who had a military background than those without one. In fact, participants who had a military 
background were also found to be statistically better in responding to cyber incidents. Overall, the 
results shown in this chapter help to demonstrate that participants who utilised offensive, or active, 
defence, were more likely to deter cyber incidents. This finding is linked to participants with a more 
appropriate and strong SA than participants who did not employ such methods. Such findings from the 
blue team capability condition experiments support the proposed research suggestion that use of 
offensive countermeasures in cyber defence is an effective strategy. Therefore, when SA is being 
aligned to doctrine then it enables cyber commanders to perform significantly better in tackling cyber 
attacks.  
 
The effects of deception on participant SA, SA efficiency, SA efficacy, SA effectiveness, perception 
correctness, perception completeness, analysis capabilities, comprehension and confidence, the 
accuracy of captured information, timeliness of captured information, timeliness of awareness building, 
capability to act and respond and the capability to adapt to changes were also examined. It was evident 
that use of deception helped significantly to deter cyber incidents when participants appropriately 
utilised cyber deception capability conditions, compared with participants who did not. Thus, these 
findings help to also highlight the importance of cyber deception in cyber security and active defence. 
However, the results also indicate that deception capability should be used carefully and appropriately 
in order to maximise its advantages (stated above). 
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In conclusion, the results and findings confirm that active intelligence gathering using offensive 
hacking techniques enhance cyber situational awareness agility and quality in dealing with cyber 
incidents to a significant degree. In addition, it is clear that, when a winning attitude is adopted, 
participant situational awareness is statistically improved. Interestingly, participants with a military 
background managed to more effectively deter cyber incidents than those without one. In fact, 
situational awareness performance was better in participants with a military background: they became 
more agile in deterring cyber incidents (possibly due to their willingness to utilise both offensive 
methods and hacking skills). Finally, the results obtained from the blue team with offensive capabilities 
demonstrate that such a strategy is an important consideration with regards to producing an effective 
active defence strategy. A deception strategy in active cyber defence also appears to be a useful tool by 
which cyber commanders can defend their network. This method allows participants to buy extra time, 
enabling them to better understand cyber incidents, thus providing more control over the impact of 
these incidents. However, as previously stated, deception capability is a double-edged sword, and 
should be used carefully by cyber commanders. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.0 OVERVIEW 
The study has systematically explored the relevant and current literature and developments in the area 
of cyber SA. It has provided some insight by investigating the efficacy of the existing SA models and 
demonstrating their limitations in enhancing SA agility and quality. The topics covered also ranged 
from the legality and ethical considerations of Active SA up to the development of a technical test 
bed/environment. 
 
In order to validate the proposed model and build this research theory, the study used Structure 
Equation Modelling (SEM), and this has afforded the research an opportunity to test whether active 
offensive intelligence gathering could enhance SA agility and quality when dealing with a cyber 
incident. The resulting SEM was then used to inform the development of the testing environment, 
where the proposed model would be tested in practice. In addition, the SEM result informed the 
development of a measurement instrument to measure SA performance objectively. After this, an 
independent sample T-test and ANOVA were used to test the effects of the following: 
 
I. Active intelligence gathering and passive intelligence gathering conditions; 
II. Influence of individual education (military and civilian background);  
III. Utilisation of deception conditions; and  
IV. Utilisation of blue team (control group) with offensive capabilities. 
 
With all the above in mind, the research that effectively identified the current security needs of the 
cyber world and the shortcomings of the existing SA models and in turn allowed the study to introduce 
a new theory and theoretical framework that eventually shaped the new, Active SA Model. 
 
The main outcome of this research is a novel and robust approach and theory for cyber SA where for 
the first time an active offensive intelligence activity is integrated into SA model which provides 
quality information that enhances the agility of awareness. So far all existing SA models discussed in 
literature were not doctrinally correct and passive in nature. This research developed the active SA 
model with an attitude to facilitate offensive intelligence gathering that aligns correctly with military 
doctrine. Also, the research provided a novel serious gaming environment as a robust testing 
environment that allowed this research to play a real cyber war in controlled environment without 
breaking the law. Finally, a novel SA assessment framework was developed to evaluate the efficiency, 
efficacy and effectiveness of cyber commanders’ cyber SA which provided for the first time an 
objective means and method to quantify SA performance. This contribution provided a capability to 
determine where candidate’s cyber training techniques may be improved. This chapter will discuss in 
detail contributions and outcomes of this research. 
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6.1 KEY FINDINGS: 
 
Although there are many improvements and recommendations that this research has contributed, the 
key findings can be summarised as follows. 
 
All current existence SA models are high-level models, are too general and are not doctrinally correct. 
They lack details about how SA should be performed, and consequently this research has helped 
advance the field of study by providing more real-life implementations and findings based on those 
models. 
 
The research has also concluded that intelligence is a crucial factor in cyber SA, and its quality and 
timeliness do affect the performance of cyber SA. Active intelligence is a force multiplier that adds a 
new capability to the cyber commander. In turn this helps to achieve proper cyber SA through 
utilisation of offensive capabilities to influence the enemy and to be able to collect intelligence from 
within the enemy’s domain. 
 
This research has introduced active offensive intelligence gathering in an SA theory and model. This 
provides cyber commanders with additional intelligence from the enemy domain, rather than 
intelligence coming from local cyber security sensors. Therefore, the superior intelligence that comes 
from direct interaction with the enemy and intelligence from the enemy domain that relate to decision 
making helps decision makers to make the right decision and determine the right response to cyber 
incidents. Active SA, with its active offensive intelligence gathering, helps in enhancing cyber 
operations where commanders are always engaged in intelligence gathering. Being active in cyber 
space allows cyber commanders to collect information about potential targets and influence them 
before even they start attacking i.e. identifying the cyber threat early.  
 
Deception is important for Active SA as it allows the defender to channel enemy attacks into a 
controlled environment where the defender can perform intelligence gathering and understand what the 
enemy is about to do. A deception service is considered a weapon, and can be used in Active SA to 
control the impact of cyber incidents and also to gather intelligence from an enemy, with the capacity 
to influence enemy decision-making and OODA loop. Therefore, training is crucial so defender utilise 
this method correctly. 
 
Similarly, the use of a serious gaming environment is indeed a very useful tool for performing cyber 
SA, where it can be used to enhance people’s capability through training. This environment allows 
users to reverse their decision and play real cyber-war games in a real controlled environment without 
breaching any laws. This research, with the use of a serious gaming environment, influences the current 
training techniques in practice. A serious gaming environment is a robust environment which can be 
used to enhance participants’ performance in cyber security, and also can act as a platform for training 
and assessment. 
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As always, training is important for active cyber SA, and the military way of thinking is crucial to gain 
the advantage from this model and finally an Active SA model adds new capabilities to cyber 
commanders in which this method allows a defender to influence enemies and affect their decision 
making process and operate actively inside their OODA loop and out manoeuvre the enemy.  
 
It is important to notice that, this thesis has highlighted the importance of offensive hacking and 
deception in enhancing cyber SA agility and quality. However, commanders should always remember 
that enemies could use deception and active offensive measures during cyber attacks. Therefore, they 
should always be prepared for similar incidents. 
6.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES & ANALYSIS OUTCOMES 
Objective 1: Determine and critically analyse the current SA models and identify the 
key dimensions and variables for Active cyber SA 
 
Most recent studies on cyber SA have focused primarily on measuring the participants’ cyber SA, 
without specifying how the cyber SA model components could be found (Stevens et al., 2013; Fink et 
al., 2013; Dutt et al., 2013). Although this is a useful field of study, there is great amount of perspective 
lost from not researching deeper the cyber SA model components themselves. In response, the current 
research has afforded the reader this view. 
 
Another limitation of the extent research is data capture, in that most recent research has not specified 
the type of data to be gathered, but provided only a general outline of this critical process. With 
statistical analysis and conclusions being derived from data, this research has allocated more time to 
this critical process, with the objective of obtaining cleaner and more accurate results. 
 
Lastly, and most critically, there is no research available that has discussed how the actual SA is 
performed, nor what the processes are for building cyber SA. One will also find that there is no model 
in the available literature that integrates, nor even includes, quality and agility aspects, which are 
critical elements that allow good cyber SA to be determined. In turn, available research is unable to 
describe how intelligence, quality and agility can be integrated into SA in order to produce superior 
and better SA. 
 
Moreover, the main finding from the literature has been that all existing modules are high level and 
generalised models that do not focus on explaining how exactly SA can be performed or achieved in a 
practical, real life way. Also, existing modules were developed with the wrong attitude that were not 
doctrinally aligned which is not suitable for emerging cyber environment. This research has achieved 
the objective through critical examination of the current literature on non-cyber SA models (Endsley, 
1995) and cyber related models (Tadda & JDL, 2008), concluding with a study into the Art of War. 
Computer forensic science was another critical part and, when combined with SA, it allowed the 
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research to develop a conceptual, hypothesised, active cyber SA model. The novel active SA theory 
was developed with due consideration given to aligning it with military doctrine and computer 
forensics capability so that a robust result in enhancing cyber SA agility and quality could be achieved.   
Objective 2: Developing a theoretical framework for Active SA 
 
To further assist in the development of the theoretical framework, a survey was conducted in which 
271 cyber security experts participated, and then an exploratory factor analysis was conducted and 
structural equation applied to verify the Active SA model and it causal relations. 
 
The purpose of this investigation was to determine whether active intelligence is more capable of 
providing enhanced security through enhanced active SA to cyber operators than passive intelligence. 
Active Intelligence (AI) as a construct can be defined as a package of both explicit and tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Nishiguchi, 2001) that directly affects SA quality and agility. On this point, 
the SEM for this study showed that AI activities significantly impacted on SA agility and quality, 
which in turn substantiates the claim that current and future cyber security measures should not omit 
adopting active defence techniques. By using SEM in order to validate this objective, the use of AI 
attests to the following statements: 
 
I. It is crucial for the defender to interact with the enemy during a cyber incident in order to be 
able to identify the enemy’s intention and motive; 
II. It is crucial to obtain and exploit new knowledge during the cyber incident; and 
III. When cyber commanders rely on intelligence coming from an enemy domain, rather than 
from local sensors alone, their SA is enhanced to a significant extent.  
 
In respect to constructs such as Passive Intelligence (PI, which provides an enemy’s IP address etc) and 
Intelligence Gathering (IG), the SEM showed that both are important to enhance overall SA agility and 
quality, as both are found to positively impact on SA and Active Intelligence (AI), since they provide 
the much-required direction to the AI for executing offensive attacks against enemy. It was also found 
that factors such as non-cyber intelligence and resource availability are no less crucial in enhancing SA 
agility and quality, as both are found to impact highly on PI, IG and AI. On this point, the study found 
that AI methods defined the principal capability at the core of the newly introduced SA model to 
deliver enhanced agility and quality in cyber SA. 
 
Altogether, the SEM substantiated the basic premise of this study: that AI gathering activities 
significantly impact on SA agility and quality, and active defence techniques are indispensable for 
current future cyber security to enhance cyber defence against threats to CNI. This, however, also 
brings forth one important point, which is the need for enacting new laws and regulations at an 
international level to facilitate the gradual militarisation of cyberspace, which clearly is the order of the 
day, considering the high magnitude of hacking activities in term of cost and disruption.  
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The Role of Offensive Hacking in Enhancing Cyber SA Quality and Agility 
Hacking, from the operator’s end, requires applying more tactics and innovation, which in turn 
enhances the operator’s agility in underpinning and exploiting the attacker’s vulnerability. This leads to 
an incremental increase in the quality of cyber situational awareness (Endsley, 2000: 3). Perception, 
comprehension and projection are the three major drivers of situational awareness, which works at 
three levels. For example, perception of cues works as the initiator of required actions at the first level; 
comprehension of the situation helps the operator to effectively interpret the same at the second level; 
and this helps the operator to reach the projection level, i.e. to perform at the highest level of 
knowledge of cyber situation awareness. This shows that there is a complex degree of rigour involved 
in achieving and exploiting situation awareness, which in turn suggests that hacking helps to enhance 
the agility of the operators as hacking provides superior intelligence which assists in the prevention of 
cyber attacks.  
 
One can arrive at the same conclusion from another perspective. Since the main task of the operators in 
protecting the network is to convert quality situation awareness into successful performance (Endsley, 
2000), they must treat SA as a separate stage of functioning, because otherwise it becomes impossible 
to obtain quality SA, due to several intervening factors such as poor strategy selection, poor decision 
choices, technical constraints, inadequate training etc. In fact, the mutually supplementary roles of 
decision making and SA – decisions influenced by SA and SA influenced by decisions – strongly 
suggest that the entire process involves instant conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Nishiguchi, 2001), and the quality of SA projection is highly dependent on 
the operators’ ability to effectively convert tacit knowledge into active knowledge within a split 
second. At this point, the significance of offensive intelligence gathering in achieving quality SA 
projection can be realised by considering the processes that act as the sources of both tacit and explicit 
knowledge by checking the enemy’s attack process:  
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Figure 6.2: Enemy Attack Process (Source: Author) 
The above diagram clearly highlights the fact that operators need to integrate the above processes with 
their own thought processes, as well as constantly synthesise them through the permutations and 
combinations of the various stages to obtain as many outcomes as possible. Therefore, it can said that 
ethical hacking acts as a much-required dynamic learning curve for the operators in order to keep them 
always alert, agile, fully aware of the latest trends of cyber attack and ready to deliver with innovative 
strategies. For this reason, Serious Gaming environment and active SA metrics should always be 
deployed to enhance cyber operator’s capabilities through training.   
 
At this point, it also becomes clear that operators require adequate training and other support, such as 
an appropriate infrastructure and a required amount of freedom, which will equip them to deal with all 
three levels of SA, i.e. perception, comprehension and projection, to the desired degree of intelligence 
and precision.  
Objective 3: Evaluate Active SA deployment in a serious gaming environment 
 
Following the findings of the literature review, which clearly posited the fact that active intelligence is 
an essential instrument for enhancing SA agility and quality, this study has introduced a new, enhanced 
situational awareness model that incorporates active offensive methods to extract active intelligence. 
This necessitated designing a new scale for SA; accordingly, new constructs have been added to the 
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model. Before, the SEM was used in the first stage to verify the theoretical model, the results of which 
were used in the second stage, to design:  
 
1. Serious gaming environment;  
2. SA behavioural anchor rating scheme; and  
3. SA measurement and marking scheme based on ground truth. 
 
In addition to the newly produced SA scale, the research needed an effective test bed. This came in the 
form of a “serious gaming environment”, due to the fact that achieving SA requires the analyst to 
proceed through three stages: perception, comprehension and projection. The challenges of each of 
these stages are ingesting large volumes of data, sustaining real time response and presenting in a 
comprehensible format, respectively. Effective presentation of the current state allows the analyst to 
more rapidly identify anomalous behaviour and devise an appropriate response (Amico, 2005).  
 
The rationale behind adopting serious gaming environment rests on the fact that traditional network SA 
tools such as Snort (www.snort.org), Nagios (www.nagios.org) or OpenNMS (www.opennms.org) 
eventually present volumes of logs and graphs of data in a variety of forms, such as streams of logs and 
scatter plots, bar charts, pie charts and graphs, which over time lose much of their meanings due to 
multiple dimensions emerging from information saturation.  
 
On the other hand, a gaming environment provides a diverse suite of tools that enables the researcher to 
creatively depict asset behaviour, state and location. In addition, these tools enable the researcher to 
create a virtual world that accurately represents the real world, where accurate geo-location of assets 
helps the player to seamlessly identify the location of network assets that operate on the network. 
These facilitators eventually enable the player to perform actions to obtain pertinent information about 
the assets of interest, which in turn depict the accurate state of SA.  
 
All the points above reinforce the importance of using a serious gaming environment, developed in this 
research using the Active SA model, as a crucial element to help test the research’s main questions.  
 
Lastly, it would be pertinent to mention at this point that, going by the available body of literature on 
SA, one finds that visualisation of SA has always been considered to be a prime precondition in 
measuring the state of SA. For example, Draper, Livnat & Riesenfeld (2008) recommend utilising 
visualisation techniques, after they identified its benefits through using their VisAlert intrusion 
detection technology, which enhanced their understanding of the state of SA among operators. 
Similarly, Glanfielf et al. (2009) used OverVlow to create FloVis, which is a visualisation tool for 
investigating network traffic. The framework of FloVis enables analysts to customise the entire 
analysis environment, which in turn allows them to better identify abnormal behaviour in the network 
under scrutiny. Altogether, the extant literature clearly identifies visualisation as the key to enhancing 
SA decision-making. Therefore, active SA theory inform the development of visualisation. 
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Objective 4: Develop a method framework for assessing cyber SA 
 
In order to be able to assess theory in practice, the research developed assessment instruments that 
allow performance evaluation of Active SA theories in practice. The participants’ SA performance was 
captured and evaluated with data gathered during the experiment. This allowed one to objectively mark 
the participants using a five-point Likert scale called SABARS, which was used for this research 
scenario and was subsequently validated during the pilot study by a group of cyber security experts.  
 
This rating scale was developed by the researchers at the University of Queensland for measuring the 
SA performance of the members of the Air Services, Australia. SABARS enables expert observers to 
rate the SA performance of the operators at an individual level, with 28 behavioural checkpoints 
indexed to SA processes (Mathews et al., 2000). It uses a five-point Likert scale, where the 
performance on specified behaviours can be rated as either very poor, poor, borderline, good or very 
good. One view of the 28 framed SA behaviours suggests that it can also be generalised for other 
networks. 
 
The rationale behind adopting SABARS rests on the fact that it encompasses almost all possible 
behaviours that can be associated with SA, and that it provides an easy way to identify the individual 
strength and weaknesses of the SA of each operator which in turn influence training technique and 
practice. Therefore, SABARS provides a solid basis for a behaviourally anchored rating (BARS) by 
assessing five broad areas of team-members’ individual SA. At the same time, it also makes the job of 
the assessors much easier, as in this case the assessors only have to make five decisions about each 
operator to eventually capture the individual state of their SA (Campbell et al., 1973; Loughry, Ohland 
& Moore 2006). Altogether, SABARS offers several advantages, such as framing behavioural anchors 
within its rating scale, making the SA decision making processes easy and remaining unobtrusive, 
while helping assessors obtain a detailed measurement of all major individual SA behaviours of the 
operators. There are at least four other important points that go in favour of using SABARS, which 
enhance its reliability:  
 
 One, it involves subject matter experts (SME) as assessors/observers to ensure the delivery of 
more reliable SA performance results of the operators;  
 Two, it facilitates on-field SA assessments, where the observers have the scope to judge each 
participant within a real-life situation before rating their SA status; and  
 Three, it is highly compatible with a C4i environment (Command, Control, Communication, 
Computers and Intelligence) (Salmon et al. 2006). 
 Inform training techniques and practice. 
 
In the case of this research, the result of the SABARS was then used to calculate participant SA 
performance, SA efficiency, SA efficacy and SA effectiveness using other metrics developed as a 
result of SEM and based on ground truth.  
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SA measurement and marking schemes based on ground truth: the rationale for using the marking 
scheme on ground truth is that it is virtually impossible to theoretically measure the intangible elements 
that build and activate SA, such as human “perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of space and time, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the 
near future” (Endsley, 2000: 3). Therefore, this research has novel contribution in being able to 
quantify SA performance. 
Objective 5: Empirically assess the significance of effect and the implications of 
active defence in enhancing cyber SA agility and quality 
 
As stated in chapter five, the main purpose of the experiment in this research study was to test the 
research hypothesis that active defence techniques are more capable of providing quality SA and 
ensuring greater degree of cyber security; this required examining the role of AI gathering by using 
offensive hacking techniques, and inferring from the outcomes of the tests whether active defence 
techniques are more capable of enhancing cyber situational awareness agility and quality in dealing 
with cyber incidents. Eventually, the finding was that participants’ SA was significantly improved 
when a winning attitude (active offensive defence) introduced.  
 
For example, the independent sample T-Test for active and passive conditions revealed that the active 
participants’ total SA mean (M) improved by 32% (almost double) when they adopted a winning 
attitude, scoring higher than the passive control group. Similarly, Active participants’ SA efficiency, 
efficacy and effectiveness were also increased by double when adopting a winning attitude. Moreover, 
the analysis reveals that SA perception, comprehension and SA projection were improved significantly 
in the case of the participants who belonged to the experiment group, which eventually enhanced each 
participant’s agility and quality while dealing with cyber incidents. These findings, therefore, 
substantiate the fact that AI gathering using active offensive defence can enhance SA agility and 
quality. Active SA model provides greater capability in providing quality cyber security.   
 
The outcome of the T-test showed that active defence techniques enhanced the overall SA performance 
of the participants by 32%, and that the participants who operated with a winning attitude scored a 
higher SA. This therefore implies that constant patrolling in cyberspace to detect, deny, pursue and 
destroy the attackers’ ploys have made the participants totally engaged in cyber operations, and such 
engagement has developed their ability to constantly gather tacit knowledge and convert the same into 
explicit knowledge in less time, which, in other words, can be described as an intrinsic process of 
developing SA agility and quality. The above view accords with the observation of Varon (2002) that 
the best defence is a strong offense, since in this case the operators are engaged in the constant lookout 
for any malicious activities in cyberspace. Altogether, the findings of the T-test clearly substantiate the 
fact that active defence techniques should be an integral part of any cyber security initiative, much in 
the mould of the old adage that prevention is better than cure.     
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The second finding from the T-test, i.e. participants’ SA efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness were 
enhanced 2 times better when adopting a winning attitude, clearly substantiates the fact that a military 
doctrine highly complements active defence techniques which advocate an active defence posture. A 
winning attitude can be defined as a proactive approach, which is an essential element of any military 
strategy and which perfectly suits the context of this study, since cyber attacks virtually resemble the 
real-life attacks intended to capture or dominate the opponent’s space and to rule over the defeated 
network. A winning attitude in this case follows a cycle of activities that goes through two stages: 
  
Constantly applying prior knowledge along with new knowledge 
Constantly engaging the attacker in deciphering this new knowledge 
 
Therefore, the efficacy of a winning attitude recorded in the T-test not only clearly endorses the above 
strategy as best practice in any cyber security initiative, but also endorses the theoretical framework of 
the active defence technique that has been applied in active SA theory:  
 
Figure 6.1: Active SA in Context (Source: Author) 
The above diagram shows that an active defence technique is guided by three drivers – a winning 
attitude (Active offensive defence posture), explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge – which together 
create a force that is superior to the attacker, and eventually that force is projected through an Active 
SA Model to defeat the attacker and achieve the desired outcome, i.e. keeping the network fully free 
from any attack. It is here that the various roles of the Active SA theory also come to the fore, since in 
the absence of those roles the participants could not have increased their SA efficiency, efficacy and 
effectiveness by 35%. Its roles thus can be framed in the following manner: 
 
I. The new active SA model facilitates interaction with the adversaries; 
II. It gets activated once an attack gets redirected; 
III. It uses deception (new knowledge for the attacker) through redirecting the attacker to 
deception server; 
IV. It controls the adversaries and enters into their domain through all possible means; 
V. It captures the attackers within a deception loop and keeps them fully busy there (i.e. busy in 
deciphering the constant barrage of new knowledge).   
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The above roles performed in Active SA Model can be distributed among the four categories of 
military strategy as suggested by Sun Tzu: Initiation, Direction, Action and Exploitation. Equally, it 
becomes clear from the above state of affairs that new knowledge, being the prime instrument of 
military strategy, acts here as the force multiplier within the newly introduced active SA model, where 
intelligence generated from new knowledge plays a big role in creating and applying the new 
knowledge.  
 
The proven efficacy of the Active SA Model also serves as a pointer to its indispensability in securing 
important networks, especially when one learns that any cyber security initiative from a 
military/strategic point of view needs to address at least eight interrelated variables, which are political, 
military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time (TRADOC, 
2010), and to address the following eight issues to build its safety framework: 
 
I. Identity (at least cyber identity) of the attacker 
II. Motive of the attacker 
III. Location of the attacker 
IV. Goal of the attacker 
V. Weakness of the attacker 
VI. Possible impact of attack on the operator’s domain 
VII. Ways to defuse the attack before its occurrence   
 
Thus, it has been determined through survey and experimentation that the success of the new Active 
SA Model has been demonstrated in practice because of the fact that it has successfully integrated the 
military philosophy of Sun Tzu in its structure and mechanisms, as well as successfully addressed the 
above variables recommended by the US Army in its cyberspace security plans for 2016-2018 
(TRADOC, 2010). In fact, a 35% increase in SA efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness among the 
participants demonstrates a high increase in SA agility and quality, since SA efficiency, efficacy and 
effectiveness eventually culminate in improved SA agility and quality. Since no cyber security 
initiative can do without SA agility and quality, the proven ability of Active SA Model thus easily 
makes its mark by enhancing the SA performance of the participant operators who have adopted a 
winning attitude and correctly used deception techniques. Even a brief discussion on the role of agility 
and quality obviates why the new Active SA Model should be considered indispensable for its ability 
to enhance SA agility and quality for delivering superior active SA in contemporary active defence 
environments.  
 
The second independent sample T-test, assessing participants’ background (military and non-military), 
was conducted to explore the impact of a military way of thinking on using active defence techniques 
and dealing with cyber incidents. The results of this test showed that those who have a military way of 
thinking are better equipped to deter cyber incidents than their counterparts. Here, the mean in 
participants’ total SA difference stood at 24%, i.e. the performance of the participants with a military 
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way of thinking was found to be 24% better than those who came from a non-military background. In 
addition, the participants with a military background were found to be more agile in deterring cyber 
incidents, which strongly suggests that their willingness to adopt a winning attitude and to exploit the 
offensive methods act as the main drivers in enhancing their SA skills.  
 
Another test was conducted in this study – a one-way ANOVA – to examine the impact of utilisation of 
the blue team with offensive capabilities and the utilisation of deception. The findings from this test 
showed that utilisation of offensive capabilities improved participants’ overall SA to a significant 
extent, which clearly suggests that participants’ SA performance was highly impacted by the active 
defence technique, as well as validating offensive capability as the major driver of SA performance. In 
regard to deception, the outcome of the analysis showed that participants who utilised deception 
service correctly were able to perform much better than those who did not. The findings also revealed 
the following points:  
 
 The deception service enabled the participants to gain extra time to thoroughly scrutinise and 
comprehend the cyber incidents; 
 As a consequence, the participants successfully utilising the deception service were able to 
control the cyber incidental impact easily and in less time; and  
 Incorrect utilisation of deception leads to failure in controlling cyber incidents and ends up 
with poor SA performance.  
 
The above points clearly articulate two facts: one, a deception technique is an essential tool that 
operators can use to remain one up against the cyber attackers; two, failure to utilise a deception 
technique can be fatal for the security system, and therefore operators should possess appropriate 
knowledge and training to successfully utilise the same. While the second point involves factors of 
human error, which can be resolved with the help of knowledge and training, the first point clearly 
shows that deception techniques are an integral part of the overall active defence technique.  
 
The study has shown that correct utilisation of deception with a winning attitude has considerably 
enhanced the SA of operators and cyber commanders alike. This finding corroborates the findings of 
the experts, who explain the correlation between enhanced SA performance and deception by 
suggesting that deception enables the operator to buy more time in many ways, which the operators can 
exploit in order to learn about the attacker in detail. For example, an operator might adopt techniques 
such as hiding information about a network’s topology, its vulnerabilities and its assets from a hacker’s 
reconnaissance by intercepting connections to unused network addresses or by impersonating 
computers, where its ruses (tricks designed to deceive) would make it difficult for the attackers to 
identify the real computers and/or scan the network without avoiding detection. This shows that 
deception can be used both by hiding and showing techniques, where in the first case deception 
conceals or obscures certain elements of the network, and in the second case it shows something that 
does not exist  (Bell & Whaley, 1992; Yull, Denning & Feer, 2006). In addition, an extremely 
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important point emerges from the seminal work of Yull et al. (2006), which is that the central tenet of 
the deception technique is to defeat the attacker, who is considered to be a discovery agent, and whose 
failure to discover the hidden thing should be attributed to the superior knowledge and skills of the 
operator. This statement perfectly suits the finding of this study, i.e. that the operator should possess a 
winning attitude (will to defeat), and should opt for offensive methods/techniques to protect the 
network. 
Participant Feedback Result Discussion 
 
In order to be certain about participants’ evaluation and feedback regarding the new model and its 
security features, this research asked participants several questions about the Active SA model, 
deception, the serious gaming environment and offensive capabilities. The results of this observation 
were positive, as participants considered the introduced model as a blueprint for future cyber SA 
security that would shape the structure of future cyber security technologies and platforms. Further to 
this, participants found that the Active model and its variables were very simple and easy to 
understand, and that this could be a very useful guidance for cyber security personnel in dealing with 
cyber attacks due to the fact that this model’s variables tell what data are to be collected, where to find 
them and how to extract them. Some of participants, in fact, believed that this model could allow the 
organisation to assess its security team and help in drawing up the right training program to enhance 
the cyber security capability.  
 
The serious gaming environment in the experiment showed a very resourceful tool to achieve the 
enhancement through assessment of an organisation’s security and the application of a real experiment 
to assess people and their capabilities in dealing with cyber incidents so that proper training can be 
provided, which they believed it is essential for the Active SA model so the organisation can get the 
full advantages out of Active SA system. The cyber deception service in the serious gaming 
environment, which is basically a clone of real resources, grabbed the participants’ attention, who 
found it to be a very useful and resourceful tool, especially when compared with the current honeypot 
technologies. Their cumulative comments about this service were positive, and they found that this 
cloned service provides cyber security personnel with more time and greater capability to understand 
enemy intentions while controlling the magnitude of the cyber attack. When asked if they found this 
feature useful going forwards, they believed it was indeed a very promising technique, as it is very 
difficult to detect compared with low-level interaction currently used in honeypots, which can be 
detected by the enemy. A point they wished to note, however, was that although the deception as a 
cloned service provides real interaction with the system, the enemy they were interacting with was 
ultimately controlled by a cyber security team.  
 
In general, participants indicated that cyber deception can be implemented at a national level to ensure 
the security of the nation’s critical assets. Finally, participants believed that interaction with the enemy 
during a cyber incident is crucial for Active SA, as such interactions would provide the defender with 
superior intelligence to defeat enemy courses action. The offensive capabilities could be utilised in 
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future to protect national assets and defeat the enemy during a cyber war, but this depends on the 
maturity of the law and the situation where counter attacks and cyber self defence are covered. 
6.3 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION 
 
This research study contributes a novel theory and framework to the cyber situational awareness 
literature that enhances cyber SA in cyber security, and identifies the variables that explain this cyber 
active SA model. Also, this research adds for the first time the notion of active intelligence and quality 
and agility to the cyber SA model, and a valid scale to measure it. Albert (2006) argues that better SA 
should rely on good intelligence, and this shows how important active intelligence is in enhancing 
cyber SA. This is due to the fact that active intelligence gathers more information about adversaries in 
order to make intelligence more complete for the defender.  
The main contributions of this research are: 
I. A theory for active cyber SA and its implementation in practice. 
II. An objective assessment framework and approaches to evaluate the operator’s performance of 
cyber SA  
III. An active defence process that explain how to apply active SA theory into practice. 
 
This research has contributed into the body of knowledge by providing a detailed framework that 
explains how enhanced cyber SA in cyber security could be achieved assessed and how it could be 
enhanced. All previous models discussed previously are too general and lack detail about how cyber 
SA can be achieved. Information about what data cyber commanders should find are not covered; there 
are only general ideas about how to monitor network assets, which makes current methods passive and 
inadequate for dealing with cyber attacks. The passive approach adopted currently is not adequate for 
cyber security, because defenders simply wait for cyber incidents and then react. Such an approach 
provides only one side of intelligence: one that is simply controlled by adversaries. Active intelligence 
using an offensive approach has been introduced in this research to enhance cyber SA by providing 
additional intelligence from the enemy’s domain through active interaction with the enemy’s attack. 
This approach shows significant enhancement in cyber SA and cyber security.  
 
The active cyber SA theory in this research includes active intelligence, quality and agility as the main 
components of SA, as this research believes that no cyber SA can be achieved without having reliable 
sources of intelligence to build agile and quality SA. In addition, this research study makes a 
significant contribution to the cyber SA literature by introducing new and valid constructs, namely 
active intelligence, quality and agility. This study is the first that has integrated and used these 
constructs in a new theory for cyber SA that truly enhances cyber SA and cyber defence capabilities in 
deterring cyber incidents and in turn provides the mean to objectively measure the performance of SA 
through quality and agility construct variables. Another major contribution made is to the cyber SA and 
cyber defence literature by providing a rich explanation of how active offensive capabilities provide 
advantages into cyber defence operations in practice by enhancing cyber SA while dealing with cyber 
incidents.  
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Previously, cyber SA and SA in general were measured either in subjective or less objective ways to 
assess people’s SA when dealing with an event. However, current metrics were designed for a non-
cyber domain, and so do not necessary explain how SA can be achieved. This research adopted non-
intrusive techniques to collect information on expert involvement in cyber incidents, which are then 
used to assess participant SA using a behavioural anchor rating scale based on the ground truth already 
identified in the experiment scenario. The results of both previous instruments were then fused into 
cyber SA assessment framework employing the metrics developed based on a SEM to measure 
participants’ cyber SA performance.  Therefore, this research added novelty in the area of assessing 
cyber SA where the introduced metric and method used in this research allowed for the first time to 
quantify cyber SA performance.  Given that Cyberspace, as one of the global commons(air, maritime, 
space, land, cyber) (MNE7, 2013), underpins and is critical to the functioning of the other global 
commons used in the defence of critical national infrastructure then active SA theory and application 
has a critical role to play in enhancing SA for many stakeholders. 
 
In addition, this research provided another novel methodological contribution shaped in a serious 
gaming environment designed for the purpose of assessing cyber SA. The main advantage of this 
environment is that it allows us to mimic a real-life cyber network and cyber attack scenarios in a 
controlled network environment without breaking laws. This environment is simply a cloned network 
asset built in to a virtualised environment that allows the research to play a cyber attack game with a 
group of experts to assess their SA performance in dealing with cyber incidents in real life. Moreover, 
the impact of this novelty has an important effect in training techniques and practice as this 
environment allows organisation to assess their personnel and determine where a candidate’s cyber 
training, techniques and practice may be improved. 
 
Finally, this research has verified and validated the active SA theory through utilising the power of 
structural equation modelling and then has been validated through an intensive lab experiment as 
discussed using cyber security experts whom they provided accreditation to this research contribution.  
The developed and demonstrated active SA theory and practice has shown significant in cyber SA 
performance dramatically in term of efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness which cannot be ignored.  
6.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
 
The following section discusses the main limitations of this research study. First, due to limited 
resources in the area of cyber SA and Active defence the research tries to apply different techniques, 
such as military and forensic science, in order to develop the theoretical Active cyber SA defence 
framework. Also, cyber SA models in the literature are too general to show how these models should 
be performed. There is no clear discussion on how different SA components interrelate, and not enough 
information on the data gathering process.  
 
Second, the measurement of cyber SA in the literature is mainly focused in measuring SA itself, and 
ignores the measurement of the quality of each process and agility in acquiring it.  
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 196 
 
Thirdly, it is interesting to note that human error has been found to be one of the most significant 
sources of susceptibility in any secure information system. This research is about developing a cyber 
situational awareness through exploiting network and system data to determine the existence of cyber 
attacks. Therefore, human error as discussed above is out of this research scope.  
 
Active offensive Cyber SA is required for future cyber security and cyber defence. However, in order 
to achieve the desire protection, defenders are required to have enough knowledge about the enemies. 
This can be achieved by continues patrolling in cyberspace to identify the potential attackers. Also, 
having distributed sensors and predication tools are important so deception and offensive measures can 
be deployed against detected incidents. Training is required as active SA personnel should have enough 
knowledge in the area of hacking and defence in order to perform correctly. Finally, Active SA is a 
great deal but it is useful to protect a national infrastructure due to fact, offensive measures and action 
should be granted and supported by law so cyber commanders won’t be prosecuted for their actions. 
 
This research adopted five Likert scale in both stage one survey and stage two lab experiment SA 
BARS due to the fact that the Likert Scale is a well known method for survey collection and is also 
easy to understand. However, respondents to such scale may interpret it differently from one another 
which could cause problems in the result. Another problem found when using Likert scale is that the 
space between each choice cannot be identified so that space is ignored. Therefore, this research 
considered the above discussed points as a limitation in this research. 
 
Finally, it would be useful to have a greater range of scenarios to test out the active SA theory and 
practice more extensively as well as addressing how active SA theory can address contemporary and 
emerging cyber threats. This will be addressed in future research where CNI such as telecom will be 
considered to test the active SA theory and practice.  
6.5 FUTURE WORK 
Quantum computing is the next era of computing, first theorised by Argonne National Laboratory. Paul 
Benioff created the first quantum computer theory in 1981, which is basically based on the power of 
atoms and molecules to perform processing tasks and memory. Quantum computing is a promising 
area, where the speed of processing will significantly increase much faster than current silicon based 
computers.  
 
With this in mind, it is envisioned that future research will focus on studying the impacts of quantum 
computing on the Active SA model and how this technology can be exploited to enhance the model’s 
capabilities and performance. Quantum computing will add new capabilities to cyber security. The 
speed of processing data will enhance the speed of detection, speed of capturing data and speed of 
processing large amounts of data, and finally will enhance the prediction. However, the question is: 
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how could this affect the intelligence gathering process in the Active SA model, and how agile is 
Active SA in deterring cyber incidents? 
 
Quantum computing has the potential to allow future research to design a robust and agile data 
gathering machine that spreads into different sources to gather intelligence, which then can be fused 
into a neural-like network to process the data quickly and efficiently, so that quality predictions and 
decisions can be made. These assumptions will require more research, so the aim of any future work 
will focus on studying the possibility of exploiting quantum computing to enhance the cyber security 
SA and maybe come to an idea about setting up a quantum cyber security SA platform. 
 
This study confirms the importance of Active SA model in enhancing cyber agility and quality to 
enhance cyber security. However, this study didn’t cover the cost of such adoption comparing with the 
benefit so as future work, the cost effective of Active SA model will be conducted. 
 
In the near future it would also be beneficial to develop a live system that can be used against real 
hackers/enemies in a parallel live environment. The idea would be that such an implementation would 
help improve the system and related models over time, to be able to bootstrap a system or theoretical 
implementation with an established knowledge database. This would allow future implementations to 
start with a concrete and up to date knowledge base, as opposed to learning the new techniques from 
scratch with each system iteration and/or deployment. 
6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Whilst it might be generally agreed that Active SA has its merits, it is still important to note that the 
respective legislation needs to sanction its greater use. It is hoped that this study affords interested 
parties a greater look into the practical applications of using Active SA in the cyber arena. Whilst 
respecting the necessity for literature and theoretical modelling, this research bridges a capabilities gap 
between the theoretical and practical usages of active SA and delivers a superior active SA prototype 
for active cyber defence. 
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APPENDIX 1: EXPLORATORY SURVEY 
1- SURVEY VARIABLES: 
1.1 SA Variables: 
1.2 Quality and Agility Variables: 
1.3 Intelligence Variables: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situational 
Awareness (SA) 
S1 Perception Correctness The extent to which awareness is consistent with ground truth  
 
S2 
Perception 
Completeness 
The percentage of relevant information attained 
 
S3 Previous Knowledge 
The explicit knowledge which serves to formulate decisions and to generate 
new knowledge by fusing it with tacit knowledge  
 
S4 Skill 
Ability to acquire new knowledge and the ability to convert both new and 
explicit knowledge into desired action 
 
S5 Analysis Capability Systematically unravelling of the knowledge and understanding  
 
S6 Confidence The willingness to use the information 
 
S7 Projection (intent) The willingness to perform an act  
 
Quality and 
Agility (QA) 
ES1 Timeliness The timeliness of awareness building 
 
ES2 Responsiveness The ability to act within windows of opportunity 
 
ES3 Adaptability The ability to adapt changes quickly  
 
ES4 
Quality 
Accuracy 
The quality of nearness to the truth, or the true value of the quality and usefulness of the 
knowledge provided 
 
ES5 
Quality 
Reliability 
The quality of the sources used to produce SA 
 
ES7 
Quality 
Timeliness 
The timeliness of intelligence 
 
Intelligence 
Constructs 
    
 1- Passive 
Intelligence (PI) 
in1 Intelligence Timeliness The timeliness of provided intelligence 
 
in2 Enemy IP IP identification 
 
in3 Enemy Motive The reason behind performing a given act 
 
in4 
Passive Intelligence Gathering 
Capability 
Local and public available intelligence (Sensors) 
 
in5 Intelligence Sharing Intelligence provided and shared with partners 
 
in6 Intelligence Collaboration Intelligence provided by partners 
  in7 Interaction Capability 
The capabilities to interact with enemy during a 
cyber incident 
2- Active 
Intelligence (AI) 
in8 Enemy Capabilities Enemy strength and resources 
 
in9 Enemy Weaknesses Enemy weak points that can be exploited 
 
in10 Intelligence Accuracy The quality of information provided 
 
in11 Intelligence Completeness The amount of truth captured 
 
in12 Information Gathering The capacity to gather intelligence 
 
in13 Destroy The capacity to eliminate threat offensively  
  in14 
Active Intelligence Gathering 
Capability 
The capacity to actively gather intelligence from 
enemy domain 
3- Intelligence 
Gathering 
in15 Resources Availability The resources available to extract intelligence 
 
in16 Non Cyber Intelligence Intelligence that influences cyber operation 
 
in17 Enemy Geo Location The geo-location of enemy 
 
in18 Enemy Attack Variation Type of attacks that can be used against enemy 
 
in19 Enemy Attack Consistency The strength of enemy attack 
 
in20 Granular level of Threat Detail The known threat 
 
in21 Enemy Possible Attack 
The possible attacks enemy can use against 
resources 
 
in22 Enemy Attack Timing The duration of attack to be completed 
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Introduction  
  
The  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  explore  the  key  factors  associated  with  Cyber  Situational  Awareness  and  evaluate  the  strength  of  its  
association  in  order  to  build  a  comprehensive  Active  Cyber  Situational  Awareness.    
  
ELIGIBILITY  REQUIREMENTS:  
To  be  eligible  to  take  part  in  this  study  you  must  be  part  of  the  following:  
1-­  IT  Security  
2-­  Network  Security  
3-­  Cyber  Incident  Response  Team  
4-­  Cyber  Defence    
  
TIME  COMMITMENT:  
This  survey  should  only  take  about  15  minutes  of  your  time.  Your  answers  will  be  completely  anonymous  unless  you  decide  to  provide  your  
personal  details  
  
PROCEDURE  &  PARTICIPANTS’  RIGHTS:  
The  research  will  be  conducted  through  a  questionnaire  survey  where  participation  in  this  study  is  totally  voluntary.  Participants  have  the  right  
to  not  take  part  of  this  survey  or  withdraw  at  any  time  prior  to  submitting  the  questionnaire.  The  survey  result  will  be  collected  anonymously  
unless  participants  decide  to  provide  their  personal  detail.  All  data  collected  will  be  kept  confidential  and  used  for  the  purposes  of  this  
research  only.  All  your  personal  data  will  be  kept  secure  and  protected  under  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998,  no  other  entity  will  be  granted  to  
access  this  research  data.  Any  publication  that  may  be  derived  this  survey  will  not  include  any  sort  of  personal  data.  
  
Please  note  the  survey  is  hosted  by  the  USA  based  survey  company  Survey  Monkey  that  is  subject  to  US  laws.Please  visit  the  following  address  
to  understand  your  rights:  https://www.surveymonkey.net/mp/policy/privacy-­policy/  
  
  
BENEFITS  AND  RISKS:  
There  are  no  known  benefits  or  risks  for  participants  in  this  study  
  
FOR  FURTHER  INFORMATION:  
If  you  have  any  questions  at  any  time  about  the  study,  please  do  not  hesitate  to  contact  Ahmed  Al-­Shamisi  (ahmed.al-­shamisi@brunel.ac.uk)  
  
  
  
Participant Information
  
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 225 
Dear  All  
  
Thank  you  very  much  for  taking  the  time  to  complete  this  survey.  Your  feedback  is  important  to  us  will  enable  us  to  build  a  strong  Cyber  
Situational  Awareness  Model  that  can  handle  Cyber  incidents  and  Enhance  Cyber  Commander's  decision  making  process.  
  
This  survey  should  only  take  about  10  minutes  of  your  time.  Your  answers  will  be  completely  anonymous.  
  
  
1-­  How  much  do  you  agree  or  disagree  with  the  given  statement  
(1-­  Do  not  agree  5-­  Strongly  agree)  
  
  
  
If  you  have  any  questions  about  the  survey,  please  contact  us  at  ahmed.al-­shamisi@brunel.ac.uk.  
  
In  order  to  progress  through  this  survey,  please  use  the  following  navigation  buttons:  
  
Click  the  Next  button  to  continue  to  the  next  page.  
Click  the  Previous  button  to  return  to  the  previous  page.  
Click  the  Submit  button  to  submit  your  survey.  
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Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 226 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 227 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 228 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 229 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 230 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 231 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 232 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 233 
 
 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 234 
APPENDIX 2: SEM SPSS ANALYSIS RESULT 
1- MULTICOLLINEARITY 
VIF greater than 10 is multicollinearity; during the test researcher found only 2 that might have 
multicollinearity issue, but not over 10. The rest are lower than 5, which is tolerable.  
Coefficients
a
 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 ES1 .377 2.653 
ES2 .304 3.286 
ES3 .240 4.172 
ES4 .363 2.752 
ES5 .343 2.915 
ES7 .381 2.623 
in2 .321 3.120 
in3 .358 2.792 
in4 .347 2.883 
in5 .261 3.837 
in6 .224 4.465 
in7 .495 2.021 
in8 .377 2.652 
in9 .225 4.453 
in10 .291 3.435 
in11 .238 4.195 
in12 .258 3.871 
in13 .241 4.155 
in14 .207 4.835 
in15 .382 2.619 
in16 .255 3.928 
in17 .223 4.477 
in18 .263 3.806 
in19 .273 3.667 
in20 .516 1.939 
in21 .630 1.587 
in22 .439 2.276 
S1 .274 3.648 
S2 .233 4.288 
S3 .165 6.057 
S4 .140 7.168 
S5 .264 3.786 
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S6 .315 3.172 
S7 .408 2.452 
2- CRONBACH’S ALPHA 
Conduct and interpret an internal consistency reliability analysis through Cronbach’s alpha, the 
corrected item-total correlations and the inter-item correlation matrix. 
A- Agility and Quality 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
No. of 
Items 
.903 .904 6 
 
Above 0.7 so it is reliable 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation No. 
ES1 3.75 .764 271 
ES2 3.84 .751 271 
ES3 3.85 .764 271 
ES4 3.71 .789 271 
ES5 3.72 .728 271 
ES7 3.80 .748 271 
 
  
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
ES1 18.91 10.125 .661 .462 .897 
ES2 18.82 9.766 .766 .662 .882 
ES3 18.81 9.442 .830 .729 .872 
ES4 18.95 9.768 .717 .555 .889 
ES5 18.94 9.915 .758 .611 .883 
ES7 18.86 10.116 .682 .469 .894 
 
No Deletion required for this scale  
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b- Intelligence  
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
No. of 
Items 
.925 .924 22 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation No. 
in1 2.74 .843 271 
in2 2.85 .907 271 
in3 2.72 .897 271 
in4 3.04 .904 271 
in5 3.00 .956 271 
in6 3.01 .958 271 
in7 2.89 .907 271 
in8 3.45 .937 271 
in9 3.45 .929 271 
in10 3.52 .918 271 
in11 3.72 .804 271 
in12 3.37 .945 271 
in13 3.64 .866 271 
in14 3.71 .865 271 
in15 2.38 .939 271 
in16 2.32 .980 271 
in17 2.18 .821 271 
in18 2.20 .869 271 
in19 2.22 .839 271 
in20 3.90 .693 271 
in21 3.20 .906 271 
in22 3.91 .789 271 
 
N21 should be deleted to get better Cronbacks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 237 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
in1 64.69 135.748 .579 .538 .921 
in2 64.58 132.682 .686 .705 .919 
in3 64.72 134.063 .625 .603 .921 
in4 64.39 133.232 .661 .639 .920 
in5 64.44 132.573 .652 .724 .920 
in6 64.42 132.081 .674 .746 .920 
in7 64.54 134.701 .585 .488 .921 
in8 63.98 133.374 .628 .596 .920 
in9 63.98 133.122 .646 .751 .920 
in10 63.92 133.300 .646 .683 .920 
in11 63.71 134.480 .681 .750 .920 
in12 64.06 132.674 .656 .721 .920 
in13 63.79 134.093 .648 .745 .920 
in14 63.72 134.801 .612 .782 .921 
in15 65.05 135.775 .511 .609 .923 
in16 65.11 136.003 .476 .737 .924 
in17 65.25 137.403 .507 .766 .923 
in18 65.23 137.133 .489 .724 .923 
in19 65.21 137.547 .487 .715 .923 
in20 63.53 140.102 .443 .334 .924 
in21 64.23 139.799 .337 .253 .926 
in22 63.52 139.421 .419 .346 .924 
      
c- Situational Awareness 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
No. of 
Items 
.942 .942 7 
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Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation No. 
S1 4.04 .722 271 
S2 4.00 .728 271 
S3 3.99 .735 271 
S4 3.98 .717 271 
S5 4.05 .705 271 
S6 4.07 .716 271 
S7 4.11 .680 271 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
S1 24.20 13.718 .812 .687 .933 
S2 24.24 13.613 .826 .732 .931 
S3 24.26 13.452 .850 .817 .929 
S4 24.26 13.468 .873 .844 .927 
S5 24.20 13.795 .818 .693 .932 
S6 24.17 13.941 .771 .620 .936 
S7 24.13 14.479 .703 .520 .942 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3- CFA 
Initial Model: 
From previous analysis we found in20, in21,in22 could cause problems, so we 
watched them carefully.  
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From visual inspection in 20,in21,in22 are loading very low  
Standardized Residual Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model ) 
None of the above variables is within 2.5, so deletion of these variables is 
justifiable. 
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

 
The standardized residual covariance should be within |2.58| (Byrne, 2006). 
Factor loading (Standardized regression weight) should be greater than 0.5, and 
preferably above 0.7 (Byrne, 2006). 
Result of initial model : 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPA
R 
CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 80 1491.791 550 .000 2.712 
Saturated model 630 .000 0   
Independence model 35 8061.029 595 .000 13.548 
RMR, GFI 
Model RM
R 
GFI AGF
I 
PGF
I 
Default model .075 .754 .719 .659 
Saturated model .000 1.000   
Independence model .251 .174 .125 .164 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model NFI 
Delta1 
 
RFI 
rho1 
 
IFI 
Delta2 
 
TLI 
rho2 
 
CFI 
Default model .815 .800 .875 .864 .874 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNF
I 
PCF
I 
Default model .924 .753 .808 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 941.791 830.820 1060.396 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 7466.029 7179.401 7759.099 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 5.525 3.488 3.077 3.927 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 29.856 27.652 26.590 28.737 
RMSEA 
Model RMSE
A 
LO 90 HI 90 PCLOS
E 
Default model .080 .075 .085 .000 
Independence model .216 .211 .220 .000 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 1651.791 1676.406 1939.960 2019.960 
Saturated model 1260.000 1453.846 3529.335 4159.335 
Independence model 8131.029 8141.799 8257.103 8292.103 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 6.118 5.707 6.557 6.209 
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Saturated model 4.667 4.667 4.667 5.385 
Independence model 30.115 29.053 31.200 30.155 
HOELTER 
Model HOELTER 
.05 
 
HOELTER 
.01 
 
Default model 110 115 
Independence model 22 23 
After fixing issues  
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPA
R 
CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 88 689.324 440 .000 1.567 
Saturated model 528 .000 0   
Independence model 32 7538.630 496 .000 15.199 
RMR, GFI 
Model RM
R 
GFI AGF
I 
PGF
I 
Default model .030 .868 .842 .723 
Saturated model .000 1.000   
Independence model .259 .181 .128 .170 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model NFI 
Delta1 
 
RFI 
rho1 
 
IFI 
Delta2 
 
TLI 
rho2 
 
CFI 
Default model .909 .897 .965 .960 .965 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNF
I 
PCF
I 
Default model .887 .806 .856 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 249.324 181.993 324.590 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 7042.630 6764.960 7326.724 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 2.553 .923 .674 1.202 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 27.921 26.084 25.055 27.136 
RMSEA 
Model RMSE
A 
LO 90 HI 90 PCLOS
E 
Default model .046 .039 .052 .853 
Independence model .229 .225 .234 .000 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 865.324 889.831 1182.311 1270.311 
Saturated model 1056.000 1203.038 2957.919 3485.919 
Independence model 7602.630 7611.542 7717.898 7749.898 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 3.205 2.956 3.484 3.296 
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Saturated model 3.911 3.911 3.911 4.456 
Independence model 28.158 27.129 29.210 28.191 
HOELTER 
Model HOELTE
R 
.05 
 
HOELTE
R 
.01 
 
Default model 192 201 
Independence model 20 21 
 
Only problem is GFI AGFI but they are very close 
CFA Validity 
 
Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)  Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
         
   Estimate     Estimate 
QA <--> SA 0.605  ES3 <--- QA 0.853 
QA <--> AI 0.431  ES2 <--- QA 0.808 
QA <--> PI 0.335  ES4 <--- QA 0.742 
QA <--> IG 0.212  ES5 <--- QA 0.816 
SA <--> AI 0.506  ES7 <--- QA 0.728 
SA <--> PI 0.38  ES1 <--- QA 0.716 
SA <--> IG 0.282  S5 <--- SA 0.83 
AI <--> PI 0.565  S4 <--- SA 0.906 
AI <--> IG 0.24  S1 <--- SA 0.819 
PI <--> IG 0.39  S3 <--- SA 0.877 
e25 <--> e26 0.475  S6 <--- SA 0.768 
e24 <--> e29 0.279  S2 <--- SA 0.867 
e17 <--> e21 0.537  S7 <--- SA 0.71 
e14 <--> e16 0.183  in14 <--- AI 0.8 
e12 <--> e15 0.228  in9 <--- AI 0.887 
e11 <--> e13 0.477  in12 <--- AI 0.801 
e3 <--> e4 0.2  in11 <--- AI 0.892 
e2 <--> e4 -0.231  in13 <--- AI 0.777 
e1 <--> e2 0.325  in10 <--- AI 0.82 
e32 <--> e33 0.277  in8 <--- AI 0.751 
e22 <--> e23 0.192  in2 <--- PI 0.85 
e17 <--> e19 0.361  in6 <--- PI 0.819 
e10 <--> e14 0.234  in5 <--- PI 0.786 
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e19 <--> e21 0.327  in3 <--- PI 0.777 
     in4 <--- PI 0.809 
     in1 <--- PI 0.667 
     in7 <--- PI 0.649 
     in17 <--- IG 0.906 
     in18 <--- IG 0.841 
     in19 <--- IG 0.831 
     in16 <--- IG 0.877 
     in15 <--- IG 0.782 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CR AVE MSV ASV PI QA SA AI IG 
PI 0.909 0.591 0.319 0.182 0.769     
QA 0.902 0.607 0.366 0.177 0.335 0.779    
SA 0.938 0.685 0.366 0.211 0.380 0.605 0.828   
AI 0.935 0.672 0.319 0.205 0.565 0.431 0.506 0.820  
IG 0.928 0.720 0.152 0.084 0.390 0.212 0.282 0.240 0.848 
          
No Validity Concerns       
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4- FINAL CFA  
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5- SEM INITIAL TESTS: 
Linearity Test 
From curve estimation we found all relation are sufficiently linear. 
DV: QA – IV: SA  
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: QA 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .419 193.614 1 269 .000 1.272 .697 
  
Logarithmic .400 179.617 1 269 .000 .852 2.322 
  
Inverse .345 141.505 1 269 .000 5.727 -6.663 
  
Quadratic .419 96.489 2 268 .000 1.418 .613 .012 
 
Cubic .427 66.404 3 267 .000 5.225 -3.071 1.139 -.110 
Compound .399 178.365 1 269 .000 1.847 1.214 
  
Power .389 171.518 1 269 .000 1.628 .654 
  
S .342 139.756 1 269 .000 1.866 -1.896 
  
Growth .399 178.365 1 269 .000 .613 .194 
  
Exponential .399 178.365 1 269 .000 1.847 .194 
  
Logistic .399 178.365 1 269 .000 .542 .823 
  
The independent variable is SA. 
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DV: QA - IV: AI 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: QA 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .216 74.031 1 269 .000 2.532 .416 
  
Logarithmic .199 66.981 1 269 .000 2.538 1.173 
  
Inverse .157 50.249 1 269 .000 4.762 -2.645 
  
Quadratic .217 37.035 2 268 .000 2.758 .267 .023 
 
Cubic .221 25.232 3 267 .000 4.107 -1.209 .524 -.054 
Compound .197 65.832 1 269 .000 2.646 1.120 
  
Power .184 60.474 1 269 .000 2.645 .321 
  
S .146 45.868 1 269 .000 1.583 -.727 
  
Growth .197 65.832 1 269 .000 .973 .113 
  
Exponential .197 65.832 1 269 .000 2.646 .113 
  
Logistic .197 65.832 1 269 .000 .378 .893 
  
The independent variable is AI. 
 
DV: QA – IV: PI  
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: QA 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .135 41.999 1 269 .000 2.983 .310 
  
Logarithmic .128 39.631 1 269 .000 3.021 .838 
  
Inverse .113 34.101 1 269 .000 4.601 -1.912 
  
Quadratic .136 21.069 2 268 .000 3.190 .164 .024 
 
Cubic .138 14.214 3 267 .000 2.515 .909 -.232 .028 
Compound .138 42.991 1 269 .000 2.948 1.094 
  
Power .139 43.576 1 269 .000 2.957 .249 
  
S .132 40.806 1 269 .000 1.562 -.591 
  
Growth .138 42.991 1 269 .000 1.081 .089 
  
Exponential .138 42.991 1 269 .000 2.948 .089 
  
Logistic .138 42.991 1 269 .000 .339 .914 
  
The independent variable is PI. 
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DV: QA – IV: IG  
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: QA 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .053 15.133 1 269 .000 3.496 .200 
  
Logarithmic .053 15.204 1 269 .000 3.623 .427 
  
Inverse .049 13.928 1 269 .000 4.307 -.732 
  
Quadratic .053 7.560 2 268 .001 3.443 .248 -.010 
 
Cubic .060 5.642 3 267 .001 2.760 1.246 -.448 .058 
Compound .055 15.667 1 269 .000 3.415 1.060 
  
Power .058 16.547 1 269 .000 3.537 .127 
  
S .056 15.844 1 269 .000 1.469 -.222 
  
Growth .055 15.667 1 269 .000 1.228 .058 
  
Exponential .055 15.667 1 269 .000 3.415 .058 
  
Logistic .055 15.667 1 269 .000 .293 .943 
  
The independent variable is IG. 
 
DV: SA-  IV: AI 
 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: SA 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .283 106.325 1 269 .000 2.325 .443 
  
Logarithmic .284 106.952 1 269 .000 2.269 1.300 
  
Inverse .259 94.025 1 269 .000 4.804 -3.150 
  
Quadratic .285 53.410 2 268 .000 2.003 .656 -.033 
 
Cubic .291 36.453 3 267 .000 .583 2.209 -.560 .056 
Compound .285 107.381 1 269 .000 2.428 1.139 
  
Power .297 113.907 1 269 .000 2.368 .390 
  
S .282 105.712 1 269 .000 1.629 -.965 
  
Growth .285 107.381 1 269 .000 .887 .130 
  
Exponential .285 107.381 1 269 .000 2.428 .130 
  
Logistic .285 107.381 1 269 .000 .412 .878 
  
The independent variable is AI. 
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DV: SA- IV: PI 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: SA 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .165 53.105 1 269 .000 2.842 .318 
  
Logarithmic .164 52.635 1 269 .000 2.861 .878 
  
Inverse .150 47.538 1 269 .000 4.533 -2.051 
  
Quadratic .165 26.507 2 268 .000 2.730 .397 -.013 
 
Cubic .167 17.849 3 267 .000 2.094 1.099 -.255 .026 
Compound .160 51.147 1 269 .000 2.843 1.096 
  
Power .163 52.390 1 269 .000 2.847 .257 
  
S .154 49.000 1 269 .000 1.539 -.610 
  
Growth .160 51.147 1 269 .000 1.045 .092 
  
Exponential .160 51.147 1 269 .000 2.843 .092 
  
Logistic .160 51.147 1 269 .000 .352 .912 
  
The independent variable is PI. 
 
DV: SA –IV: IG  
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: SA 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .088 26.048 1 269 .000 3.294 .239 
  
Logarithmic .089 26.203 1 269 .000 3.446 .511 
  
Inverse .083 24.189 1 269 .000 4.267 -.879 
  
Quadratic .089 13.014 2 268 .000 3.232 .296 -.012 
 
Cubic .096 9.495 3 267 .000 2.517 1.340 -.470 .061 
Compound .090 26.614 1 269 .000 3.227 1.074 
  
Power .095 28.139 1 269 .000 3.368 .155 
  
S .091 27.041 1 269 .000 1.466 -.272 
  
Growth .090 26.614 1 269 .000 1.172 .071 
  
Exponential .090 26.614 1 269 .000 3.227 .071 
  
Logistic .090 26.614 1 269 .000 .310 .931 
  
The independent variable is IG. 
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DV: AI –IV: PI 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: AI 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .370 157.710 1 269 .000 1.610 .573 
  
Logarithmic .358 150.166 1 269 .000 1.664 1.562 
  
Inverse .315 123.782 1 269 .000 4.612 -3.573 
  
Quadratic .370 78.582 2 268 .000 1.547 .617 -.007 
 
Cubic .370 52.202 3 267 .000 1.434 .742 -.050 .005 
Compound .352 146.002 1 269 .000 1.831 1.210 
  
Power .360 151.154 1 269 .000 1.836 .534 
  
S .338 137.243 1 269 .000 1.629 -1.262 
  
Growth .352 146.002 1 269 .000 .605 .191 
  
Exponential .352 146.002 1 269 .000 1.831 .191 
  
Logistic .352 146.002 1 269 .000 .546 .826 
  
The independent variable is PI. 
 
DV: AI –IV: IG 
 
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: AI 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 b3 
Linear .065 18.851 1 269 .000 2.818 .248 
  
Logarithmic .069 19.911 1 269 .000 2.967 .541 
  
Inverse .065 18.837 1 269 .000 3.841 -.942 
  
Quadratic .068 9.834 2 268 .000 2.557 .485 -.049 
 
Cubic .069 6.573 3 267 .000 2.362 .770 -.174 .017 
Compound .064 18.402 1 269 .000 2.730 1.087 
  
Power .071 20.663 1 269 .000 2.860 .188 
  
S .071 20.663 1 269 .000 1.359 -.335 
  
Growth .064 18.402 1 269 .000 1.004 .084 
  
Exponential .064 18.402 1 269 .000 2.730 .084 
  
Logistic .064 18.402 1 269 .000 .366 .920 
  
The independent variable is IG. 
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Multicollinearity 
No issues 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
IG .802 1.247 
PI .554 1.804 
AI .531 1.884 
SA .687 1.457 
a. Dependent Variable: QA 
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6- SEM INITIAL MODEL: 
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Result: Three highlighted regressions shows non-significant  
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
PI <--- IG .405 .066 6.093 ***  
AI <--- PI .509 .059 8.642 ***  
SA <--- AI .359 .064 5.601 ***  
SA <--- PI .063 .059 1.067 .286  
SA <--- IG .117 .049 2.367 .018  
QA <--- SA .568 .079 7.146 ***  
QA <--- AI .128 .071 1.803 .071  
QA <--- IG .011 .053 .204 .838  
QA <--- PI .050 .063 .787 .431  
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 87 689.461 441 .000 1.563 
Saturated model 528 .000 0   
Independence model 32 7538.630 496 .000 15.199 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .030 .868 .842 .725 
Saturated model .000 1.000   
Independence model .259 .181 .128 .170 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .909 .897 .965 .960 .965 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .889 .808 .858 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
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NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 248.461 181.158 323.700 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 7042.630 6764.960 7326.724 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 2.554 .920 .671 1.199 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 27.921 26.084 25.055 27.136 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .046 .039 .052 .861 
Independence model .229 .225 .234 .000 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 863.461 887.688 1176.845 1263.845 
Saturated model 1056.000 1203.038 2957.919 3485.919 
Independence model 7602.630 7611.542 7717.898 7749.898 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 3.198 2.949 3.477 3.288 
Saturated model 3.911 3.911 3.911 4.456 
Independence model 28.158 27.129 29.210 28.191 
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7- FINAL SEM 
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Result: 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
PI <--- IG .406 .066 6.104 ***  
AI <--- PI .512 .059 8.694 ***  
SA <--- AI .396 .055 7.229 ***  
SA <--- IG .136 .046 2.940 .003  
QA <--- SA .578 .078 7.367 ***  
QA <--- AI .160 .062 2.594 .009  
All Significant 
 Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 84 691.547 444 .000 1.558 
Saturated model 528 .000 0   
Independence model 32 7538.630 496 .000 15.199 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .032 .868 .843 .730 
Saturated model .000 1.000   
Independence model .259 .181 .128 .170 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .908 .898 .965 .961 .965 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .895 .813 .864 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
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NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 247.547 180.201 322.833 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 7042.630 6764.960 7326.724 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 2.561 .917 .667 1.196 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 27.921 26.084 25.055 27.136 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .045 .039 .052 .875 
Independence model .229 .225 .234 .000 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 859.547 882.940 1162.125 1246.125 
Saturated model 1056.000 1203.038 2957.919 3485.919 
Independence model 7602.630 7611.542 7717.898 7749.898 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 3.184 2.934 3.462 3.270 
Saturated model 3.911 3.911 3.911 4.456 
Independence model 28.158 27.129 29.210 28.191 
HOELTER 
Model HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 193 202 
Independence model 20 21 
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APPENDIX 3: LAB EXPERIMENT SESSION: 
1- EXPERIMENT ENVIRONMENT: 
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2- EXPERIMENT ENVIRONMENTS TOOLS 
 
2.1 Coded Tools: 
a- Data capture tool: 
 
 
 
b- Intelligence reporting tool: 
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c- Server-side intelligence reporting system code: 
 
 
 
d- Kill-chain automated script: 
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2.2- Networking and Alerts Tools 
a- IDS:
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b- Network monitoring tools: 
 
 
 
c- Gateway and routing tools: 
 
 
 
Active Cyber Situational Awareness Theory and practice Ahmed Al-Shamisi 
  P a g e  | 265 
2.3- Experiment Exercises  
 
a. Exercise one: (controlled group) 
 
You have been asked to monitor an ADX system and make sure you keep it safe 
and available. The tools you have for this exercise are: 
 
1. Network Activities Monitoring Solution. 
2. Intrusion Detection System. 
3. Live intrusion Detection Alert System. 
4. Firewall. 
 
During the exercise, participants should speak out loud whenever they come to a 
point of perception or decisions. As explained in the induction session, 
participants will be asked to fill out answers to several questions during the 
experiment, and they may ask at any point to freeze the exercise.  
 
b. Exercise Two: (experimental group) 
 
You have been asked to monitor an ADX system and make sure you keep it safe 
and available. The tools you have for this exercise are: 
 
1- Network Activities Monitoring Solution. 
2- Intrusion Detection System. 
3- Live intrusion Detection Alert System. 
4- Firewall. 
5- Intelligence Reporting System. 
6- Blue Team (with offensive capabilities). 
7- Deception Services. 
 
During the exercise, participants should speak loud whenever they come to a 
point of perception or decisions. Also, participants may use deception services to 
buy extra time or to collect intelligence about attackers in a safe and controlled 
environment. Moreover, the Blue Team can provide participants with offensive 
capabilities either to collect intelligence or destroy the enemy. The blue team 
works under participants’ command and accepts the following commands: 
 
1- Deceive and Watch: Channelling attacker into the deception service and 
collecting intelligence. 
2- Reconnaissance: Scanning attacker and trying to find their weaknesses.  
3- Destroy: Clearing the order to eliminate the enemy.  
4- Active Intel: Either through channelling the attacker into deception or by 
utilising offensive action against enemy network to gather intelligence. 
    
As explained in the induction session, participants will be asked to fill out 
answers to several questions during the experiment, and they may ask at any 
point to freeze the exercise. 
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c. ADX System And Network Typology: 
 
1- HTTP server port 80  
2- Database Server port 1433 
3- VPN Server port 1723 
4- Remote Share port 3389 
5- Legacy system share port 445 
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3- LAB SURVEY: 
  
 
 
 
The  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  explore  the  key  factors  associated  with  Cyber  Situational  Awareness  and  evaluate  
the  strength  of  its  association  in  order  to  validate  comprehensive  Active  Cyber  Situational  Awareness  model.    
  
ELIGIBILITY  REQUIREMENTS:  
To  be  eligible  to  take  part  in  this  study  you  must  be  part  of  the  following:  
1-­  IT  Security  
2-­  Network  Security  
3-­  Cyber  Incident  Response  Team  
4-­  Cyber  Defence    
  
TIME  COMMITMENT:  
This  Experiment  should  only  take  about  25  minutes  of  your  time.  Your  answers  will  be  completely  anonymous  unless  
you  decide  to  provide  your  personal  details  
  
PROCEDURE  &  PARTICIPANTS’  RIGHTS:  
The  research  will  be  conducted  through  a  lab  experiment  semi-­structured  survey  where  participation  in  this  study  is  
totally  voluntary.  Participants  have  the  right  to  not  take  part  of  this  experiment  or  withdraw  at  any  time  prior  to  
submitting  the  questionnaire.  The  survey  result  will  be  collected  anonymously  unless  participants  decide  to  provide  
their  personal  detail.  All  data  collected  will  be  kept  confidential  and  used  for  the  purposes  of  this  research  only.  All  
your  personal  data  will  be  kept  secure  and  protected  under  the  Data  Protection  Act  1998,  no  other  entity  will  be  
granted  to  access  this  research  data.  Any  publication  that  may  be  derived  from  this  survey  will  not  include  any  sort  of  
personal  data.  
  
BENEFITS  AND  RISKS:  
There  are  no  known  benefits  or  risks  for  participants  in  this  study  
  
FOR  FURTHER  INFORMATION:  
If  you  have  any  questions  at  any  time  about  the  study,  please  do  not  hesitate  to  contact  Ahmed  Al-­Shamisi  
(ahmed.al-­shamisi@brunel.ac.uk)  
  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
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4- PARTICIPANTS ASSESSMENTS SURVEY  
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